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ABSTRACT
For over three hundred years, including its most recent, “Fordist” phase, 
industrial capitalism has been shaping the organisation of territory, fostering 
urbanisation and the emergence of the great cities and industrial regions. 
Recently, many observers have suggested that Fordism is in crisis and a period 
of transition is underway to a "post-Fordist" economy, the characteristics of 
which are antithetical to those of Fordism.
Though territorial aspects are in many ways at the core of the post-Fordist 
school, particularly the so-called “rise” of the industrial district, regional and 
especially urban factors are not systematically dealt with in the literature.
There is scant empirical evidence of the territorial organisation of the post- 
Fordist productive systems, nor a clear delineation of the logic behind this 
particular structure of territorial organisation.
Drawing on evidence of three case studies of industrial districts in the Third 
Italy, the central thesis put forward is that the pattern of cities and regions that 
has been evolving relatively smoothly since the beginning of the industrial era is 
currently undergoing a dramatic reorganisation, as a result of a new logic of 
post-Fordist capital accumulation. New patterns of uneven development are 
being forged, that are in many ways a reversal of previous and long-standing 
urban and regional evolutionary trends. The role of spatial and territorial 
factors in the evolution of certain forms of post-Fordist organisation of 
production are also explored.
In basic outline, the thesis:
• argues that we are entering a post-Fordist era and industrial districts can be 
marshalled as evidence of this;
• offers explanations as to why these particular territorial systems of 
production emerged in the Third Italy, and how they relate to the logic of
post-Fordist accumulation; and 
• concludes that post-Fordism is associated with a reorganisation of urban 
and regional territory at all geographical scales: regions, urban systems and 
the urban hierarchy, intra-urban and intra-district space.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 19th and 20th centuries we have witnessed a continual process of 
concentration of population and employment in cities and towns. Within a 
relatively brisk period, the countries of Europe, America and elsewhere have 
been transformed from overwhelmingly rural cultures to predominantly urban 
societies within in relatively short period. The primary force driving this 
transformation is industrial capitalism, which has not only reconfigured rural 
nations into city-dwellers, but also produced the metropolis, the Turins, 
Detroits, and Manchesters; the great cities; industrial regions, and a complete 
reorganisation of the internal space of cities.
For most of the current century, patterns of uneven development (of which 
cities are the most extreme example) have been framed by a particular phase of 
industrial capitalism generally referred to as “Fordism”, after the father of mass 
production, Henry Ford. By and large, the Fordist period has continued 
trajectories in industrial organisation, urbanisation and uneven development 
that pre-dated it, but on a more massive scale, creating yet larger cities and 
higher levels of urbanisation.
In recent years, many observers have suggested that Fordism is in crisis and a 
period of transition is underway to a "post-Fordist" economy, the 
characteristics of which are antithetical to those of Fordism. If true, we could 
expect changes in patterns of uneven development - especially in patterns of 
evolution of cities, city-systems and regions.
Though territorial aspects are in many ways at the core of the post-Fordist 
school (the industrial district, the re-emergence of regions, agglomeration 
economies, etc.) regional and especially urban factors are not systematically 
dealt with in the literature. There is scant empirical evidence of the territorial 
organisation of the allegedly post-Fordist productive systems, nor a clear
11
delineation of the logic behind this particular structure of territorial 
organisation.
This thesis addresses this under explored aspect of the debate, aiming to 
address implications of post-Fordist production for the evolution of cities, city- 
systems and regions. At the same time, it explores the role of spatial and 
territorial factors in the evolution of certain forms of post-Fordist organisation 
of production.
Industrial districts are at centre of the current debate, and are often cited as 
prime examples of flexible production complexes and “evidence” of the new 
post-Fordist regime. This thesis presents original research on three productive 
systems in Emilia-Romagna, the post-Fordist region par excellence. An 
essential idea behind the empirical research is that it is important first to 
understand the territorial productive systems in detail, their organisation and 
logic within the wider economic context, in order to better understand their 
relationship with cities and regions. The territorial organisation of three 
production systems from the “Third Italy “ (as the north-east central part of 
Italy in which Emilia-Romagna is located is called) is examined in detail: the 
knitwear district of Carpi, the oleodynamic components district of Modena, and 
the automatic packaging machinery industry of Bologna.
The research addresses questions such as: Are we indeed entering a "post- 
Fordist” era? What are the characteristics of post-Fordism? What are 
industrial districts? How can their territorial organisation of production be 
explained? Are they evidence of post-Fordism? What are the implications for 
the evolution of cities and regions?
The central thesis put forward is that the pattern of cities and regions that has 
been evolving relatively smoothly since the beginning of the industrial era is 
currently undergoing a dramatic reorganisation, as a result of a new logic of
12
post-Fordist capital accumulation. New patterns of uneven development are 
being forged, that are in many ways a reversal of previous and long-standing 
urban and regional evolutionary trends. In basic outline, the thesis:
• argues that we are entering a post-Fordist era and industrial districts can be 
marshalled as evidence of this;
• offers explanations as to why these particular territorial systems of 
production emerged in the Third Italy, and how they relate to the logic of 
post-Fordist accumulation; and
• concludes that post-Fordism is associated with a reorganisation of urban 
and regional territory at all geographical scales: regions, urban systems and 
the urban hierarchy, intra-urban and intra-district space.
The thesis is organised in three parts. Part I sets the research in the broader 
context of the current debate. Chapter One presents a summation of the 
existing literature on the subject, while Chapter Two draws out the relevant 
themes and issues.
Part II presents the case study evidence, beginning with a description of the 
evolution and characteristics of industry, cities and territorial patterns in Emilia 
Romagna. Each of the three case studies is presented in turn: Chapter Four 
presents the Carpi knitwear district, Chapter Five the Modena oleodynamic 
components district, and Chapter Six the automatic packaging machinery 
district of Bologna. Each chapter examines the industry setting, the territorial 
organisation of production, and presents a synthesis which addresses why each 
of these particular territorial organisational structures evolved in the manner 
they did.
Part III draws the literature and case study evidence together to return to the 
broader issues of post-Fordism and uneven development. Chapter Seven 
addresses the existence and characteristics of post-Fordism, and suggests a 
generalised explanation of the emergence of the industrial districts within the
13
broader context of the logic of post-Fordism. The thesis concludes by drawing 
specific implications of post-Fordism for cities and regions.
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PARTI
THE POST>FORDIST DEBATE
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CHAPTER O N E
PRODUCTION, FLEXIBILITY, LOCALISATION
I. PHASES OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND THE EYOLUTION OF TERRITORY
Industrial capitalism is the driving force which has shaped the evolution of 
territorial patterns of uneven development for the last four centuries. The most 
extreme example of uneven development is the city - and indeed the evolution 
of cities, the urban system, and regions is clearly and inextricably tied to the 
evolution of industrial capitalism. In 1899, Adna Weber noted that while the 
U.S. in 1790 had the same total population as Australia in 1891, the former's 
population was 3 percent urbanised and the latter's 33 percent urbanised. 
Industrial capitalism also created the modem metropolis, as is evident in the 
19th century growth in population of Liverpool from 82,000 to 518,000; of 
Manchester from 90,000 to 703,000; of Chicago from 0 to over one million 
(Weber, 1899). As Weber remarked, "That the most remarkable social 
phenomenon of the present century is the concentration of population in cities 
is a common observation..." and "..the tendency towards concentration or 
agglomeration is all but universal in the Western world" (1899: 1).
Industrial capitalism has indeed brought about massive transformation in the 
economy, social life, and the built environment. But the evolution of industry 
and with it, cities and regions, has not been a smooth, linear process. Distinct 
phases of industrial capitalism have been identified, each with its own attendant 
pattern of urbanisation and regionalisation. The most recent of these is the 
“Fordist” period, said to have begun around 1900.
Since about 1970 however, the advanced industrial economies have universally 
found themselves in a period of economic and social upheaval. Many 
phenomena are cited as indications of this transition, but of particular interest 
here is the re-emergence in many advanced industrial nations of the industrial 
district: a localised, specialised, flexible production complex.
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Many observers have interpreted events of the last two decades as a period of 
transition to a "post-Fordist" phase of capitalism. Based on the history of the 
last four centuries, if it is indeed true that we are entering a new phase of 
industrial capitalist accumulation, we can expect transformations in the 
evolution of cities, regions, and patterns of uneven development in general.
This thesis attempts to determine the broad outlines of a post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation, and extract its major implications for cities and regions, defining 
the mechanisms through which such territorial transformations might occur.
This chapter provides a necessarily brief review of the main literature 
surrounding the emergence of localised, flexible production complexes.
Section 2 looks at the historical relationship between industrialisation and 
urbanisation, up to and including the Fordist period. This will allow us to 
determine the main characteristics of the urban/regional system and its linkages 
with industrial capitalism to 1970. Section 3 examines the current literature 
dealing with the alleged transition to a post-Fordist economy, with a view to 
determining the major characteristics of the new regime and the degree to 
which there is consensus on this issue. Section 4 examines how the literature 
deals with the relationships between post-Fordism on the one hand, and cities, 
regions and uneven development on the other.
2. INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND URBANISATION
It is almost a truism to say that the last 400 or so years of urbanism have been 
shaped by the emergence and evolution of capitalism, .first in its mercantile 
forms, and later, by industrial capitalism (see for example Mumford, 1961; 
Weber, 1899; Gordon, 1978; Pred, 1977). Mercantile capitalism is associated 
with the expansion of large cities such as London, Paris or Amsterdam, as well 
as a wave of new city foundings that launched the "urban revolution" (Storper 
and Walker, 1989).
Industrial capitalism is primarily associated with a transformation in the modes
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of production, and a shift from agriculture to manufacturing industries. While 
of course the functioning of capitalism also requires distribution of goods to 
markets and transport of inputs to factories, and the railroad undoubtedly 
played a major role in the industrial revolution, it is the process of production 
that primarily underpins the economy. However, other approaches to the 
evolution of the urban system have taken distribution and retail market areas as 
a basis for explaining patterns of urbanisation. Probably the most influential of 
these is central place theory.
As defined by Christaller (1935) and subsequently refined by Losch (1944), 
central place theory aims to explain a hierarchical urban system based on the 
minimum market size thresholds needed to supply certain goods or services. 
Basic goods and services require lower market thresholds, and can therefore be 
supplied in smaller urban centres, and there will be many such centres. More 
specialised goods, however, require larger markets in order to make them 
economically viable, and these are therefore supplied only in larger urban areas, 
of which there are relatively few. As Pred (1977) points out, the Christallerian 
urban system is one of hierarchy and dominance: the largest urban unit must be 
completely self-reliant, there can be no large-city interdependence, and there 
can be no larger city acquisition of goods or services from smaller cities. The 
central place system exhibits a pattern of even distribution of urban centres 
over space (albeit centres of different sizes) - in a regular pattern. Such an 
approach can only apply in places where industrial production does not figure 
into the economy. Indeed many of the examples provided are in flat, 
agricultural areas, such as Wisconsin (Brush, 1953), Iowa (Berry et. al., 1962) 
or Snohomish County, Washington, U.S.A. (Berry and Garrison, 1958).
Within the period of industrial capitalism, which, depending on definitions, is 
identified as covering various portions of the period beginning in the mid 16th 
century, various phases have been identified. Each phase is associated with 
particular organisational structures and geographical patterns. Perrons (1981),
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for example, identifies four major periods of capitalist production, 
differentiated on the basis of the labour process: manufacture, machinofacture, 
scientific management and Fordism, and neo-Fordism. Each phase is seen as 
representing an increasing division of labour, both functionally and spatially, 
and a particular spatial pattern.
Rural Manufacture
In the period of manufacture, from the mid 16th century to the early 18th 
century, workers were collected into workshops where they could be 
supervised, the work day controlled, and the work process fragmented into 
specific tasks, although craft skills were still required. In Britain, 
manufacturing operations were widely dispersed throughout the countryside, 
largely to avoid guild restrictions and high labour costs which prevailed in the 
cities, and to have ready access to water power. Much work continued to be 
done in the home (Perrons, 1981).
Machinofacture: the urban wave
The key element of the period of machinofacture, from the early 18th century 
until the early 20th century, was the introduction of machinery and alternative 
sources of power into the production process. The division of labour proceeds, 
eliminating the need for craft skills and allowing the use of women and children 
as labourers. Surplus value was raised by increasing the amount of the working 
day devoted to productive activity (i.e. decreasing the "porosity" of the work 
day), increasing the length of the working day, and increasing productivity 
through changes in the labour process and applications of machinery (Perrons, 
1981). Productivity gains were also dependent upon access to a wider market 
and raw materials through infrastructure improvements, such as the railway.
Machinofacture was therefore associated with the demise of rural areas as the 
primary locations for industry, and the concentration of manufacturing in urban 
locations, where alternative forms of cheap labour were to be found. In short,
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this was the period of factory mass production and rapid urbanisation, in which 
urbanisation proceeded at rates much higher than population growth, in Britain, 
America, and elsewhere. In Britain, pre-machinofacture forms of production, 
generally in rural areas were rendered obsolete (Perrons, 1981).
In the United States, industrialization proceeded concurrently with initial 
settlement and immigration. The northeast was the industrial heartland, where 
industrialization was fully underway by 1850, but the wave of industrialization 
continued westward during the second half of the 19th century (Storper and 
Walker, 1989). In the US, this period saw the evolution of the Manufacturing 
Belt and the rise of large urban centres such as Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Indianapolis, etc. (Scott, 1988a).
During the period 1850 to 1870, some argue that while industrialisation 
decisively led to urbanisation, that both smaller and larger urban centres grew 
as a result, that "there was no significant correlation between rate of 
employment increase and initial population rank-size", and larger cities were 
not growing at faster rates (Gordon, 1978, p.39). The "rank-size rule" 
suggests that the population of any city multiplied by its rank in terms of size, 
will yield the population of the urban system's largest city. The tenth biggest 
city will therefore be one-tenth the size of the largest city, the second biggest 
city one-half the largest city's population, and so on. In these two decades, 
while New York, Chicago and Cleveland grew rapidly, so too did Jersey City, 
Worcester or Dayton.
A turning point seems to have occurred around 1870, when manufacturing 
began to concentrate in the largest urban centres: New York, Chicago and 
Philadelphia, where the rate of manufacturing employment increase was 
substantially higher than that of smaller urban centres (Gordon, 1978). This is 
what Weber (1899) called the period of growth of the "great cities". He 
attributes the centralization of industry to transportation improvements, which
21
had the effect of cheapening raw materials relative to other inputs (labour, 
etc.), and increasing the importance of "non-natural" advantages for production 
(e.g. labour). For "finer manufactures", nearness to consumers becomes the 
dominant factor, which suggests locations in the largest cities.
This centralization in the largest urban centres is confirmed by Pred (1977), 
who notes than in 1860, 10 major cities accounted for 24.1% of U.S. 
manufacturing, while in 1890, they accounted for 38.1%. Like Weber, he 
attributes large city growth during the latter half of the 19th century and early 
20th century to the "spatial lengthening" of industrial production through 
improved transportation, but suggests that this was synonymous with increased 
minimum optimal scales of operation, or the raising of thresholds of production 
beyond the reach of smaller cities.
The centralization of industry in large urban centres had commensurate impacts 
on the smaller towns and villages, which had previously been the locus of a 
significant amount of manufacturing activity. As the scale of production 
increased with the size of the market, small manufacturing establishments were 
replaced by the larger, urban factories. By the end of the 19th century, this 
development was hailed as the "doom of the small town" (Weber, 1899). The 
factory system was seen as destroying family industry in the farm houses, 
diminishing the number of "agriculturalists", destroying industries in the 
handicraft stages (such as milling or shoemaking) and removing population 
from the villages (Weber, 1899).
Even by the turn of the century, however, Weber was predicting that 
centralization had reached its limit. In the last decade of the 19th century, he 
observed "A reaction toward decentralization began when manufactures 
located their mills in the suburbs of large cities in order to escape the high city 
rents and still avail themselves of the city's superior shipping facilities" (1899, 
1961 ed., p. 202). And indeed, in the large urban centres, a trend toward
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suburbanisation from the central cities was subsequently confirmed to have 
begun around the turn of the century (Gordon, 1978).
Fordist Cities
Though correct in his assertion of the suburbanisation of industry, Weber had, 
in 1899, failed to anticipate Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford. Taylor's 
approach to industrial production focused on the control and supervision of 
work, with the objective of transferring all decision-making to management. 
Taylorism therefore aimed to ensure a rigid distinction and spatial separation 
between control and execution (Perrons, 1981). Meanwhile, Henry Ford had 
conceived of the assembly line as a means of recombining the fragmented 
production process. Surplus value was therefore raised both by decreasing the 
porosity of the working day, and by changes to the labour process. These 
approaches allowed larger firms to increase their competitive superiority and 
market position, and furthered the tendency toward industrial concentration 
(Perrons, 1981).
In the U.S., the continued trend towards industrial concentration and the rapid 
development of a market for consumer durables fostered the multi-divisional 
company, with a separation between control and execution functions, as early 
as the 1920s. The spatial separation of control from execution functions, as 
well as the new importance of marketing activities to ensure mass markets, 
gave rise to the growth of office-based activities, which replaced industry in the 
central city locations, with industry continuing to suburbanise (Perrons, 1981).
The Fordist period, extending from about 1900 to 1970, was the period that 
saw the emergence of urban centres in which large-scale industry founded on 
Fordist principles was located, the most obvious example being Detroit, but 
also Los Angeles, Dallas or Seattle in the U.S.. In the early part of the period, 
the industrial core centred around the automobile complex of Detroit and the 
machine tool centre of Chicago, though the intervening region also included
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steel mills along the Great Lakes and household appliance assembly throughout 
the area (Storper and Walker, 1989). Other industrial centres included New 
York City, Niagara, New York and Philadelphia (chemicals); Boston, the 
Hudson Valley, and Pittsburgh (electrical equipment); and oil, movies and 
aircraft industries in Southern California. In the period of "high Fordism" 
(1940-1975), the Chicago-Detroit region continued to dominate, but new 
centres emerged in the oil industry (Houston); the aircraft industry (Pacific 
Northwest; and defence, aerospace and television took root in Southern 
California (Storper and Walker, 1989).
The New International Division of Labour
The 1960s also mark a key turning point for adherents of the "new international 
division of labour" theory. According to this view, beginning around 1960, the 
division of labour and separation of conception and execution functions that 
were characteristic of Fordism were extended to a trans-national scale. The 
term refers to the manner in which "continuing industrial concentration is 
associated with an increasing extension of the division of labour within the firm 
over international boundaries" Perrons (1981: 85). The increasing 
fragmentation of work and the simultaneous deskilling and "hyper 
qualification" of the labour force are seen as giving rise to a spatial process in 
which the elite and organizational functions are concentrated in the new office 
complexes of world cities such as New York, London, Paris or Tokyo, and the 
decentralization of basic manufacturing, operational functions and manual tasks 
are located in peripheral regions (e.g. Ireland) (Perrons, 1981). Divisional 
offices, mid-level engineering, advertising and other similar services are located 
in secondary cities (Storper and Walker, 1989).
Within the region, spatial patterns of the multi-national enterprise are seen to 
differ from traditional industry, as Perrons shows in the case of Ireland. 
Traditionally, industrial location was characterised by the formation of large 
industrial conurbations, because of a need for proximity to functionally related
24
activities and access to infrastructure, services and labour. For the multi­
national, however, these needs are fulfilled within the corporation and thus 
"corporate integration supersedes geographical integration", while 
infrastructure supply has been generalised throughout most territory and skilled 
labour is less a concern with routinized production (Perrons, 1981). There is 
therefore a bias for such industry to locate outside of traditional urban 
locations.
In Italy, the internationalisation of production is seen as heralding the end of an 
era in which urban areas and production systems coincided with one another. 
For example, in the 1960s, the automobile industry was largely contained 
within Turin. Capital accumulation was seen to depend upon agglomeration 
and urbanisation economies, and production systems "grew with the large 
cities" (Dematteis, 1988). The 1970s, however, ushered in a period of non- 
metropolitan growth and counter-urbanisation, following two decades of 
intensive largest-city expansion in Italy. These urban trends are linked to the 
reorganisation of large companies and the decentralisation of production 
(Dematteis, 1988).
Urbanization since 1970
All of the advanced industrial economies have recently undergone radical 
changes in patterns of urban growth, development, and decline. Change is still 
underway and there is considerable ongoing debate about the nature of the 
industrial transformation and its urban implications. For example, de­
industrialisation has hit particularly hard in the older industries generally 
situated in inner city locations, resulting in the "de-industrialisation of the city" 
(Fothergill et al, 1988). Where industry has relocated or new industries have 
emerged, they have tended to be drawn to suburban locations. This trend has 
been felt across industrialised cities, from Buffalo to Liverpool, leading to 
severe inner city blight and social problems.
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In the U.S., while many of the large manufacturing belt cities continued to 
flourish until the 1960s as centres of heavy industry, most recent growth has 
taken place outside this area altogether, in the "Sunbelt" (Scott, 1988b). The 
new centres of industrial production include Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, 
Orange County, Phoenix, San Diego, Santa Clara County, etc. At the scale of 
the city-system, an inverse relationship has been noted between growth rates 
and urban size. In a reversal of 19th and early 20th century patterns, smaller 
centres began to grow more rapidly than larger cities.
Hall and Hay (1980) have summarized the post-war patterns of evolution in the 
American urban system as consisting of the following movements:
• downwards, i.e. through the urban hierarchy from larger to smaller urban 
systems;
• outwards, i.e. within metropolitan areas from cores to rings, and from 
metropolitan to non-metropolitan areas (from urban to rural);
• across, i.e. from older industrialized and urbanised regions to newly 
industrializing and urbanising regions.
Along with others, they suggest that these patterns, which emerged around 
1970, represent a "clean break" with patterns of urbanisation established and 
underway since the Industrial Revolution. In particular, they note a reversal of 
rural to urban migration and a new pattern of "counter-urbanisation" (Hall and 
Hay, 1980; Dematteis, 1988; Scott, 1988a).
In Europe, post-war urban patterns do not lend themselves so easily to a simple 
characterization. At least until 1970, there was no evidence of a tendency to 
deconcentration, as in the U.S. case. Non-metropolitan areas were static in 
terms of population, while concentration continued in metropolitan centres in 
the 1950s, and then in the metropolitan rings in the 1960s (Hall and Hay,
1980). In the early 1970s, the urban cores accounted for less growth, while the 
metropolitan rings accounted for an increasing share, but overall, the trend still 
consisted of a movement from non-metropolitan areas to metropolitan centres
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(Hall and Hay, 1980).
However, Hall and Hay (1980) report distinct variations within Europe. In 
Southern Europe, including Spain, Portugal and Italy, there was a strong trend 
toward concentration in major metropolitan centres, which accounted for over 
80% of growth in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, however, the rate of 
core growth slowed while that of the metropolitan rings accelerated.
In the U.S., post-war urban growth patterns can be interpreted as conforming 
to the "rule" that as industrialisation proceeds, urban hierarchies evolve from a 
primate distribution, in which a single large centre dominates, to a rank-size 
distribution, through the acceleration of growth in smaller centres (Hall and 
Hay, 1980). Though it is difficult to see'a rationale for the supremacy of a 
rank-size distribution relationship, an urban system which adheres to the rank 
size rule has been viewed as an indication of a mature, developed urban system. 
In Europe, however, in countries which had a primate structure, the tendency 
was actually to reinforce primacy rather than evolve away from it, with 
vigorous growth exhibited at the top of the urban hierarchy. This was 
especially the case in Italy.
Despite considerable empirical evidence to the contrary, it has also been 
suggested that the rank order relationships of an urban system are stable over 
time, that is, that "rank stability" prevails (Pred, 1977). Pred maintains that the 
dynamics of urban growth and development are such that it is very difficult to 
overcome initial advantage and growth feedback mechanisms: "One of the 
most striking features of the historical growth and development of city-systems 
in those countries which can currently be classified as economically advanced is 
the long-term stability in the national or regional population rank of their 
leading metropolitan complexes" (1977: 33).
Hall and Hay (1980) attempt to explain the European patterns by postulating
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that as industrialisation and urbanisation proceed, there are predictable, 
sequential phases: centralisation during loss; absolute centralisation, relative 
centralisation, relative decentralisation, absolute decentralisation, and 
decentralisation during loss. Variations within Europe are explained by the fact 
that each country is at a different stage in the process of industrialisation- 
urbanisation. This is seen to explain why Great Britain, for example, which 
industrialised and urbanised early, was by the 1960s decentralising in a way 
similar to patterns observed in the U.S., compared to a relatively late- 
industrialising country like Italy, in which concentration was still observed.
Others see a flattening of the urban hierarchy associated with increasing 
internationalisation and the local productive specialisation that that brings 
about, and an erosion of an urban centre’s control over its hinterland 
(Dematteis, 1988). According to this view, the new urban hierarchy consists 
fundamentally of only two levels: a metropolitan one and a regional one. "The 
former is directly inserted within the network of international exchanges 
(capital, goods, information, etc.) and by means of this function it controls and 
orientates the second level and with it also the rest of the territory" (Dematteis,
1988). Geographical urban hierarchies such as Christaller's are replaced with 
the interconnected network of nodes, each with its particular specialisation.
Clearly the evolution of urban and regional systems is strongly tied with the 
history of industrial capitalism. Up until the end of the Fordist period, 
industrialization engendered a process of ongoing urbanization. Around 1970, 
urban patterns began to shift in ways not previously seen during industrial 
capitalism. Perhaps not coincidentally, for many observers 1970 marks the 
beginning of a transition to a new regime of accumulation and a new economic 
order. The nature of that order and its implications for the evolution of urban 
and regional systems, as outlined in the literature, are the subject of the 
remaining sections of this chapter.
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3. POST-FORDIST INDUSTRIALISATION: ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND 
APPROACHES
The current body of literature on post-Fordist industrialisation began (at least 
in the Italian case) with the emergence of several competing concepts aimed at 
describing some unique productive-territorial changes being observed in parts 
of that country. These were primarily "stand-alone" concepts, not generally 
situated within the context of any broader theory of productive organisation or 
economic development.
"Rural industrialization" consisted of a close-knit network of small, specialised 
enterprises, whose inter-relations are characterised by cooperation (Fua, 
1985). Garofoli (1983) proposes a three-part typology, including: areas of 
productive specialisation (small firms in the same sector, horizontally 
organised, and in competition); local productive systems (the same, only more 
extensive inter-relations amongst firms); and system-areas. The typology 
essentially represents a continuum from low to high levels of self-sufficiency, 
with the system-area representing the most advanced case, in which industries 
produce their own technology and production equipment. A "constellation" 
also consists of small-firm networks, but here the approach emphasises the 
process by which individual firms within such formations grow, based on inter- 
firm linkages, or investment decisions (Lorenzoni, 1987).
A main point of contention amongst these various viewpoints was whether the 
observed organisation of production was the result of endogenous factors (a 
territory characterised by small and medium-sized towns, a local 
entrepreneurial tradition) or exogenous factors, particularly productive 
decentralisation of large firms in the northwestern Italian industrial triangle.
With generally only slight differences in emphasis amongst them (e.g. rural 
industrialisation obviously emphasising the distribution of industry in rural 
locations), these concepts generally all share common core characteristics,
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including: specialised small firms within the same sector, many inter-firm 
linkages, and geographical concentration. As we will see below, there is 
considerable overlap with the industrial district idea. Based on Alfred 
Marshall's work of 100 or so years ago, the industrial district began to gain a 
growing following among current observers (including Bellandi, Becattini, 
Brusco, Sforzi, Piore, Sabel, Scott, and others), and was subsequently drawn 
into a broader theory, which now interpreted the industrial district as primary 
evidence that a transition to a new, post-Fordist regime of accumulation was 
underway. In this section, the evolution of the literature will be traced in a 
necessarily brief way.
Industrial Districts
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Alfred Marshall sought to explain the 
existence of several specialised areas of production based on firms of moderate 
size, such as the Lancashire cotton industry and the production of cutlery in 
Sheffield. The existence of these apparently successful areas contravened 
then-orthodox economic thinking, which tied competitiveness to efficiency to 
increasing internal scale economies and rising firm size.
These industrial districts were characterized by the production of a single 
product, and a division of labour amongst many specialised, small, and 
localised firms. Marshall draws on the concept of economies of scale to 
explain the possibility that small firms could be as efficient as large factories, by 
differentiating between "internal economies" (regarding internal organisation of 
factories, management, etc.) and "external economies", which relate to factors 
outside the firm and the "general development of the industry", "...those very 
important external economies which can often be secured by the concentration 
of many small businesses of a similar character in particular localities: or, as is 
commonly said, by the localisation of industry" (Marshall, 1890)1.
Principles of Economics. 8th Edition (first edition, 1890); London: Macmillan, 1986, quoted in Bellandi, 1989.
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The specialisation of each firm in a particular phase of production, and use of 
specialised machinery and labour which is associated with this, is linked to the 
attainment of efficiency and economies of scale, and is seen as a source of 
external economies - each firm and the industry as a whole benefit from the 
individual firm's specialisation. Such external economies are not however, 
linked at this point specifically to geographical concentration, that is, they are 
not seen as "agglomeration” economies.
This latter force does come into effect, however, with respect to transaction, 
skill, and innovation (Bellandi, 1989). The costs of transactions, for example, 
for non-standardized or customised inputs are reduced by agglomeration 
because personal contact is required, and the market relationships are infused 
with 'personal knowledge and trust'. Agglomeration and spatial proximity are 
also related to the acquisition of skills in the district, where specialised 
knowledge and learning become part of the local culture, and to the 
intercommunication of ideas that underlies innovation. These often more 
esoteric qualities of the industrial district, associated with agglomeration, are 
what Marshall has referred to as "industrial atmosphere".
In the late 1970s, the work of Alfred Marshall on industrial districts was 
resuscitated by a group of academics at the University of Florence2, who were 
looking for ways to explain the recent success in their region of localised, 
specialised systems of production. In summarising the debate that had evolved 
in Italy around organizational forms and economic development, Brusco 
proposed three models to describe these systems, based on their internal 
organisation and connections with the market (Brusco and Sabel, 1981;
Brusco, 1982; Brusco, 1986; Brusco, 1990).
The first, or "traditional artisan" model is characterised by small firms, a 
traditional or mature product geared to a primarily local market, and low levels
Including Becattini, Brusco, Bellandi, Sforzi, sometimes called the “ Florentine School” .
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of productivity attributable to labour intensive techniques and low levels of 
technology. Relations between firms were described as being governed by 
imperfect competition. The discussion of the traditional artisan was linked to 
a wider debate surrounding a dualism between the North and South of Italy, in 
which the small, "inefficient" artisan firms of the south were juxtaposed against 
the large, capital-intensive, high-wage, efficient firms of the North.
The second model, the "dependent subcontractor" (also referred to by Brusco 
as "the small firm in the shadow of the large") is said to have its origins in a 
process of productive decentralisation, which occurred in the late 1960s in 
Italy. Brusco stresses the "serious rigidities" associated with the increasing 
dominance of trade unions in the large firms in bringing this about, combined 
with expanding and diversifying markets. External sources of labour and 
supply afforded a level of flexibility not achievable within the firms. The large 
firms vertically disintegrated, and activities once performed internally in large 
factories were now undertaken externally, by sub-contractors, often located 
nearby. The sub-contractors provided intermediate goods to the large firms, 
which had the direct relations with the final market, which was generally 
national or international. Levels of technology and wages were a subject of 
debate, but Brusco (1990) argues that in the small firms, skill levels were 
frequently high, and a low wage was not necessarily a link to low productivity, 
but could co-exist with high productivity.
Inter-firm relations were characterised by "fierce competition" amongst firms 
involved the same phase of production. Between the small firms and the large, 
there was a monopsonistic situation, in which the large firms were able to 
squeeze and lower the small firms' profits. The discussion of the dependent 
sub-contractor was situated within the context of labour market segmentation, 
and a dualism between the large firms, viewed as high wage, with advanced 
technology, and the small firms, seen more as sweat shops. Brusco challenged 
this view, asserting that conditions were comparable between the two sectors,
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with the latter providing quantitative flexibility but not (except of course for the 
differences in the average size of firms) being of a qualitatively different nature 
(Brusco, 1982).
In his third model, "the small firm in the industrial district", Brusco returns to 
Marshallian concepts. In later work, he refined this model into "Mark I" and 
"Mark II" districts, with the former being characterized by market forces, while 
the latter type involve significant government intervention (Brusco, 1990). The 
Mark I industrial districts emerged in the mid-1970s, and were said to be 
comprised of: firms which produce the final product and have the direct 
relation with the final market; "stage-firms", which are each involved in a single 
phase of production; and other firms which may not strictly be classified in a 
particular productive sector but which nevertheless work solely in that sector 
(e.g. consultants, transportation). Thus "A district comprises a cluster of firms 
producing something which is homogeneous in one way or another, positioning 
themselves differently on the market. Thus the district could be defined as 
being a cluster, plus a peculiar relationship amongst firms." (1990, p. 14)
After Piore and Sabel (1984), the innovative capacity of industrial districts is 
stressed. Levels of technology and average wages are comparable to the large 
firms, but there are wider wage differentials. Relations between firms are 
characterised by both competition and cooperation: "horizontal" competition 
between firms providing the same product or in the same phase of production; 
but "vertical" cooperation between firms involved in different phases of 
production.
In the Mark II industrial district, the impacts of new markets and technologies 
in the early 1980s for both large and small firms are viewed as having required 
significant government intervention. The innovative capacity of the district is 
seen primarily as a social process, reliant upon informal interaction. Brusco 
contends that this can be problematic in the adoption of new technologies,
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because there is no single power (as in a large, integrated firm) to dictate their 
introduction. This point is somewhat difficult to understand, given that each 
firm has an head, and if, as he claims, firms are independent, it is not clear why 
the introduction of new technology might be impeded. Indeed, as we shall see 
below, other observers argue the opposite view. In any event, Brusco claims 
that local governments have reacted by providing "real services" to firms, 
including information on markets, import specifications, assistance with 
international marketing and contract bidding, etc.
Brusco's industrial district models, particularly his Mark II model, draw on 
elaborations of Marshall's ideas in the Third Italy context drawn by Becattini, 
who was probably the first to make these connections. Becattini's main 
contribution is his attempt to integrate the economic rationale for industrial 
districts with its social context. Thus he sees the industrial district as "... a 
socio-territorial entity which is characterised by the active presence of both a 
community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically 
bounded area. In the district, unlike in other environments, such as 
manufacturing towns, community and firms tend to merge." (1990: 38). It is 
a localised division of labour, in which firms become rooted in the territory, and 
cannot be conceptualized independently of its historical development.
Industrial districts are characterized by self-containment, a progressive division 
of labour, and a permanent network of links between suppliers, clients and the 
district itself. In terms of the local community, Becattini emphasises the 
importance of a relatively homogeneous system of values and views, and a 
parallel system of institutions and rules, including the market, family, church, 
local authorities, unions, or political parties.
Characteristics particular to industrial districts are attributed to social 
foundations. For example, a high degree of mobility amongst labour within a 
district, particularly of skilled labour, is attributed to a social stigma attached to
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\one under-utilising one's potential, and also explains the high productivity of 
the district. This finding of the place where each worker can maximise his or 
her potential is said to be characteristic of an industrial district, and not possible 
in an isolated firm or in "urban anonymity".
Further, because markets in the district operate on information other than just 
price, which in turn relies on shared values and institutions, districts are 
constrained to those areas of communities which adhere to those value 
systems. Indeed, Becattini contends that prices in intermediate markets 
between firms in the district are socially mediated at the local level. They are 
not only determined by the national and international market, but also local 
demand and supply conditions, and the "stabilising influence of local 
institutions", forming a hybrid between administered and market prices. 
Although, like Brusco, Becattini maintains that relations within industrial 
districts are characterised both by cooperation and competition, Becattini's 
description of the integration of these two characteristics within the same price 
mechanism, and its origins in the socio-cultural system actually permeating the 
market mechanism, is significantly different. And unlike Brusco, Becattini sees 
the social foundations of the district as being an aid to the introduction of new 
technologies, because it too is a social process in which all members of the 
district actively participate, and understand the tradeoffs.
Becattini compares the inherent adaptiveness of the industrial district to that of 
a large, integrated firm. While control over any phase in the large firm is 
hindered by "company sclerosis", the "social machine of the district... seems to 
be built for the purpose of that control" (1990: 46). This gets at the heart of 
Becattini's explanation for the industrial district: that unlike large companies 
(which are presumably defined by corporate culture and fundamental divisions 
between the owners of the means of production and the worker) industrial 
districts are first and foremost social entities, defined (geographically and 
functionally) by local community, shared values, institutions, and history.
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Presumably, the geographical boundaries of these shared values and community 
are limited, which accounts for the localisation of production. Becattini seems 
almost to be saying that the social forces of community can overcome the 
inherent contradictions and conflicts that exist within the capitalist system of 
production, and that that is the key to their success.
On the opposite site of the coin, Becattini's position implies that large 
corporations cannot hope to achieve a sense of shared values or purpose, and 
this impedes their competitiveness. It also suggests that industrial districts 
would not be possible in culturally or socially diverse areas, such as large cities 
and metropolises. Aside from the fact that many would fervently attack the 
implication that larger urban areas and metropolises are lacking in community, 
shared values, institutions, etc., as we will see below, there are indeed 
examples of industrial districts within larger cities.
In his comments, Becattini hints that industrial districts are a superior form of 
economic organisation compared to the large, integrated firm. But neither he 
nor any other of the Italian observers extended their conceptualisation - either 
to situate it within the context of a larger context of economic theory, nor to 
suggest that the new industrial districts were an indication that a much more 
significant economic transformation was underway. This task was left to 
American commentators, in particular Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, who 
noticed the work of the Italians and interpreted industrial districts as a sign of a 
new kind of economic organisation, "flexible specialisation".
Flexible Specialisation
There is a high degree of overlap between the industrial district model of the 
neo-Marshallians, particularly Brusco's "small firm in the industrial district", 
and the "flexible specialisation" model proposed by Piore and Sabel in their 
seminal work, The Second Industrial Divide. While the latter shares 
specialisation as an essential characteristic with the industrial district model, for
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Piore and Sabel the emphasis is placed upon flexibility as the defining, central
concept of the emerging territorial modes of production, along with innovation.
Flexible specialisation is defined as
...a strategy of permanent innovation: accommodation to ceaseless 
change, rather than an effort to control it. This strategy is based on 
flexible - multi-use - equipment; skilled workers; and the creation, 
through politics of an industrial community that restricts the forms of 
competition to those favouring innovation. For these reasons, the 
spread of flexible specialisation amounts to a revival of craft forms of 
production that were emarginated at the first industrial divide (1984:
17).
Piore and Sahel's post-Fordist, 'high-tech cottage industry' is organised spatially 
into districts, each of which specialises in the production of a range of related 
goods. Firms are very small, most employing from five to fifty skilled workers 
and advanced, multi-purpose production machinery, such as numerically- 
controlled equipment. Sabel argues that "Where Fordism calls for the 
separation of conception from execution, the substitution of unskilled for 
skilled labour and special-purpose for universal machines....specialisation often 
demands the reverse: collaboration between designers and skilled producers to 
make a variety of goods with general-purpose machines (1982: 194). Their 
work deals with examples of systems of production based on flexible 
specialisation are to be found not only in Italy, but also in Germany, or 
Austria.
The emergence of flexible specialisation is situated in the much broader context 
of post-1973 global crises, including the oil shocks of the 1970s, the move to 
floating exchange rates, and the simultaneous occurrence of high interest rates, 
world recession and debt crisis. However, these crises only made obvious the 
latent limitations that were already being reached by the mass production- 
based economy, including the saturation of consumer goods markets, and 
entrance of new sources of competition from the newly-industrialising 
countries, and fragmenting demand (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
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A nation's ability to successfully adopt the flexible specialisation model was 
seen to depend upon that country's prior degree of adaptation to mass 
production. Italy was a relatively late entrant into mass production, and 
unification did not occur until 1961. Political instability and labour militance 
peaked in the 1960s, when two rounds of widespread strikes (in 1962/62 and 
1968/70), culminating in the autunno caldo (the "hot autumn") resulted in 
labour rigidity and wage rates that were too high for an industrial structure that 
had derived its international competitiveness from cheap labour.
The intractability of the labour force problem under mass production is seen by 
Piore and Sabel (1984) as being the singlemost important factor in the 
decentralisation of production that subsequently occurred. They claim that 
decentralised producers were able to gain direct access to markets through 
devising their own products, and through a collective approach to production. 
Collectivism took the form of industry associations, for example, which 
provided services to small firms and allowed them to compete with larger ones. 
A high level of technological sophistication also provided the small firms a 
competitive capacity.
In Italy's case, four further "coincident factors" are viewed as central to the 
success of the small firms: the extended family provided economic stability to 
households through a diversity of sources of income; a view of artisan work as 
a distinct type of economic activity; the existence of merchant traditions 
connecting the provinces to world markets; and the willingness of municipal 
and regional governments to provide necessary infrastructure (Piore and Sabel, 
1984).
Sabel (1988) has suggested a that large firms too are moving toward flexibility, 
signalling a convergence of the small firm and large firm models and a growing 
ubiquity for the industrial district model,"... an emergent corporate form which 
blurs distinctions between large and small firms is spreading ~  in different
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variants and speeds in every country ~  through the advanced capitalist world' 
(1988: 8).
Piore and Sahel's work thus made some sweeping claims and optimistic 
interpretations. While many of their specific observations can and have been 
called into question (e.g. the empowerment of the worker, the degree and 
importance of flexibility), their work served to move the issues into an 
international context, provoking a large scale debate, and it situated events 
such as the emergence of industrial districts within the context of a broader 
theory of long term, structural economic change. The Regulation School also 
position the issue within the context of a broader, comprehensive theory, 
though unlike Piore and Sabel's liberal economic approach, theirs is a Marxist- 
based theory of capitalist accumulation.
The Regulation School
The Regulation School has evolved since the mid-1970s, and has been 
concerned with the analysis of macroeconomic crisis generation, and the 
dynamics of the relations between capital, labour, and the state in a crisis 
environment (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989). More recently, it has turned 
its attention to the analysis of regional and urban geography of economic 
restructuring under contemporary capitalism. While the approaches outlined in 
this chapter so far have sought to explain a single geographical/productive 
phenomenon, or a group of such phenomena seen as sharing similar 
characteristics, the Regulation School offers a broader theoretical approach, 
encompassing the nature of the capitalist system, and a variety of spatial 
patterns of industrial organisation, of which the industrial district is just one.
A central concept which underpins the regulationist approach is the "regime of 
accumulation", described as "the ensemble of regularities that assure a general 
and relatively coherent progression of the accumulation process. This coherent 
whole absorbs or temporarily delays the distortions and disequilibria that are
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bom out of the accumulation process itself'3. These regularities include:
• a certain type of relationship between the forces of production and the 
relations of production;
• a certain type of sector and market organization;
• a certain distribution of produced value to assure the dynamic reproduction
of different classes and social groups, and hence, the mode of production;
• a certain composition of social demand;
• a certain social and spatial division of labour (Moulaert and Swyngedouw,
1989).
Essential to the existence of any regime of accumulation is a particular set of 
norms, habits, laws, regulating networks, social processes, etc., or "forms of 
adjustment of expectations and contradictory behaviours of individual agents 
with the collective principles of the regime of accumulation", referred to as the 
"mode of regulation". It is through an examination of the regime of 
accumulation and the mode of regulation that sectoral organization and spatial 
differentiation are understood.
Capitalism is seen as a succession of regimes of accumulation and modes of 
regulation. According to the regulationists, the post-war Fordist regime of 
accumulation was characterised by rapid and intensive accumulation, based on 
mass production and a mode of regulation consisting of regulatory state 
intervention in the form of the welfare state. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
this regime began to reach its limits, due to overaccumulation, falling rates of 
profit, and market saturation, and a crisis ensued. The collapse of this regime of 
accumulation was temporarily forestalled by a spatial expansion into new 
markets, and a "lower variable capital composition", resulting in a core­
periphery relationship within and between nations, and spatially segmented 
labour markets (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989).
3
Boyer,R., 1986, La Theoril de la Regulation: Une Analyse Critique. Paris: La Dkouverte, quoted in Moulaert and 
Swyngedouw, 1989.
Though as we will see in Chapter Two, the Regulation School’s analysis of the 
broader economic situation and allegations of crisis do not go unchallenged, 
their interpretation of events leads them to proclaim the emergence of a new 
phase of capitalist development in the 1980s. Like the flexible 
specialisationists, the regulationists see the defining characteristic of this new 
regime as flexibility - in products, the production process, and the regulation 
of labour relations. The flexible accumulation regime has brought a re­
organisation of the production process, including the vertical disintegration of 
production, new forms of economic partnership, and different forms of spatial 
proximity; a flexible labour force; and new forms of regulation. Table 1.1 
compares the 'regularities' of the Fordist regime with that of a flexible regime of 
accumulation, as outlined by Moulaert and Swyngedouw (1989). These can be 
viewed as the "necessary" elements of the respective regimes. This is probably 
the most definitive and complete description available of Fordist vs. flexible 
regimes, and will be employed in the final chapter as a basis for evaluating 
whether the production systems presented in the case studies can be considered 
consistent with a flexible, post-Fordist regime.
According to the regulationist approach, each regime of accumulation
"produces a specific mode of spatial organisation profoundly different from the
previous one" and "creates new or renewed forms of spatial crisis" (Moulaert
and Swyngedouw, 1989: 330). Cities and regions in which old regimes
predominated are subject to economic decline and adaptation, while new
territories are "invaded" under the new regime, creating
... new socio-economic landscapes and a new division of labour... The 
characteristics and dynamics of newly emerging modes of organization 
of production, forms of technological change, and social differentiation 
provide us with insight into the specific pattern of uneven 
development." (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989: 330-331).
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Table 1.1
Characteristics of Fordist and Flexible Regimes of Accumulation
FORDIST FLEXIBLE
The production process
Based on economies of scale Based on economies of scope
Mass production of homogeneous products Small batch production
Uniformity and Standardization Flexible and small batch production of a variety of 
product types (flexible automation)
Large buffer stocks and inventory No stocks
Testing quality ex-post (rejects errors detected late) Quality control part of the production process 
(immediate detection of errors)
Rejects are concealed in buffer stocks Immediate rejection of defective parts
Loss of production time because of long set-up times, 
defective parts, inventory bottlenecks, etc.
Reduction of lost time; diminishing the porosity of 
the working day1
Resource driven Demand driven
Vertical (and in some cases) horizontal integration (Quasi-vertical) integration or vertical disintegration
Cost reductions through wage control Leaming-by-doing integrated in long-term planning
Labour
Single task performance by worker Multiple tasks
Payment per rate (on job-design criteria) Personal payment (detailed bonus system)
Bureaucratic labour hierarchy Individualized promotion schemes
High degree of job specialization Elimination of job demarcation
No or only little on-the-job- training Continuous on-the-job training
Vertical labour organization and internal labour- 
market segmentation (primary and secondary labour- 
market circuits)
More horizontal labour organisation for core workers
No learning experience On-the-job training
Emphasis on diminishing worker's responsibility 
(disciplining through pacing by assembly line)
Emphasis on worker's coresponsibility (disciplining 
through cooptation of core workers)
No job security High employment security for core workers; no job 
security and poor labour conditions for temporary 
workers; increasing informal activities
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FORDIST FLEXIBLE
Space
Functional spatial hierarchy Spatial clustering and agglomeration
Spatial division of labour Spatial integration or division of labour
Homogenisation of regional labour markets (spatially 
segmented labour markets)
Labour-market diversification (in-place labour 
market segmentation)
Worldwide sourcing of components and sub­
contractors
Spatial proximity of vertically quasi-integrated firms; 
formation of regionally specialised 'filieres'
Organisation of the space of consumption through 
suburbanisation
Organisation of the space of consumption through 
urban centralisation (the spectacle city)
Selective sociospatial integration Polarisation of the social use of urban space
State
Collective bargaining Division or individualisation; local or firm-based 
negotiations
Socialisation of welfare (the welfare state) Privatisation of collective needs and social security; 
the 'soupkitchen state'
International stability through multilateral 
agreements
International destabilisation; increased geopolitical 
tensions
Centralisation Decentralisation and sharpened interregional or 
intercity conflicts
The 'subsidy* state or city The 'entrepreneurial' state or city
Indirect intervention in markets through income and 
price policies
Extensive direct state intervention in markets 
through procurement
National regional policies 'Territorial' regional policies (third-party form)
Firm-financed research and development State-financed research and development
Industry-led innovation State-led innovation
Ideology
Mass consumption of consumer durables: the 
consumption society
Individualised consumption: "yuppie culture"
Modernism Postmodernism
Totality or structural reform Specificity or adaptation
Socialisation Individualisation: the "spectacle society"
Source: Moulaert cmd Swyngedouw, 1989
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Some regulationists see a regime of flexible accumulation bringing about new 
forms of organisation of production, in turn leading to new spatial 
relationships, particularly spatial clustering and spatial integration, in a quite 
deterministic manner (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989). Why must an new 
regime apparently necessarily result in the invasion of new regions and 
abandonment of the existing?
Others, however, see a more complex process unfolding under a flexible 
regime, in which a range of production organisation options are available to 
solve the problems of the Fordist crisis, based on approaches to the 
organization of labour, the wage relation, and the territorial organisation of 
production (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988). Different approaches to each of 
these variables can be combined in various ways, leading to three predominant 
models, each which has a distinct potential spatial manifestation: I) a 
"specialised productive area" (territorial disintegration, scattered branch plants 
or agglomerations of sub-contractors around branch plants, e.g. Southeast 
Asia); ii) a "local productive system" (vertical disintegration with a tendency 
toward vertical quasi-integration, combined with territorial concentration, e.g. 
Silicon Valley); and iii) a "system area" (vertical quasi-integration in the form 
of territorially integrated, diversified, multisectoral network of specialised and 
principal firms, e.g. the Third Italy). These categories of production complex 
refer specifically back to Garofoli’s (1983) typology. The major point the 
authors are trying to communicate is that though new production technologies 
induce specialised firms and vertical quasi-integration, these may be realised 
either through territorial integration &r disintegration.
The "California School”
The so-called "California School" (after Storper, 1994), which includes Scott, 
Storper, and Christopherson, combines the Regulation School framework of 
regimes of accumulation, modes of regulation and institutions with other 
elements, particularly an emphasis on transactions costs. The first building
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block of their approach has to do with certain basic abstract tendencies, based 
on types of production system and internal and external economies, the 
primary source of the latter being the social division of labour (Scott, 1988a). 
Under specifiable conditions, fragmentation of production processes into 
specialised independent or quasi-independent units creates external economies. 
These economies are realised through transactions, which rearticulate 
producers into an interdependent complex (Scott and Storper, 1992).
However, "...because these transactions are spatially-extensive, they incur 
multi-dimensional costs that are positively related to distance... " (Scott and 
Storper, 1992: 266), hence producers will be induced to converge locationally 
around their own collective centre of gravity in order to minimise transaction 
costs. Where convergence or agglomeration occurs, "the external economies 
engendered by the social division of labour are transformed into and consumed 
as agglomeration economies" (Scott and Storper, 1992: 266). A necessary 
concomitant outcome of this will be the emergence of a local labour market 
(since workers are needed for production) and this acts to further consolidate 
local agglomeration economies.
The specific geographical patterns exhibited may vary, however, depending in 
part on the characteristics of the transactions. For example, in industrial 
complexes with much inter-linkage, there will be a tendency to converge 
around a territorial centre of gravity, especially where linkages are small in 
scale, unstandardised with respect to substance, rapidly changing in space and 
time, and therefore incur high unit costs. Producers without these 
characteristics (e.g. with standardized transactions) will be more spatially 
independent (Scott and Storper, 1992). It is interesting that a distinction is not 
made between transactions involving goods and transactions purely involving 
information, as this will surely have important implications with respect to the 
potential for spatial clustering. Neither are the potential impacts of 
telecommunications technology addressed. What would the spatial outcome
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be, for example, if all industrial districts were to be "wired" through a 
metropolitan area network, as is currently being put in place on an experimental 
basis in the textile district of Prato?
Having established these abstract "tendencies" with respect to the conditions 
under which extemalisation of functions and agglomeration will occur, they are 
then situated within "technological-institutional systems" - the second major 
element of the California School approach. A technological-institutional 
system can be, for example, Taylorist or Fordist, but generally will consist of 
the following elements:
• given states of technology
• labour markets and industrial relations
• managerial cultures or norms
• market structures and forms of competition
• regulatory institutions at all levels (Scott and Storper, 1992).
These elements of a technological-institutional system have much in common 
with the 'regularities' of a regime of accumulation proposed by the Regulation 
School.
A great deal of emphasis is placed upon the last element, the role of institutions 
and culture: "...capitalist relations of production and exchange are always 
embedded in wider sets of social relations and cultural norms" (Scott and 
Storper, 1992: 16). There are essential ways in which institutions play roles in 
many of the key dimensions of "place-bound" economic and social life, that is, 
in inter-firm transactions, technological innovation, the local labour market, the 
organisation of the community etc. Inter-firm transactions are seen as relying 
on trust, which is supported by institutional infrastructures or social practice.
Scott argues further that flexible production complexes are most likely to be 
successful when they secure for themselves appropriate frameworks of 
institutional and collective order, and are superior to market-only based
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systems of interaction:
"...flexible production agglomerations that approximate to this free 
market vision are liable to suboptimal outcomes, both because of their 
susceptibility to severe internal market failure and because there are 
superior benefits to be obtained by judicious mixes of competition and 
cooperation" (1992a: 223).
Instead of the typical Williamsonian tradeoff in which transactions can take 
place either through the market mechanism, or through non-market 
mechanisms of negotiation and command in hierarchical organisations, Scott 
argues for a third option, that combines varying degrees of centralized and 
decentralized decision-making, e.g. joint ventures, strategic alliances, 
multidivisional corporations, etc. The emergence of non-market forms of 
economic coordination are attributed to the fact that assumptions of perfect 
competition (e.g. full information) are never realized in reality, and that under 
certain conditions, competitive markets can subvert the possibility of efficient 
outcomes (e.g. when investment in R&D is avoided because it is not 
appropriable). "Without some governance structure that transcends market 
relations, problems like these will undermine general productivity levels"
(Scott, 1992a: 225). A "collective order" is required, and "it is precisely those 
agglomerations that manage to build for themselves a complementary fabric of 
institutional and cultural infrastructures that are most viable and dynamic" 
(Scott, 1992a: 226).
In emphasising non-market forms of interactions, Scott seems to undermine his 
own explanation that geographical clustering is determined by the market- 
dictated force of transactions costs minimization. It is also not clear how a 
transactions costs explanation co-exists with changing market conditions, 
which tend to emphasize non-price factors of competition.
Untraded Interdependencies, Learning, and Evolutionary Economics
As we have seen above, Scott's analysis suggests market uncertainties invoke 
vertical disintegration, which generates inter-firm transactions and a new
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importance of the cost of those transactions, which firms then seek to 
minimize, leading to geographical agglomeration as a cost-reduction strategy 
(e.g. Scott, 1988b). A major critique that emerged to this approach was that 
as it relied on transactions to explain agglomeration, it could not explain 
instances that had been identified in which agglomeration takes place without 
significant, direct, local, inter-firm transactions (Storper, 1994). While Scott 
has identified different types of district (craft-intensive, hi-tech, services4), each 
with its own locational tendencies, he does not differentiate in terms of the 
dynamics which bring about the different spatial outcomes for each type.
The fact of agglomeration without transaction leads Storper, on the other hand, 
to begin to differentiate not only between different types of district but also the 
different types of processes inherent in each. In particular, he focuses on the 
"technologically dynamic production complexes", or what he calls "technology 
districts", which include sectors in which product technology is highly 
uncertain, (e.g. high tech districts) or in dynamic versions of a sector 
characterized by relatively mature technologies. Examples cited include semi­
conductors in Silicon Valley, clothing and ceramic tiles in Italy, motion 
pictures in Hollywood, machine tools in Germany, and financial services in 
London (Storper, 1992). His "technology district" therefore cuts across Scott's 
and includes examples from each of Scott's types.
In these areas, the conditions of uncertainty are different than simple market 
fluctuations for two reasons:
1) a given transactional relationship is "more dense", because it involves 
knowledge that is not only not yet standardized, but often not yet 
developed; e.g. user-producer relations involve interpretation;
2) the whole transactional structure may be subject to redefinition as new 
types of products and new firms enter the structure, and as whole new 
"channels, nodes and codes of transaction" are defined - where "rapid
4 Described in more detail in Section 4 of this chapter.
learning" is taking place, transactional structure is likely to involve constant 
negotiation, renegotiation, dependence on achieved understanding (Storper, 
1993).
But even these input/output transactions do not adequately explain 
agglomeration, particularly in cases where some agglomerations exhibit 
relatively low levels of direct inter-firm transactions. Such agglomerations are 
instead characterised by non-market or "untraded interdependencies". The 
basis for both complex transactional structures and "untraded 
interdependencies" is to be found in behaviours which promote "technological 
learning" as the key to innovation. It is the rules, institutions, and practices of 
key collective agents that enable local technological learning.
Here Storper draws on key elements of "evolutionary economics" recently 
developed by Dosi, Arthur, Soete and others5. His argument centres on 
"spillovers" and unfolds along the following lines (Storper, 1994).
Technologies develop along "pathways" or "trajectories", which describe 
choice sets that are totally different from those of orthodox economics. It is 
impossible to predict outcomes from a starting point, even where actors are 
rational, and there is no single optimal outcome. Instead, outcomes are "path- 
dependent".
The particular path of evolution of a technology is the result of inter-dependent 
choices (e.g. between users and producers). They are therefore not always 
based on efficiency. Pathways are also the result of technological spillovers in 
the economy, with respect to knowledge or common practice, such that 
"...technological excellence comes in packages or ensembles. Since such 
excellence relies frequently on knowledge or practices which are not fully
Referred to in Storper, 1994 and including: Dosi, G., K. Pavitt and L  Soete, 1990, The Economics of Technical Change and 
International Trade. New York: NYU Press; Arthur, W.B., 1989, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by 
Historical Events", The Economic lournal. 99: 116-131; Arthur, W.B., 1990, "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy", Scientific American. 
Februrary, 9-99.
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codifiable, the particular firms who master it are tied into various kinds of 
networks with other firms, both through formal exchanges and through 
untraded interdependencies" (Storper, 1994: 16). Untraded interdependencies 
include labour markets, public institutions, and locally or nationally-derived 
rules of action, customs, conventions, common languages, understandings and 
values aimed at developing, communicating and interpreting knowledge.
Technological learning is the key to reproduction of the technology district, 
and depends on conventions. These "practices, routines, agreements and their 
associated informal or institutional forms", define a local 'world of production' 
that underpins technological performance (Storper, 1993: 435). Conventions 
are said to have dimensions of identity and participation (Storper, 1993). 
Technological learning takes place on the basis of socially constituted 
identities. In the case of northeast-central Italy, the identities of key skill 
groups is associated with certain important institutions, e.g. the CNA 
(Confederazione Nazionale d'Artigianato), while participation involves "voice 
and community loyalty", and the "civic culture" which has been identified as 
being so strong in Emilia-Romagna (e.g. by Putnam, 1993).
The untraded interdependencies and uncertainty inherent in emerging industries 
are a primary source of spatial clustering of firms. While "input/output" or 
direct network relations can involve some degree of territorialisation, "...in all 
the cases where organizations cluster together in territorial space in order to 
travel along a technological trajectory, they have interdependencies which are 
untraded" (Storper, 1994: 18). Technological spillovers and their untraded 
interdependencies would be territorialised under certain conditions, notably 
where the technological trajectories are particularly open, with wide margins of 
potential variation.
In essence, Storper replaces a static, equilibrium neo-classical economics-based 
theoretical setting (transaction cost minimisation) with a dynamic, path-
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dependent setting in which the usual economic rules do not apply, and untraded 
interdependencies necessarily draw firms together into localised 
agglomerations.
Though the intent seems to be that technology districts are a particular sub-set 
of industrial districts, distinguished primarily by the evolving nature of the 
industry, the centrality of technological learning and the untraded 
interdependencies that both support it and cause clustering even in the absence 
of direct inter-firm relations, it is difficult to see how these characteristics differ 
fundamentally from other districts. Lack of standardization of knowledge, 
changing district structures, the need for ongoing learning, could be said to be 
characteristic of all districts. Indeed, aside from the fact that untraded 
interdependencies are primarily mobilized in aid of technological learning, the 
concept seems otherwise to be very similar to the Regulationists' "mode of 
social regulation", and of course has many commonalities with agglomeration 
economies. It also harks back to Becattini's (1987, 1990) emphasis on local 
culture, values and institutions, bringing the evolution of approaches to 
industrial districts full circle.
Clusters
While individual elements of the preceding body of theory tend to continuously 
build upon and incorporate approaches that have gone before, Porter's (1990) 
recent work attacks the issue from a distinct perspective, that of the 
competitiveness of nations. Porter is somewhat outside the post-Fordist debate 
described to this point. He proposes that the dynamics of national economic 
growth are such that an economy will evolve into groupings or clusters of 
industries, linked through vertical (buyer/supplier) or horizontal (customers, 
technology, etc.) relationships.
Clusters are primarily economic groupings; they frequently but do not 
necessarily represent geographical clusters. Clustering emerges directly out of
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the determinants of national advantage, which include four interrelating factors 
that make up what Porter calls the national "diamond". The points of the 
diamond consist of factor conditions (e.g. labour, natural resources, 
infrastructure etc.); demand conditions (e.g. overall demand levels, structure, 
sophistication); related and supporting industries (i.e. degree of competitive 
advantage in supplier or related industries); and firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry (e.g. firm management, degree of competition amongst national firms). 
Italy, for example, is seen as having clusters in textiles and apparel, household 
products, (appliances, lighting, furniture, ceramics, etc.), food and beverages, 
and personal products (jewelry, eyeglass frames, etc.). Italian industry is 
further characterised by the small to medium size of its export firms, and 
patterns of geographic concentration.
The growth of clusters takes place when a foothold in one industry helps to 
create other ones, engendering mutually supporting, multi-directional 
relationships, linkages and information flows. The most fertile conditions for 
growth occur when "exchange and flow of information about needs, 
techniques, and technology among buyers, suppliers and related industries... 
occurs at the same time that active rivalry is maintained in each separate 
industry "(1990: 152). Such information flow is a key to competitiveness, and 
can occur through many channels, including personal relationships due to 
schooling, community ties, trade associations or norms of behaviour. "Goal 
convergence" can also be achieved through family or quasi-family ties between 
firms, common ownership or interlocking directors.
Though clusters are economic entities first, Porter does emphasize the 
important role that geographical concentration can play in heightening the 
positive aspects and mutual reinforcement of the elements of competitive 
advantage. Geographic concentration can:
• provide a concentration of rivals, customers, and suppliers that promotes 
efficiency and specialization;
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• improve innovation through contacts between buyers, suppliers, 
institutions, etc.;
• present sophisticated local customers who offer possibilities for 
transmitting information about needs and technologies;
• increase the speed of information flow and the rate of innovation diffusion, 
while simultaneously constraining the flow of such information outside the 
cluster.
Though Porter acknowledges the important role of geography, he defines the 
spatial dimension in a rather limited fashion, exclusively in terms of localised 
clustering of firms within a district. He does not acknowledge other critical 
spatial relationships, such as the geographical location of production centres 
vis-a-vis markets, or the role of existing patterns of local uneven development 
in production and competitiveness.
Porter then suggests that the process of national economic development also 
takes place in stages, according to the four elements of the competitive 
diamond: the factor-driven stage; investment driven; innovation driven; and 
wealth-driven. In each stage, different elements of the diamond come into play, 
in different ways, and each nation develops along its own path, not necessarily 
in the linear order of the model. Italy in the post-war period, for example, is 
seen to have skipped from the factor-driven stage to the innovation-driven 
stage, missing the investment-driven phase altogether.
While many of the other approaches have emphasized the unique aspects of 
cooperation observed in industrial districts, as does Porter, he also reasserts 
the role of competition. As will be seen in the case studies that follow, 
competition does indeed play a decisive role in pushing the social division of 
labour and specialisation to their extremes, as well as motivating a process of 
adoption of new technology, amongst other things. Coming at it as he does 
from a business perspective, Porter also points out the role of ownership and 
inter-firm managerial structures, a factor which the case studies will show to
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be important in determining elements of competitiveness, spatial patterns, but 
which tends to be under-emphasised in the other literature.
4. POST-FORDIST TERRITORY
If indeed, as much of the literature presented above suggests, we are in 
transition to a new economic order (be it a regime of accumulation or a 
technological-institutional system), and given the strong historical linkages 
between industrialisation and urban and regional systems, what does the post- 
Fordist era imply for the way cities, regions and territory are shaped? What 
role do territory, cities and regions play in the broader economic regime?
All of the approaches reviewed above refer to geographical clustering as a 
recurring element of post-Fordist systems of production, while some go further 
to attempt to explain localisation and its role in the functioning of the district. 
Yet while being central to so many of the arguments heralding the emergence 
of new, flexible ways of organising production and indeed central to the notion 
of the evolution of an entirely new regime of accumulation, the details of the 
spatial patterns are relatively unexplored in the literature, as are links to the 
role of the urban system and implications for its evolution. Terms are used 
loosely, leading to confusion. While there is a fair amount of theoretical 
conjecture, in the form of extrapolations from the other elements of the post- 
Fordist regime to spatial patterns, there is little actual empirical evidence. Are 
regions and industrial districts the same thing? Where are industrial districts 
located? How spatially constrained are they? What is their internal spatial 
arrangement? How do they relate to the urban system? Is it primarily an urban 
or rural phenomenon, large city or town? Does it suggest increased patterns of 
uneven development? At what scale? The literature which addresses these 
questions, such as it is, is summarised in this section.
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Post-Fordism and cities
Marshall remarked upon the relationship between industrial districts and cities 
and towns, a link which has been lost to a large degree in subsequent research. 
He noted, for example, that productive specialisation of districts often became 
the productive specialisation of towns and cities, and that even within a 
particular industry, individual towns would be specialised in a particular sub­
phase or intermediate product: "As is well known, fine spinning, coarse
spinning, and weaving are localized separately Blackburn, Preston, Nelson
and Oldham are centres of four different classes of staple cotton cloth, and so 
on"6. And he remarked upon the "...mutual influences of the localization of 
industry, the growth of towns and habits of town life, and the development of 
machinery"7.
Indeed, there are many historical examples of metropolitan industrial districts: 
guns and jewelry in Birmingham (Wise, 1949); metal and engineering in the 
west Midlands (Florence, 1948); footwear in East London (Hall, 1962); or the 
Midtown garment district in New York City (Haig, 1927). Though some 
post-Fordists call these historical examples into evidence (e.g. Scott, 1988a) 
(and indeed some are still in existence today), with respect to post-Fordist 
industrial districts, on the other hand, the literature generally takes the position 
that flexible, localised production complexes tend to be a decidedly non- 
metropolitan phenomenon, systematically avoiding the major metropolitan 
centres of Italy, Germany, the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations.
The usual examples cited are the Third Italy, Baden-Wurtemmberg in 
Germany, or Silicon Valley.
Though flexible production complexes are seen as marking a "definite spatial 
reagglomeration of production..", they occur only "...in selected areas, often 
based on the active evasion of labour pools that exist in areas previously
6 From Industry and Trade, first published in 1919, quoted in Bellandi, (1989).
7 Principles..., quoted in Bellandi (1989).
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dominated by Fordist modes of production" (Scott, 1988b: 14). Scott 
concludes that the locational tendencies of flexible production systems differ 
markedly from those of Fordist mass production and are "...almost always 
some distance - socially or geographically - from the major foci of Fordist 
industrialization" (Scott, 1988b: 14). This may explain the alleged anti­
metropolitan bias of post-Fordist industrial districts as, as we saw earlier, the 
cities and especially the large cities were both the creation of and the locus of 
industrial capitalism, particularly in the machinofacture and Fordist phases.
Despite his claim that flexible production complexes are averse to Fordist 
space, it is ironically Scott's work in particular that cites metropolitan examples 
of industrial districts (1988b). He notes, for example, that high-level business 
services are found clustered in the central business districts of major 
metropolitan cities, as well as selected suburban communities. Clothing, 
furniture or jewellery is produced in the inner cities of metropolitan regions 
such as New York, Los Angeles or Paris, where new waves of immigration 
provide a ready source of low-wage labour. Other flexible, design-intensive 
craft industries occur in the towns of peripheral regions, such as the Third Italy, 
as well as in parts of Denmark, France or Portugal, or southern Germany.
High technology clusters, on the other hand, have materialised in a wide range 
of locations, including a number of suburban sites next to major cities in older 
and new industrial areas in North America and Western Europe (Silicon Valley, 
Route 128, M4 Corridor). Also included amongst high tech locations are small 
to medium-sized towns, in peripheral areas, such as Boulder, Colorado; Austin, 
Texas; Cambridge, England; Grenoble or Montpellier, France.
Scott (1988b) asserts that these examples fall into a three-part typology of 
districts, that is, I) flexible, design intensive craft industries, ii) high-tech 
clusters, and iii) business services. Each type of agglomeration is identified 
with its own geographical pattern, as suggested in the above examples, though
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the type-specific dynamic that underlies these spatial tendencies is not 
elaborated.
Others have claimed that flexible production complexes are appearing within 
major urban centres, such as the motion picture industry in Los Angeles, where 
it has been equated with a "reagglomeration in urban centres" (Christopherson 
and Storper, 1986). Citing this and other examples, particularly in Los 
Angeles, but also New York City, Japan and France, claims have been made 
that the new industrial districts represent a new model of "urban re- 
industrialization"(Sabel, 1988).8
Others see implications for the structure of the urban hierarchy. The 
emergence and growth of the high-tech industrial clusters are seen as turning 
the traditional urban hierarchy "upside down", as smaller and more remote 
cities attract an increasing share of economic activity (Moulaert and 
Swyngedouw, 1989). Producer services (banking, real estate, insurance, 
business services, etc.) are also seen as transforming and replacing the 
"traditional" urban hierarchy, which was based on manufacturing industry and 
social/personal services (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989). Typically 
producer services are associated with the growth of the largest cities, so it is 
difficult to see how this acts to turn the urban hierarchy "upside down".
The pattern of districts
Aside from its relationship to the urban system, what do post-Fordist forms of 
production imply for larger scale patterns of development? What regions are 
likely to be the sites of post-Fordist production, and what regions might enter 
into a period of decline? How, if at all, is the relationship between regions 
affected? The current literature only begins to address these questions. The 
response is often answered in very general terms: post-Fordist production 
generates new spatial patterns, including spatial clustering and agglomeration,
Quoting E.W. Soja and A.J. Scott, "Los Angeles: Capital of the Late Twentieth Century", Society and Space. September, 1986.
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and spatial integration of all functions in the production process. This latter is 
seen as putting a premium on the spatial integration of functional firm levels 
(greater autonomy for branches) and/or an improved transactional structure 
(Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989).
Somewhat more specifically (and has already been noted), spatial clustering 
and agglomeration ( in the form of recently emerging localised, flexible 
production complexes) have generally been observed to occur outside of the 
areas of Fordist accumulation (e.g. the U.S. rustbelt) and in "new industrial 
spaces" where there was no prior tradition of industrialisation (e.g. the U.S. 
sunbelt) (Scott, 1988a; Storper and Walker, 1989). These agglomerations 
have also emerged in areas formerly considered the "periphery" - that is, 
outside the Italian northwestern "industrial triangle" formed by Milan, Turin 
and Genoa; and in the northeast-central "Third Italy" (Arcangeli et.al., 1980).
For Italy, Sforzi (1989, 1990) has employed a multivariate analysis to identify 
61 Marshallian industrial districts. His analysis generally supported the view 
that such districts were to be found outside the areas of Fordist accumulation; 
all the districts were located in or near the "Third Italy", as can bee seen in 
Figure 1.1. The pattern of districts also clearly avoids the major urban centres, 
systematically locating outside these areas, as Figure 1.2 shows. However, 
some geographic clusters have been identified in the "Fordist" and metropolitan 
space of the Milan-Turin-Genoa industrial triangle, including a factory 
automation equipment cluster in Turin, and a jewelry cluster in Valenza Po 
(Porter, 1990).
It is interesting to note, however, that the areas that emerged as corresponding 
to the Marshallian definition of industrial districts were almost all in traditional 
industries, including textiles, clothing, footwear, leather goods, tanneries, and 
wooden furniture;
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Figure 1.1
Marshallian Industrial Districts in Italy, 1981
f
Source: Sforzi, 1989
Figure 1.2
Urban Systems in Northern and Central Italy, 1981
Source: Sforzi, 1990
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only a few districts emerged in other industries, such as metal goods, 
mechanical and electrical engineering (Sforzi, 1990). Despite the fact that the 
peripheral spatial pattern corroborates what Scott, for example, predicts for the 
"craft-oriented" production agglomerations, it raises an issue brought forward 
by the critics of the post-Fordist philosophy. That is, given the industrial 
concentration of these Marshallian districts in traditional industries, can they 
be considered to be post-Fordist spaces, or do they in fact precede the period 
of transition to post-Fordism?
The pattern in districts
Again, only a limited amount of empirical work has been devoted to examining 
the actual spatial patterns of industrial districts. The research to date presents a 
conflicting view of spatial patterns within areas of post-Fordist production. 
Three major spatial patterns have been identified at this scale in the literature: 
what could be called a pattern of "even development"; a pattern of 
concentrated development, and a pattern of core-periphery differentiation. The 
evidence in each case is summarised below.
In the limited analysis that has been done at the intra-regional scale, the 
overriding spatial characteristic that has been found in the Third Italy is non- 
concentration, and that non-concentration is cited as an essential element in the 
ability of the productive system to reproduce itself. Stated differently, local 
spatial concentration will lead to the demise of an industrial district.
Some researchers characterised the phenomenon as "diffuse industrialisation" in 
the "peripheral" Third Italy (see, for example: Arcangeli, Borzaga and Goglio, 
1980; Coulet, 1978). Under this model, development in the Third Italy in the 
1960s and 70s was linked to the northwest core, and it is the very lack of 
concentration which allowed the system to be reproduced. The dispersion of 
factories throughout the countryside was seen as a factor which allowed the 
region to maintain the original conditions and structure which attracted
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development. Thus the region was able to avoid problems of infrastructure 
shortage, for example, and the locational concentration of workers which could 
lead to capital-labour confrontations.
A similar pattern is described by Fua as "rural industrialisation", though he 
emphasises endogenous factors and local conditions such as a large supply of 
available labour, and a territory rich in small and medium-sized towns over the 
"push" from the northwest (Fua, 1983). Like Arcangeli et. al., the small scale, 
diffuse organisation of production, and the avoidance of concentration are seen 
as key to the reproducibility of the system, in avoiding upheavals in urban land 
markets and social structures, for example: "..we must avoid a situation in 
which the "area-systems" act as magnets attracting a concentration of 
population and activities, thereby causing congestion within the area and 
abandonment outside it; should this happen, the underlying conditions from 
which the NEC9 model draws its strength would no longer exist" (1985: 363).
Coulet is one of the few to evaluate in detail the spatial aspects of the emerging 
systems of production, and concludes that diffuse production is characterised 
by an absence of concentration of establishments, of development poles, and on 
the other hand a diffusion over the entire regional territory of the workforce 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (Coulet, 1978).
The "Emilian model" of integrated small firms is characterised by "...the 
absence of a large metropolis, around which a structure consisting of large 
companies which decentralize to smaller companies generally develops, and the 
presence instead of a productive micro-structure system" (Bianchi and 
Gualtieri, 1990: 90). The pre-existing pattern of small towns and villages, 
evenly distributed over space, is seen as a factor in bringing about the Emilian 
model of production.
North-east central.
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The absence of concentration and of major urban centres, the almost "even 
development" of production units and employment within productive districts 
and across towns and villages, are reiterated as characteristics of the Emilian 
system of production. This reinforces points made earlier, particularly in the 
Italian literature, that such productive systems would not be possible in larger 
urban contexts or metropolitan areas, in what Becattini (1990), for example, 
describes as "urban anonymity". This idea appears to be put forward on two 
grounds: that a metropolitan context would not permit the social connections 
that are the fundamental basis for the industrial district, and that the a 
concentration of activity within the industrial district will lead to problems such 
as infrastructure shortage that would bring about its demise.
It should be noted that the pattern of "non-concentration" described by Coulet, 
Fua, and Arcangeli et.al., relates to the overall pattern of distribution of 
employment and productive establishments for all manufacturing industries, not 
the pattern within particular industries or of individual industrial districts.
Their evidence suggests that when many specialised, concentrated areas of 
production take place within the same region and overlap with one another, as 
is the case in Emilia-Romagna, that production becomes fairly evenly 
distributed over the region as a whole - that together these clusters ironically 
generate a pattern of even development.
Contrary to this body of evidence, Sforzi's (1990) analysis shows a high degree 
of spatial concentration of individual industries in the Marshallian industrial 
districts he identified. Using a "location quotient" which shows a locality's 
share of national employment in a particular industry in comparison to that 
locality's share of total national employment, he finds high degrees of 
concentration in all the industrial districts, with the exception of metal goods 
and engineering.
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Sforzi also undertakes an analysis to define the boundaries of an industrial 
district, particularly where a district's boundaries may not correspond to those 
of a town, towns or region. Using Prato as an example, he overlays economic 
criteria with social criteria and joumey-to-work patterns to define the 
geographical boundaries of that textile district. He found "...a system of firms 
which is spatially concentrated and industrially specialised and a population 
consistent with it and sharing the same geographical area" (Sforzi, 1990: 156).
The third major spatial pattern in evidence at the local scale is one of core- 
periphery differentiation. A handful of case studies of industrial districts have 
led to claims of spatial differentiation based on technological factors and firm 
size within districts, between their core and periphery. In the New York City 
garment industry, for example, plants are located in the core, while subcontract 
shops are scattered through the fringes of the Greater New York region. A 
localized decentralization of production which occurred between 1946 and 
1956 was attributed to lower labour costs in the suburban areas. 
Decentralization was most pronounced among shops producing lower-quality 
and standardized outputs, and peripheral shops operated on a section-work 
basis (each garment made by deskilled, technically divided labour processes). 
On the other hand, central city shops worked on a "making through" basis, in 
which one operator produces the whole garment. Production in the high 
quality, high fashion segment of the market remains centralised in Midtown 
Manhattan (Scott, 1988a).
In the Tokyo car industry, a three tier supplier system was found, in which the 
tiers corresponded to a stratified set of labour processes, employment 
conditions and wage levels (Scott, 1988a). Labour market fragmentation was 
seen as a factor in this particular productive configuration. Producers are 
arranged throughout the region, not just one sub-area of the metropolis, in a 
pattern of intra-metropolitan nuclei and sub-nuclei.
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Such evidence leads Scott (1988a) to hypothesize a "rough direct correlation 
between such plant characteristics as size and routinization, and distance from 
the core of the city". Large plants performing routine functions locate in the 
periphery, while small shops performing specialised, non-routinized functions 
locate in the core. He goes on to say "If true, this proposition suggests that 
technological or organizational changes in industry up or down the scale of 
plant size and routinization will tend to be associated with decentralization and 
recentralization" (1988a: 90). This last remark is particularly interesting, 
because it hints at the possibility for an urban recentralisation, the urban re- 
industrialization foreshadowed by Sabel (1988), Christopherson and Storper 
(1986). Such a potential would have a remarkable implication for the myriad 
inner cities of the advanced industrial nations that have, since the 1970s been 
devastated by de-industrialisation in a seemingly irreversible downward spiral 
that has for the most part been immune to policy and program attempts at their 
revitalisation.
Based on evidence from Orange County, California in the manufacture of
injection-moulded plastics, circuit-boards and surgical and medical instruments,
Scott further finds a positive relationship between fragmentation of labour
processes and the locational clustering of units of production. But there are
different patterns, associated with firm size. Small plants have an especially
strong tendency to cluster together compared to large plants:
"....any large industrial complex will almost certainly exhibit distinctive 
patterns of internal locational differentiation. These patterns will be 
likely at a minimum to consist of (a) a spatially dominant network of 
small plants in selected central areas of the complex, overlain by (b) a 
more dispersed distribution of large plants, the latter becoming 
dominant in peripheral zones." (1988a: 197)
Others have noted that the new hi-tech complexes tend to be dominated by a 
few core plants, surrounded by a host of dependent sub-contractors and 
suppliers (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989). This pattern is attributed to 
higher unit transactions costs faced by small plants compared to large (i.e.,
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smaller plants do not benefit from bulk transportation rates). Also, small firms 
were seen as more labour-intensive, so there was an inducement to gravitate 
toward the spatial centre of their main areas of labour supply. Large plants 
enjoyed economies of scale as a result of their higher levels of transactional 
activity, thus they were less locationally restrained than small plants. Large 
plants often required larger premises, which suggested lower-cost, peripheral 
locations (Scott, 1988a).
However, as will be shown in the case studies presented in Part II of this thesis, 
this pattern of clustered small firms and dispersed large firms is by no means 
universal. In fact, the case studies will present evidence of exactly the opposite 
pattern. This contradictory evidence is characteristic of the existing empirical 
spatial evidence as a whole. The somewhat scanty body of research is fraught 
with contradictions: are industrial districts a metropolitan or non-metropolitan 
phenomenon? Do districts occur in "Fordist" space or only in "non-Fordist" 
space? These issues will be taken up again in the case study and conclusions 
chapters. In the next chapter, the main themes and debates that appear in the 
literature and relate to these kinds of questions are presented.
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CHAPTER TWO 
T H E M E S  A N D  ISSU ES
I. POST-FORDISM AND ITS CRITICS
Chapter One began by looking briefly at the evolution of industrial capitalism 
up to and including the Fordist era, and how it has been decisively linked to the 
process of urbanisation. Recent developments in the economy and industrial 
organisation were then presented, according to the various schools of thought 
which address this so-called transition to post-Fordism. We then reviewed 
how these approaches deal with the urban, regional and territorial aspects of a 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation.
There is a high degree of concordance amongst the approaches outlined in the 
previous chapter, between the Italians, the flexible specialisationists, the 
regulation school, and the California school. The broad outlines of these 
approaches are the same and each tends to build upon the other10, though there 
are differences in emphasis in explanation (stressing the role of social factors 
and local institutions vs. industrial organisation and transactions costs) and 
minor empirical discrepancies (the degree to which industrial districts support 
the adoption of new technology, or the degree of competition vs. cooperation). 
There is a high degree of consensus that the localised, flexible production 
complex is an important reality and it is evidence of a new, flexible, post- 
Fordist regime of accumulation.
Together, these approaches have been termed by its critics the "new 
orthodoxy" (Amin and Robins, 1990a; 1990b). The opposition to the new 
orthodoxy emanates from virtually a single, Marxist-inspired camp. It fails to 
present an equally coherent, alternative theorisation of developments described 
by the new orthodoxy group as post-Fordism. Instead, it adopts a defensive
10 The exception perhaps is Porter's work, which approaches the issue from the vantage point of the competitiveness and 
evolution of national economies.
67
position of contesting particular points, or denying the existence of a new 
regime and resorting to re-asserting the on-going pertinence and dominance of 
the Fordist regime of mass production (Amin and Robins, 1990a, 1990b).
Seen in this way, the debate is therefore dualistic in nature: the new orthodoxy 
versus its critics. No other approaches have been put forward to challenge 
these two predominant and opposing views.
Nevertheless, the literature raises a number of issues and there are several main 
points of debate. Some of these contested points are empirical in nature (the 
degree to which flexibility is actually exhibited by post-Fordist production 
systems, the degree to which new systems of production are characterised by 
competition or cooperation). However, most of the debate is focused on 
broader, theoretical issues relating to the economic significance of post- 
Fordism. From the perspective that the current thesis adopts, i.e. to understand 
the urban, regional and territorial implications of a post-Fordist regime of 
production in the same way that we understand the urban implications of 
industrial capitalist regimes prior to post-Fordism, a few key themes emerge 
from the literature. We need to know:
• what are the characteristics of post-Fordism and post-Fordist systems of 
production?
• do productive systems with these characteristics represent a qualitatively 
new and distinct phase of capitalist accumulation?
• how can the localised patterns of industrial organisation and concentration 
associated with post-Fordism be explained?
We must address these questions before we can get to the ultimate purpose, 
that is to understand the implications of post-Fordist production for cities and 
regions, and the dynamics that dictate this relationship. This chapter will now 
address each of these issues in turn.
2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-FORDISM
As noted above, there is a general compatibility of views amongst members of
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the 'new orthodoxy' group regarding the characteristics of the new regime of 
accumulation. Though the Italians (Brusco, Becattini, Sforzi, etc.) tend to 
focus only on the industrial district, other schools see the industrial district as 
just one piece of evidence of a broader 'flexibilization' that extends, for 
example, to large firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984), or that includes other potential 
industrial-spatial outcomes (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988.) Below, we recap 
where the literature has arrived at in terms of the characteristics, definition and 
types of industrial district, and note two particular areas in which the 
characteristics of post-Fordist production are being especially challenged: 
regarding the nature and role of flexibility, and the nature of work.
What is an Industrial District?
In the literature presented in Chapter One, industrial districts tended to be 
defined primarily on the basis of their observed characteristics. While different 
approaches may tend to emphasize particular facets, the main elements of 
industrial districts include: small firms specialised by production phase, with a 
high degree of inter-linkages between them, producing a single type or range of 
products, clustered geographically. As such, "industrial district" can and has 
been used to apply to a wide range of productive agglomerations, including hi- 
tech areas, business services, complexes for the production of mature goods, as 
well as the Emilian-type industrial district. Indeed, Scott’s (1992b) definition 
captures a broad range of production complexes: an industrial district exists 
wherever there is "a localized network of producers bound together in a social 
division of labour, in necessary association with a local labour market", arguing 
that while specific manifestations of districts may indeed vary, this definition 
captures the fundamental ingredients of social division of labour, external 
economies and agglomeration. This definition does not lead Scott to exclude 
any types of production complex that he formerly included in his three-part 
typology of craft industries, high-technology clusters, and business service 
complexes.
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On the other hand, Brusco (1986) has attempted to be more definitive, 
suggesting indicators that would allow us to distinguish industrial district firms 
(and also equivalent to the flexible specialisation model) from dependent sub­
contractors or traditional artisans. Indicators of the first group include: a high 
percentage of firms with direct relations with the final market; a high 
percentage of sub-contractor firms with a large number of clients; and the 
presence of firms that manufacture the production machinery used within the 
district (this last point also the defining characteristic of Garofoli’s “system- 
area”).
There is clearly a wide range of definitions. Given the centrality of spatial 
agglomeration, clustering, and localisation, it is surprising that spatial aspects 
of industrial districts are not a clear parameter of the definition. The definition 
of industrial district stops with the characterisation of spatial agglomeration - 
what this means in real terms, how boundaries might be defined or how 
districts might be differentiated from "regions" is not discussed.
Alongside Scott's sectoral typology, two others have been proposed, as 
reviewed above, including Garofoli's (1983) continuum of self-sufficiency 
(areas of productive specialisation, local productive systems, system-areas); 
and Brusco's (1990), which is really a typology of firms within districts 
(traditional artisan, dependent sub-contractor; industrial district firm). We can 
also add Storper's "technology district", which he differentiates from other 
kinds of industrial localizations, based on three criteria: 1) they have dynamic 
economies of scale, owing to the nature of technological change, that 
counteract equilibrium tendencies; 2) their production networks are frequently 
characterized by relationships other than markets or hierarchies; and 3) they 
have conventions of economic life that mobilize resources and regulate 
interactions so as to make technological learning possible (Storper, 1992: 90).
Storper's "technology districts" can include examples from each of Scott's three
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types, and it could be said, if innovation is a prime characteristic of industrial 
districts (as many claim it is, e.g. Piore and Sabel, 1984) that the concept does 
not narrow the range in any way. Meanwhile, a sectoral approach does not 
appear to offer a window with any explanatory power, able to address the 
economic or spatial dynamics of districts. As the case studies that follow 
indicate, industrial districts in three very distinct sectors all exhibit remarkably 
similar patterns of spatial and industrial organisation.
Indeed, the typologies have not been conceived or used in a way that would 
allow one to relate each type of district in a systematic way to an individual 
evolutionary dynamic or a particular spatial pattern. At present, they are 
merely categories. The body of literature has not come to any coherent 
determination on whether the many examples of industrial districts do in fact 
represent essentially a single, distinct type of entity, or whether they are 
comprised of several types. That is, are they just different breeds or are they 
different animals altogether? Do they operate according to the same 
fundamental, global forces, or according to individual dynamics? Indeed, as we 
will see below, the definition and typologies of industrial districts proposed by 
members of the new orthodoxy is challenged by its critics.
Flexibility
Flexibility is, of course, the central concept in the literature on emerging modes 
of production, the defining characteristic of the emerging regime of 
accumulation, a regime of 'flexible' accumulation. There is some empirical 
debate about the degree of flexibility actually exhibited by so-called 'flexible 
production systems', calling into question the possibility of a new regime with 
flexibility as its defining feature. Like the issue of spatial clustering, given the 
centrality of the issue to the broader debate, there has been a surprising lack of 
real empirical evidence in support of (or against) allegations of increasing 
flexibility.
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This problem may stem from a lack of consensus on what flexibility is and how 
(or if at all) it can be measured. Some object to the dualistic juxtaposition of 
flexibility against "rigidities" (see, e.g. Pollert, 1991). Sayer (1989), has 
shown, for example, how seeming "rigidities" in Japanese mass production 
systems can actually generate longer term "flexibilities". Or at least, the two 
concepts should be seen as opposite ends of a spectrum, rather than polar 
opposites.
The literature often refers to different types of flexibility, with different sources, 
but without being explicit or specific. An important contribution is made in this 
regard by Sayer (1989), who differentiates between numerical flexibility 
(output, employment) and functional flexibility (changes in product 
configuration). These are sometimes referred to as quantitative and qualitative 
flexibility, although the latter also includes flexibility in the labour process. The 
sources of flexibility include labour markets, working practices, machinery, and 
organisational forms. Each source can exist and generate benefits to capital 
separately. And, as will be shown in the case studies that follow, the particular 
type and source of flexibility is intimately related to the territorial organisation 
of production.
Given the centrality of flexibility to the post-Fordist thesis, more systematic 
attempts at evaluating degrees and types of flexibility have emerged. One 
study of numerical flexibility (represented by the use of short-term contracts, 
sub-contracting and out-sourcing) by large companies found little increased 
used in these arrangements in the early 1980s, though initial use was already 
quite high (Marginson, 1991). Another study of labour flexibility found only 
“uneven” and “incremental” expansion of job demarcations, multi-skilling and 
labour mobility (Eiger, 1991). While these studies are not necessarily 
representative, they are correct in their underlying assertion that flexibility as 
currently used in the post-Fordist debate is too vague a concept that can 
obscure other, potentially more definitive aspects of a system of production.
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In one case in particular, the centrality of flexibility is challenged, not by the 
critics of the new orthodoxy, but by the evolutionary economics-based 
approach. This school does not so much position itself either in favour or 
against flexibility and the proposition of a new, post-Fordist era, but recasts the 
question and reinterprets recent economic history along the following lines 
(Storper, 1994). In the immediate post-war period, the U.S. held an absolute 
technological advantage in mass production industries, but as their technologies 
became imitable, the absolute advantage disappeared and a competition for 
comparative advantage ensued, based on a search for lower production costs 
within a given technological paradigm. Ultimately, however, competition 
began to take place on the basis of "...new forms of production, not based on 
mass production methods, but instead oriented again toward the technological 
learning which had once characterized competition within mass production..." 
(Storper, 1994: 17). As a result, technological trajectories were "re-opened" 
and the western world once again became a "learning economy".
At least within the "technology district", flexibility is cast aside as the central 
defining feature Of the post-Fordist regime, to be replaced by technological 
learning. "But what is important is the notion that it is not flexibility per se that 
is the central theoretical element of the current age, but flexibility (and many 
other features of contemporary production systems) as a means to 
technological learning and the absolute advantages it is generating for 
learners." (Storper, 1994: 17). Indeed, as the case studies will show, there is 
some evidence to suggest that too much emphasis has been placed on 
flexibility, while other equally or more important factors have been 
downplayed. Flexibility has come to be portrayed as an end in itself, when in 
fact it is simply a means to achieve certain product or process objectives.
The nature of work
Of the empirical points of contention that emerge in the literature, the nature of 
work and the implications for workers of the newly emerging forms of
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production is probably the most hotly contested. On the one hand are those
who look upon flexible specialisation as highly favourable to the worker.
Sabel, for example, views the 'Emilian' organisation of production as
democratising the workplace, reintegrating conceptualisation and execution
functions for the individual worker, as in pre-industrial craft production.
Workers are extremely skilled and the division of labour is described as fluid
and informal, "the difference between them (workers) and their supervisors
almost imperceptible" (Sabel, 1982). In short, it is a veritable worker's utopia:
If you had thought so long about Rousseau's artisan clockmakers at 
Neuchatel or Marx's idea of labour as joyful, self-creative association 
that you had begun to doubt their possibility, then you might, watching 
these craftsmen at work, forgive yourself the sudden conviction that 
something more utopian than the present factory system is practical 
after all (Sabel, 1982: 220).
Murray challenges Sabel's glowing characterisation of the nature of flexible 
specialisation, especially regarding the opportunities it affords workers for the 
reintegration of conceptualisation and execution, and the degree of 
improvements in the quality of work. He notes that the 'quality craft work' 
Sabel discovers is generally available only to one sub-group of the working 
population: middle-aged Emilian men. "For the vast majority of workers who 
do not possess the market power of an elite of male machinists, technicians, 
and designers, a shift towards a fragmented, informal or casual cottage industry 
spells a return to the worst excesses of industrial capitalism" (Murray, 1987: 
92).
Murray argues that the degree of independence of small capital may be 
overstated, as well as the amount of market diversification. In addition, the 
geographical fragmentation of production and weak trade union representation 
tend to lead to a wide variety of working conditions, and maximum wage 
differentials between different groups of workers, which invariably occur along 
racial and gender lines.
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Competition and Cooperation
Advocates of the new orthodoxy, almost without exception, emphasize the 
role of cooperation in the success of industrial districts, citing shared local 
values, norms, and rules, local institutions, associations, etc. (e.g. Becattini, 
1990; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989; Storper,
1993, 1994). While indeed these factors play a unique role in the production 
systems of the industrial district, competition is also an important factor, as 
Porter (1990) points out. He notes how local rivalries can promote efficiency 
and specialisation. In the Third Italy, as the case studies contained in this thesis 
will demonstrate, local competition has a strong and dynamic affect upon the 
social division of labour, and the adoption of new technologies, and hence the 
local geography of production.
3. A NEW PHASE OF CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION?
As we saw in Chapter One, one of the major theoretical claims laid by Piore 
and Sabel was that the nature of the changes that they described relating to the 
division of labour, cooperation and collectivism, etc., was so fundamental, it 
signalled that the period of Fordist industrial capitalism was at a critical turning 
point, or "second industrial divide" in which two directions were available: a 
revival of mass production or flexible specialisation (Piore, 1990). This view 
is supported by the California School (see e.g. Scott, 1992a), and the 
Regulation School, who have extended the theoretical concept, heralding a 
new phase of capitalist "flexible accumulation" (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 
1989; see also Harvey, 1987; Harvey and Scott, 1988). Others have argued 
vehemently against the notion of a new phase of capitalism, reasserting the 
dominance of mass production. The main sub-themes of this debate are 
summarised below.
Post-Fordism is not pervasive
Those arguing against the possibility of a new phase of flexible accumulation 
do so not on the basis of countervailing theories of the new developments
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observed in industry, but by criticising the generalizability of the empirical 
evidence presented, arguing that the primarily Italian and German examples 
cannot be extended to other contexts and to claims of a new, flexible regime of 
accumulation. They assert that flexible specialisation is not and cannot be 
pervasive and hegemonic, so it therefore cannot represent a new phase of 
capitalist accumulation.
The issue of definition is relevant here, because it forms the basis for arguments 
regarding the pervasiveness of the flexible phenomenon: the broader the 
definition, the more pervasive flexible production spaces can be said to be. 
Critics maintain that a too-broad definition of flexible specialisation overstates 
pervasiveness and it is on the basis of these aggrandizements that claims about 
a new phase of capitalist accumulation are (falsely) laid: "... all kinds of 
different areas in different countries are being described as industrial districts in 
a bid to demonstrate that this form of growth is the globally enabling condition 
for a new post-Fordist economic regime...(and that)... the very laws of 
capitalist development are becoming, as it were, Marshallian (as opposed to 
Fordist)" (Amin and Robins, 1990: 199).
Critics therefore argue for a much more narrow view, limiting the meaning of 
industrial district to the kind of productive system found in the Third Italy only. 
They concede that Third Italy industrial districts represent "differentiated 
manifestations of one phenomenon: the widespread industrialisation, since the 
1960s, of semi-rural areas and small towns with very similar social and 
economic structures (self-contained communities of artisans, peasant farmers 
and merchants, near or in towns with strong municipal traditions)" (Amin and 
Robins, 1990: 196). Even with this more limited definition, they argue, there 
are still problems. Significant differences exist between Marshallian industrial 
districts in terms of their origins and their consolidation as industrial districts 
(the basis of their competitiveness, for example) (Amin and Robins, 1990).
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Certainly, argue the critics, the industrial district notion is not generalizable to 
areas outside the Third Italy, as in the flexible specialisation model, which also 
includes a broad range of other productive areas, from the high tech districts in 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 near Boston, to motion picture industry clusters 
in Los Angeles, to manufacturing districts in the "Second Denmark" and 
Baden-Wurttemberg in Germany, to the flexibilization of large firms. This 
catch-all approach has been criticized as incorporating fundamentally different 
phenomena, with different underlying processes of change (Amin and Robins,
1990).
Instead, it is argued that the flexible specialisation model is not pervasive, and 
the evidence put forward especially by Piore and Sabel has limited 
generalizability, on the basis of factors such as:
• the unusually small firm size of their production systems;
• that the industrial sectors cited are not representative, limited to traditional 
non-durables, specialised suppliers (e.g. metalworking) or luxury versions 
of mass production (e.g. German cars);
• that only niche markets were being served, in residual spaces left by mass 
producers; and
• that the specific historical and cultural conditions (e.g. pre-existing 
industrial skills, collective values) would limit applicability elsewhere11.
On the issue of pervasiveness by firm size, some have argued that the 
emergence of flexible production districts is silent on this question, and that 
large firms are not inconsistent with flexible production; indeed they can play a 
key role (Scott, 1992b). The empirical evidence presented in this thesis 
supports this claim, with many firms in the 100 to 1,000 employee range 
playing key roles within an industrial district. Piore and Sabel have argued that 
the big firms too are adopting flexible techniques, leading to a convergence 
between big and small firms. To the critics this only represents a confusion of
Summary of points from Storper, 1994.
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flexible specialisation with a "general flexibilization of production" (Storper,
1990).
On the points relating to sectors and niche markets, if one accepts the position 
that markets are fragmenting, then these "non-representative" sectors and niche 
markets, though smaller perhaps than individual mass markets, are together 
accounting for an increasing share of total economic output, and even such 
venerable mass production sectors as steel are subject to this process (Piore 
and Sabel, 1984). Moreover, individual "niche" markets can still account for 
significant absolute levels of output, such that a niche knitwear district can 
account for direct employment of one out of every three employed workers in a 
town of 60,000, as it does in Carpi (CGIL, 1988).
The literature is less developed on the questions of geographical pervasiveness, 
though some research examines other kinds of regions, such as old industrial 
regions (e.g. Hudson, 1989), or mid-western U.S. manufacturing (Knudsen,
1991). Recent research on industry in Southern Ontario, Canada found many 
similarities with production complexes in the Third Italy, in terms of market 
demands, for example (Gertler, 1994). And as we saw in Chapter One, there is 
evidence of post-Fordist production not only in the "new industrial spaces" 
described by Scott (1988b), but also in large metropolises, and a few cases in 
older, "Fordist" regions (Kenney and Florida, 1992).
Critics claim that there is no evidence to suggest that flexible accumulation has 
established a 'systemic' or 'hegemonic' presence, and go on to show that this is 
particularly true in the UK (Lovering, 1990). In fairness, Scott, Storper and 
the other flexible accumulationists do not suggest that flexible accumulation is 
hegemonic in that it removes all vestiges of other modes of production, but 
rather it represents dominant principles (Storper, 1990). Moreover, even if it 
were true that examples of the Marshallian industrial district could not be found 
in the U.K., these critics do not address the validity of examples from 
elsewhere.
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Fordism lives!
Some critics propose an alternative view which posits the existence of several 
types of new production complexes (not just the industrial district), each 
different, and "whose development is not guided by one overarching structural 
transformation" (a transition to post-Fordism) (Amin and Robins, 1990: 204). 
They then go on, however, to invoke their own, albeit different overarching 
structure, claiming that "what we are seeing in the present period are 
organisational developments that are in significant ways an extension of Fordist 
structures" (1990: 210).
The reassertion of the dominance of Fordism is taken up by others, presenting 
various arguments. On a theoretical point, it is argued that Fordism itself has 
not been clearly defined, and many of its supposed characteristics, including 
hegemony, have not been demonstrated. This makes it difficult to assert a 
post-Fordism (Sayer, 1989).
More importantly, it is argued that it is by no means clear that Fordism is in 
crisis, as claimed by the Regulation School and others; the alleged inherent 
limitations such as labour resistance and rigidity are doubtful, and mass 
production still flourishes. Economic and labour problems are seen as related 
to a specifically western Fordism, and are attributed not to internal 
inconsistencies, but competition from Japan and the newly industrialising 
countries (Sayer, 1989). It is certainly true that the macro-economic evidence 
is extremely mixed; certain advanced industrial countries have continued to 
expand economically (Japan, Germany), while others have had much more 
unstable economic paths (U.K., Italy). But Japan is a particular example 
because it combines elements of both Fordist and post-Fordist models - flexible 
mass production, mid-size firms, high use of sub-contracting, etc12.
See for example, Scott (1988a) on the Tokyo car industry.
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Certainly there is ample evidence that the mass production sector is proving 
extremely resilient, adopting techniques of flexibility and increased 
standardisation at the same time, as is evident in the success of Ford's 'world 
car1, for example, which includes standardised 'world' components but is 
customised for particular regional markets. Critics of the crisis of Fordism 
notion also make this point, asserting that mass production should not be 
assumed to be synonymous with inflexibility; flexibility can be an asset in the 
production of a fixed product range or a single product, and can be achieved in 
many ways, some of which may appear "rigid" at first glance (Sayer, 1989).
At the heart of flexibilization is computer technology, which allows for efficient 
changes to product or production process, increased productivity across 
virtually all sectors, as well as constituting a high-growth sector of its own13. 
The question is whether changes such as flexibilization or the application of 
computer technology in production and in the circulation of capital mark a 
transition to a fundamentally different regime of accumulation, or simply 
provide a "technological fix" for the existing regime, in the same way that a 
"spatial fix" was said to have been found in the internationalisation of Fordism, 
averting the previous impending crisis of the late 1960s.
A second stream of thought re-asserting Fordism argues that because most of 
the cited examples of flexible production agglomerations are recent in origin 
and outside areas of Fordist accumulation, the reasons for initial location as 
well as "subsequent extemalisation" must be elaborated. It is argued that the 
initial reasons for locating in a given area often amount to "productive 
decentralisation", which has continuities with Fordism that are inconsistent with 
the flexible accumulation theory (Phelps, 1992). This point can be countered, 
however, with examples that predate the transition to post-Fordism (e.g. New 
York garment district, Bologna automatic packaging machinery district), and
13 Indeed, it has been claimed th a t the information technology sector was generating the highest rates of profit in the 
history of economic activity, though this probably has more to do with the fact that the industry is in the very earliest stages of 
evolution.
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other cases that were not “subsequently” externalised but established from the 
outset as disaggregated systems of production (e.g. Modena oleodynamic 
components sector).
A third stream cites examples of the early years of Fordist production 
complexes in the car industry, in places like Detroit, Turin or the U.K., which 
also exhibited tendencies to localisation and a highly articulated social division 
of labour. Critics argue that the objects of analysis are so broadly defined by 
the new orthodoxy that they can apply to earlier phases of industrial capitalism 
"whose economic and geographical logic is supposed to be antithetical to that 
of post-Fordism" (Amin and Robins, 1990: 203). This suggests that the new 
industrial spaces "do not reflect the structural or organisational requirements of 
a new post-Fordist economic regime which demands the vertical disintegration 
and flexible specialisation of production (Amin and Robins, 1990: 203). In 
other words, similar localised production complexes existed in an earlier phase 
of capitalism, so localised production complexes cannot now be cited as 
evidence of a specifically post-Fordist phase. Though, as noted above, Amin 
and Robins have a point about the broad definition of industrial districts, they 
do not provide detailed evidence on the localisation and extended social 
division of labour in the cases they cite.
Amin and Robins propose an alternative view, which suggests that the spatial 
containment of production need not be for reasons which are structurally or 
historically bound. They cite Walker’s (1988) interpretation that the territorial 
production complex is seen as an independent and trans-historical 
organisational form, and not the necessary outcome of any particular form of 
industrial organisation. This seems to contradict their earlier statements re­
asserting Fordism. Or are they suggesting that while localised production 
complexes are the result of independent and trans-historical forces, mass 
production systems and their spatial manifestations (e.g. core-periphery 
relationships) are tied to an overarching, necessary dynamic associated with a
81
Fordist regime of accumulation? This question begins to get at the issue of the 
respective roles of necessary versus contingent factors in the evolution of 
industrial districts, a question which underlies another major theme of debate, 
the relative importance of global versus local factors.
Global v. local
Critics of the new orthodoxy assert that flexible accumulation and industrial 
districts are not the result of any new regime of accumulation governed by 
necessary relationships. Instead, such developments can be explained 
contingent factors, and the presence of industrial districts cannot therefore be 
cited as evidence of a new regime of accumulation.
Specifically, they question whether the theoretical link forged between flexible 
accumulation on the one hand, and extemalisation of production and 
agglomeration on the other, is a necessary one, arguing that the latter is not 
proof of the former. They differentiate between general forces leading to 
extemalisation (market fragmentation, new technologies) and place-specific 
factors, the latter consisting primarily of “place-specific processes of 
cumulative causation which may be operative in existing centres of 
accumulation” (Phelps, 1992: 43). In other words, they reject the validity of 
flexible production situated in existing production complexes, attributing their 
emergence to pre-established forces of cumulative causation, which they view 
as a contingent factor. If place-specific factors are the real impetus behind the 
extemalisation of production functions, then a flexible accumulation thesis 
cannot be argued. It is the failure of proponents to differentiate between these 
cases and the "... conflation of the role of general forces and the place-specific 
factors of existing ('Fordist?') agglomerations which leads the proponents of the 
flexible accumulation thesis into accepting some very different examples of 
agglomeration as instances of flexible production systems" (Phelps, 1992: 43).
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This line of criticism, suggesting that flexible specialisation and associated 
flexible production complexes are the result of place-specific (contingent), not 
global (necessary) forces, is echoed by others. It may be attributed to a range 
of possible explanations, for example, the spatial logic of U.S. military- 
industrial capitalism (which presumably generated the high-tech districts of the 
US southwest) (Lovering, 1990). They propose that flexible specialisation may 
be but one of several coexisting forms in which capital accumulation can take 
place. In this 'experimental' and 'contested' period of change, a single clear 
direction of change is not foreseeable, and flexible specialisation can only be 
interpreted as a contingent local outcome, not an "inexorable process of 
contemporary capitalist development" (Lovering, 1990: 169).
The argument implies global forces are "necessary" forces, while place-specific 
forces are by definition "contingent". There is some danger in using these 
terms interchangeably, particularly when this argument ultimately rests on the 
assertion that industrial districts are the result of contingent forces. I would 
argue that it must be kept in mind that global/local and necessary/contingent 
are two different {but intersecting) concepts. There are necessary forces at both 
the global and local levels, and equally there are contingent factors at both 
levels. In other words, to maintain the critics’ argument, it is not enough to 
argue that industrial districts are the result of local factors; it must be shown 
that industrial districts are the result of specifically contingent factors, which 
may or may not include “place-specific processes of cumulative causation”.
The critics take issue with the positions put forward by Scott and Storper, for 
example, whose arguments imply that necessary factors at both the global and 
local scales are behind the evolution of industrial districts and technology 
districts. Storper (1994), for example, argues the necessity of regionalisation 
under certain conditions, while Scott (1988a, 1988b, 1992) ties market 
conditions to extemalisation of production to geographical clustering as a 
necessary sequence.
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These arguments form part of a much wider stream in the literature, which
addresses the relative importance of global versus local factors in the evolving
transition. While most accounts do acknowledge both global and local forces,
generally one is emphasized over the other. Many accounts of flexible
production complexes in the Third Italy stress local factors, institutions, and
capabilities (Fua, 1985; Becattini, 1990; Brusco, 1990, 1986). Sabel also
emphasises the endogenous nature of the process:
"...the region as an economic entity full of under- or unused resources 
that range from traditional artisanal skills to petty commerce.
Prosperity depends, according to the new doctrine of endogenous 
growth, on developing these resources rather than importing the 
equipment and skill of a mass production economy from the rich 
exterior". (1988: 43)
Indeed, there is much evidence in the Third Italy of a rich local heritage 
including elements of a strong civic tradition; unique local politics (a long 
tradition of governance at the local level by the communist party); a history in 
education including a university dating back 800 years and a more recent 
system of technical schools; a history of local independence emanating from the 
region’s past as a collection of city-states; a highly evolved, poly-centric urban 
system; and a powerful local and regional governance structure (see, e.g. 
Capecchi, 1990; Nanetti, 1988; or Putnam, 1993). The question is whether 
these contingent factors, on their own, are sufficient to explain the rise of 
industrial districts in the Third Italy, or whether some broader dynamic is also 
(or exclusively?) at work.
Against the preponderance of explanations which emphasise local factors are 
those that reiterate global forces. Amin and Robins (1990), for example, stress 
tendencies toward internationalisation, the global integration of local and 
national economies, the key role played by multinational corporations, 
increasing centralisation and internationalisation of capital, and deepening 
uneven development. These critics argue the co-existence of globalizing and 
localising forces, and a range of spatial strategies, but, unlike the flexible 
specialisationists' sub-text of the resurrection of local community, posit a loss
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of local autonomy in the face of worldwide economic actors.
Rebuttals to this claim do not deny the ongoing internationalisation of
capitalism, but suggest that this process "has occurred alongside, and not
necessarily in opposition to, the formation of industrial districts", and that
multinationals play a facilitating rather than purely destructive role (Scott,
1992b). One way out of the conundrum emerges in "glocalisation", which
attempts to capture the inter-related, simultaneous, "double movement" of
globalisation and localisation (Swyngedouw, 1992). The notion that
globalisation and localisation are in fact inter-dependent rather than in
opposition is a compelling one: in an era of globalisation, the local actually
becomes more important. When everyone, everywhere has equal access to
global information through the Internet, for example, what becomes more
valuable and the basis upon which localities can distinguish themselves is by
availability of and access to local information. Or, as Porter puts it:
While classical factors of production are more and more accessible 
because of globalization, competitive advantage in advanced countries 
is increasingly determined by differential knowledge, skills, and rates of 
innovation which are embodied in skilled people and organizational 
routines. The process of creating skills and the important influences on 
the rate of improvement and innovation are intensely local. (1990:
158)
In any event, the separation of global from local, necessary from contingent, 
seems somewhat artificial. A more reasonable and powerful approach may be 
to attack the issue from the point of view of the interaction of global and local, 
necessary and contingent forces, to produce specific outcomes. This is the 
approach taken to explain the case studies to be presented in this thesis.
A temporary condition?
Finally, there is little consensus on the future prospects for localised, flexible 
production agglomerations. Some see them potentially as a "transitional" 
phase that is destined to give way to the more powerful forces of global capital 
(Amin and Robins, 1988; Harrison, 1992). Amongst the threats cited are:
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• Impediments to adopting new technologies (Brusco; 1990), (though others 
argue that districts ease the adoption of new technologies (Becattini, 1990; 
Porter, 1990).
• Takeovers and necessary tendencies to concentration (Amin and Robins, 
1988; Harrison, 1992). This claim is countered by those who conclude 
that while there have been some takeovers, these do not constitute a threat 
to Emilian industrial districts (Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1990); and others who 
suggest that the presence of large producers in an industrial district by no 
means indicates a threat. Instead, "...industrial districts may comprise 
varying combinations of both large and small establishments and that large 
producers are often quite instrumental in inducing and sustaining 
agglomeration" (Scott, 1992b).
• New international competition, including an influx of products from newly 
industrialising countries (Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1990).
• New types of external economies and diseconomies which may be difficult 
to resolve at the local level, such as the need for more sophisticated inputs 
(technological research and information, financial services) (Triglia, 1990). 
Echoing Fua (1985), this also includes the typical kinds of diseconomies 
which may be “new” to Emilia-Romagna, such as pollution, traffic 
congestion, etc.
The critics argue that, as a temporary condition only, industrial districts cannot 
be interpreted as evidence of a new regime of accumulation. However, in 
another context, these same critics have also argued that these forms existed in 
the Fordist era, which (if you accept that they are indeed similar forms) would 
suggest that while they may not be evidence of a post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation (as they claim), that at least the form has a certain longevity! On 
the other hand, there are many examples of industrial districts that were in
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existence in the Fordist era, and continue to exist today (e.g. the Bologna 
automatic packaging district, garment districts in many metropolitan centres). 
The major dilemma which emerges from this thread of the debate is whether a 
productive form which existed in the Fordist era (and pre-Fordist era, in the 
case of some districts referred to by Scott), can also be cited as evidence of a 
post-Fordist era. I would argue that such examples (if indeed they are truly 
comparable to Fordist or pre-Fordist examples, and this is questionable) cannot 
be summarily rejected on this basis. The economic context has been 
transformed, and there may be very unique reasons why the industrial district 
seems to be re-emerging at this point; it may well fit into the dynamic of capital 
accumulation and economic growth in a totally different manner, and surely 
faces internal (e.g. computer technology) and external (e.g. international 
competition) conditions that earlier forms did not.
That fundamental change has been underway since about 1970, representing a 
radical departure of previous evolutionary paths, seems unquestionable. The 
question is whether such change can be said to constitute a new regime of 
accumulation. The literature is divided into two clear camps on this question, 
which tends to dichotomize and polarize the issue: Fordist versus post-Fordist; 
global versus local; rigid versus flexible; mass production versus niche markets; 
integrated factory versus disintegrated industrial district. The reality is likely 
more complex and less bipolar. Processes of globalization and localization are 
more likely inter-dependent than oppositional. Fordism and mass production 
should not be taken to mean the same thing, as is frequently the case. There is 
plenty of evidence to suggest that the demise of Fordism may not mean the 
demise of mass production, as mass production industries become more flexible 
and increasingly customize their products. Is there not such thing as a post- 
Fordism which includes mass production and industrial districts?
4. THE REIGN OF THE REGION?
A further claim made by the flexible specialisationists is that this emerging
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model of production represents a "reconsolidation of the region as an 
integrated unit of production", based on the following evidence:
• the emergence of industrial districts in parts of Europe, USA, and Japan;
• the reorganisation of multi-national corporations;
• the convergence of large and small firm structures; through the 
flexibilisation of big firms and direct alliances between large and small;
• the transformation of local governments from welfare dispensaries to job- 
creation agencies; and
• the cooperation of the trade unions in the reorganisation of the large firms 
(Sabel, 1988).
The origins of regionalisation lie in increasingly volatile markets, which brought 
about the need for flexibility, which in turn led to the centrality and 
"reconsolidation" of the region (Sabel, 1988).
This region-centred view is extrapolated even further, in suggestions that the 
internationalisation of the economy has proceeded alongside the formation of 
industrial districts, and that "the world economy is increasingly reconstructed 
as a mosaic of regions consisting of localized networks of transactions (i.e. 
industrial districts) embedded in global networks of transactions" (Scott, 
1992b).
The evolutionary economics-based approach seeks to explain why "..regions 
keep emerging as centres for new rounds of growth even as our capacities for 
transcending the frictions of space continue to improve" (Storper, 1994: 23). 
The response is said to lie in two points. First, the tension between 
respecialisation and destandardization of inputs and outputs, ceteris paribus, 
raises transactions costs. Second, organizational and technological learning is 
associated with agglomeration, which in turn has two roots. The first is the 
case in which direct transactions ("input-output relations") constitute webs of 
user-producer relations essential to information development and exchange, 
and hence to learning. A second (and more general) case lies in the untraded
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interdependencies which attach to the process of economic and organisational 
learning and coordination.
The region is a key, necessary element in the "supply architecture" for learning 
and innovation, and has "... a central theoretical status in the process of 
capitalist development which must be located in its untraded 
interdependencies" (Storper, 1994: 23). This means that these 
interdependencies are necessary to capitalist development and that they are, 
under certain conditions (e.g. particularly open trajectories), necessarily 
regionalised. Having made this claim, Storper goes on to say that this does not 
mean that there are not other reasons for regional economies to exist or grow, 
apparently that these "necessary" relations only apply in certain cases where 
regions do act first and foremost as a "nexus of untraded interdependencies".
The only challenge to this view of regions as the building block of the new 
economy comes from Porter (1990), who reasserts the importance of nations, 
arguing that the determinants of advantage are more similar within nations than 
between nations (e.g. policy, regulations, capital markets, factor costs, etc.), 
and that "...social and political values and norms are linked to nations and are 
slow to change" (1990: 158). Though there is much recent evidence which 
would support a view that social and political values may be even more 
strongly local/regional than national (e.g. the U.S.S.R. did not fracture into its 
constituent nation states, regional successionist movements in Spain, Italy, 
Canada, etc.), Porter maintains that"... it is the combination of national and 
intensely local conditions that fosters competitive advantage" (1990: 158).
Despite the sweeping nature of claims laid by Piore, Sabel, and Scott (and to a 
lesser extent Storper, as he is referring only to specific instances) with respect 
to the emergence of regions as the basic building blocks of the global economy, 
this aspect of the ‘new orthodoxy’ is probably the least theoretically developed. 
While the idea of regions as the basic economic units is intuitively appealing,
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particularly in an era in which nation-states continue to cede powers to supra­
national organisations and multi-lateral free trade bodies, this stream of the 
literature on emerging economic regimes raises more questions than it answers. 
Some very basic questions are not addressed in the literature. What is the 
relationship between industrial districts and regions? What is a post-Fordist 
region? How does it differ from a Fordist region? Do relationships between 
post-Fordist regions differ from Fordist inter-regional relationships, i.e. are 
they relations of dominance and dependence, as the new international division 
of labour theory implies? What regions are likely to grow and what regions 
likely to decline under a post-Fordist regime of accumulation? These questions 
are taken up again in Chapter Seven.
5. EXPLAINING LOCALISATION
How is the geographical pattern of production - specifically the geographical 
clustering of firms into industrial districts - explained by the various 
approaches? There is a wide range of explanation amongst the various schools 
of thought.
Some camps only address this question in a general way, and avoid identifying 
specific mechanisms or dynamics which cause spatial clustering. While 
members of the flexible specialisation school, such as Piore and Sabel, do 
attempt to address the specific theoretical issue of localisation, their 
explanations deal primarily with the advantages of network production, and do 
not address or explain the reasons for spatial concentration. The link between 
the allegedly "re-emerging” regional economies and localised production 
systems is not one that is clearly elaborated by proponents of the flexible 
specialisation school, and so the explanations for each become muddled 
together. They do not tell us what they mean by "region" - is it the same as an 
industrial district? Or is it the area in which groups of such districts can be 
found? As such, explanations of the tendency toward spatial agglomeration at 
the industrial district level are quite muddied. Nevertheless, the flexible
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specialisationists can be said to link, implicitly if not explicitly, spatial 
agglomeration with the essential characteristics of their paradigm, that is, the 
need for flexibility stemming from volatile markets; the capacity to innovate; 
importance of trust and collaboration, and the learning advantages of networks 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1988).
The Regulation School, while noting that the crisis of Fordism could be 
resolved through productive organisations which involve either territorial 
integration or disintegration, nevertheless focus to a great degree on spatially 
integrated models. Spatial clustering is seen as necessary for fast, flexible and 
competitive changes in the production process, and as offering advantages such 
as the close monitoring of production and circulation processes. Technological 
linkages, networking, information and material exchange help to accelerate the 
pace of innovation. There is an emerging "interdependence which relates space 
to technological change in a very intricate way" (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 
1989).
Other schools of thought address the question of geographical concentration 
more explicitly. The explicit explanations can be categorized into three groups: 
social boundedness, agglomeration economies, and transactions costs.
Social boundedness
The Florentine school tends to suggest that because industrial districts are 
inherently social systems, that they are "bounded" by "natural" and "historical" 
features, defining common social characteristics, shared values and community 
(see for example, Becattini, 1990). As such, the geography of a given 
productive complex can only extend as far as the homogenous social system in 
which it is situated, acting to spatially constrain the industrial district. Virtually 
all of the “new orthodoxy” approaches have cited shared local values, rules, 
customs, etc. as a fundamental component of the industrial district. This 
concept overlaps with an agglomeration economies explanation, in that they
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both would include elements such as local institutions.
Agglomeration economies
Many explanations of geographical clustering in post-Fordist production 
complexes rely (implicitly or explicitly), on the concept of agglomeration 
economies. This includes Marshall's "industrial atmosphere", to the flexible 
specialisationists' emphasis on cooperation and institutions, the California 
school's emphasis on the institutional and cultural context, and Storper's 
"untraded interdependencies". Much of the literature merely cites examples of 
different types of agglomeration economies as being important to the industrial 
district, and the concept is treated rather vaguely.
If we are looking to explain spatial clustering it is useful to address the 
definition of the concept. Bellandi returns to Marshall’s original work, to make 
an important distinction between "external economies", and "agglomeration 
economies", which are often taken to mean the same thing (Bellandi, 1990; 
Phelps, 1992). External economies relate to the general development of the 
industry, the development of the division of labour and inter-firm linkages, 
which derive from processes of extemalization, remaining silent on the question 
of spatial clustering. Agglomeration economies, on the other hand, are 
benefits to production that result specifically from spatial clustering, from the 
existence of shared institutions other social or economic infrastructure (roads, 
airports), or as a result of improved interaction within a confined area, or other 
benefits of specifically localised production14. Bellandi cites three cases in 
particular in which agglomeration economies come into play, with respect to 
transaction, skill, and innovation. Transaction costs are reduced by 
agglomeration; skills and learning are spread through formal and informal 
interaction, and specialised local institutions; and innovation is supported by 
formal and informal information flows, contacts and institutions. Storper’s
Though Scott (1992) suggests th a t where there is spatial agglomeration, external economies resulting from a  social 
division of labour are transform ed into and consumed as agglomeration economies.
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(1994) concept o f ‘untraded interdependencies’, for example (which includes 
labour markets, institutions, rules, values, etc.), is invoked to explain cases of 
clustering in technology districts in the absence of direct inter-firm linkages, is 
really just a particular sub-set of agglomeration economies.
Clearly, the post-Fordist era is said to mean the revival of the role of 
agglomeration economies. Under a Fordist regime, agglomeration economies 
were rendered obsolete, as production functions were internalised within the 
self-contained, vertically integrated, mass production organisation (Perrons, 
1981). Now, as production vertically disintegrates and fragments, 
agglomeration economies move into centre stage (though this underlying point 
is made more implicitly than explicitly in the literature), and production 
necessarily becomes more place-bound.
Transactions allow external and agglomeration economies to be harnessed in 
production, serving to reintegrate an otherwise fragmented production system. 
This places an new emphasis on transaction costs.
Transactions costs
Perhaps because the California School addresses the question of spatial 
concentration most directly, it has attracted the most criticism. Though the 
California School adopts the macro-economic analysis of the Regulation 
School, it combines this approach with a micro-economic explanation of spatial 
clustering which focuses on transaction costs as the main explanation for 
agglomeration. Scott's approach is criticised on both fronts.
The neo-classical, microeconomic approach is attacked on the basis that it is an 
individualistic methodology that "...excludes from analysis those class and other 
social relations which are the preconditions for the atomistic choice it 
examines" (Lovering, 1990: 163). And while Scott notes the role of national 
governments in bringing about the restructuring of the regime of accumulation
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and a new mode of regulation, these elements are under-emphasised and do not 
form part of the theory. Scott's approach amounts to an ahistoric model which 
limits the ability to analyse the firm as a social organization, and does not allow 
us to interpret "empirical outcomes as complex and mediated expressions of 
'strategies' intended to achieve goals" (Lovering, 1990: 164).
The link made by Scott between increasing market uncertainty and vertical 
disintegration is also challenged. Critics suggest that there is no necessary 
relationship between increasing uncertainty and declining internal economies of 
scale, and therefore no link to the extemalisation of production that Scott 
suggests follows. "Whether uncertainty translates into rising or falling internal 
economies of scale therefore depends on the context of economic practices and 
institutions" (Lovering, 1990: 162).
Neither does a transactions costs approach seem to fit with the market 
framework of the post-Fordist regime in which it is situated, and in which 
competition takes place not only (or even primarily) on the basis of cost, but 
instead with respect to factors such as product quality or customisation, and 
time-based competition (see e.g. Gertler, 1992, 1994). While a transactions 
cost minimization explanation may have held some sway in the context of a 
Fordist regime in which competition was based primarily on achieving low cost 
through long production runs, in the post-Fordist context it seems a weak 
rationale for spatial clustering.
Sayer (1989) addresses the further link made by Scott between vertical 
disintegration, the development of inter-firm networks and localised 
agglomeration, critiquing the California School's "current blend" of Marxist and 
transactions cost analysis. He argues that vertical disintegration may in fact 
include vertical integration, if the actual organisational forms are examined. 
Firms that look vertically integrated (many divisions under one ownership) may 
in fact be very weakly organised, while firms under separate ownerships
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(vertically disintegrated systems) can have either weak or strong organisation. 
The key variables are how the market is used, how far prices govern 
relationships, etc. Sayer proposes that what we may be seeing is a rise in 
"vertical organisation", including both vertical integration and vertical 
disintegration.
Sayer's critique of a transactions costs approach is that "...it offers a largely 
unidirectional explanation, from cost patterns associated with markets and 
production processes to organisational forms - disintegration or integration" 
(1989: 679). He argues that the opposite direction of causality is often 
present: organizational forms are to some extent the creator of cost patterns. 
Similarly, the need for spatial proximity may be a function of productive 
organisation rather than a cause of it. The spatial organisation of any industry 
is influenced by pre-existing spatial forms. Neither can transactions costs 
explain the vastly different organizational structures within the same industries 
in different countries. Furthermore, as a static theory, transactions costs 
cannot take into account the development and maintenance of routines of 
knowledge and learning on which firms' longer term survival depends.
The linkages made by Scott between vertical disintegration and localisation are 
also a source of question. Critics argue that even if it can be shown that 
agglomerated forms are the result of the same general forces (that is, that they 
are not the result of contingent relations, and this is questioned), there is no 
necessary link between extemalisation and localisation: "...there is no 
necessary reason as to why activities externalised by firms ... will be farmed out 
to the local suppliers" (Phelps, 1992: 40, emphasis added).
Other critiques focus on other aspects of the California School's emphasis on 
transactions cost as an explanation of localisation, arguing a number of points:
• this proposition applies only in instances of perfect competition which 
rarely obtain in reality;
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• the type of empirical analysis undertaken does not and cannot support a 
transactions cost approach;
• that transportation costs are a small and declining cost of production and 
therefore not a powerful explanation of localisation (Phelps, 1992).
Finally, if, as Becattini and others suggest, transactions between firms in 
localised production complexes are not purely market transactions, but are 
socially mediated, how can a neo-classical economic approach explain them 
and the resulting spatial patterns?
According to the approach most recently espoused by Storper (1994), relying 
on evolutionary economics, agglomeration can be explained not just by 
economic factors such as the minimisation of transaction costs, knowledge 
spillovers and externalities, but also by technological factors (the need to avoid 
"lock-in" to a particular technology in a constantly emerging field and to retain 
flexibility, primarily achieved through production networks, based on elaborate 
and shifting inter-firm and inter-unit divisions of labour. His recent approach 
stresses the role of a third category of behavioural factors, the untraded 
interdependencies that include qualities of transactions and technological 
learning.
In short, although it is the most direct and precise explanation offered in the 
literature, the concept of transactions costs minimisation seems to be 
inadequate in explaining spatial clustering under a post-Fordist regime. In 
particular, it fails to demonstrate the necessity of spatial clustering, which 
would reinforce the argument made by the critics of the new orthodoxy, that 
industrial districts are the result of contingent factors like those that are 
contained in the "social boundedness" explanation.
6. THE URBAN AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF POST-FORDISM
While in the historical literature, industrial capitalism and urbanisation are
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clearly and strongly linked, with a wealth of empirical evidence upon which to 
draw, the (albeit younger) literature on post-Fordism has almost entirely 
sidestepped the issue of the relationship to cities, the urban system, and 
patterns of urbanisation. The same applies at the level of regions, and to 
patterns of uneven development in general. If the allegations of a new regime 
of accumulation are true, and if that regime has characteristics that are in many 
ways the antithesis of the Fordist regime, it would only seem reasonable to 
expect that not only would the pattern of territorial development be 
fundamentally and dramatically transformed, but that cities and regions take on 
a whole new centrality in larger processes of economic development. Such 
outcomes therefore have highly significant broader implications.
We would expect, for example, that some of the major observed patterns and 
tendencies associated with Fordist urbanism and regionalism would be 
transformed. These include:
• ongoing centralisation and urbanisation;
• suburbanisation and de-industrialization of the inner city;
• top-down relations of dominance in the urban hierarchy;
• rank-size stability in the urban hierarchy;
• relations between market size, production scales and cities in the urban 
hierarchy;
• core-periphery relationships between regions; and
• patterns of regional growth and decline.
The post-Fordist literature does not directly address these kinds of issues, 
although it is interesting to note that the "clean break" involving the reversal of 
long-standing urbanisation patterns begins at the same time as the start of the 
transition to post-Fordism.
The current post-Fordist literature, to the extent that it addresses issues of this 
kind, consists of many ambiguities and contradictions: Does post-Fordist 
urbanism represent a pattern of even or uneven development? Is it a
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metropolitan or non-metropolitan phenomenon? What are the implications for 
hierarchical relationships between regions or within the urban hierarchy? What 
is the relationship between industrial districts and regions?
In order to answer these questions, we need to understand the dynamic of 
urban and regional change, within the context of the relevant regime of 
accumulation. This cannot be achieved in the abstract; a detailed 
understanding is required of the territorial organisation of production, labour 
process, internal and external organisation of production, and types of inter- 
firm linkages in order to better comprehend spatial outcomes. This is what the 
following case studies attempt to do.
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PART II
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS IN THE THIRD ITALY
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EM ILIAN ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY
1. INTRODUCTION
Part II of the thesis presents the empirical evidence, which consists of three 
case studies, each of a different industrial district. In this chapter, the case 
study approach and methodology are briefly outlined in Section 2, and the 
context for the individual case studies is set in Section 3 with a brief overview 
of the evolution of industry and the urban/regional system in Emilia-Romagna. 
The individual case studies then follow in Chapters Four, Five and Six.
2. THE CASE STUDIES 
Approach
Following the approach of Massey (1984), Scott (1988a, 1988b) and many 
others, the division of labour is seen as central to understanding the territorial 
pattern of production, uneven development, the evolution of territory and 
patterns of urbanisation under capitalism. Massey in particular, has outlined a 
systematic framework which elaborates the concept of division of labour, and 
situates it within a broader understanding of the evolution of the industrial 
landscape.
Massey's elaboration of the organisational structure of capital was employed as 
the basis for structuring the field research which is presented in the three 
following chapters. The central elements of Massey's (1984) approach are:
• "economic ownership", i.e. the power to allocate investment capital;
• "possession", or control over the production process, including control 
over the physical means of production, and control over labour;
• the division of labour itself, that is, the degree to which production tasks 
are fragmented, specialised, and simplified;
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• conceptualisation and execution, that is, the degree to which a worker 
partakes in both the conceptualisation and realisation of a product.
Although Massey employs these elements in the analysis of multi-establishment 
enterprises, they provide an equally useful basis for exploring the 
organisational structure of capital in the Third Italy. The field research 
addressed these elements, and in particular, attempted to identify them in a 
spatial and territorial context. As well, other basic and relevant aspects of the 
system of production were investigated, including:
• firm history
• basic firm characteristics (revenues, number of employees, export 
orientation etc.)
• indices of flexibility (in product and production process)
• management structures
• labour process, internal division of labour and technology
• occupational structure
• relations with other firms.
With this information uncovered, we can describe the broad outlines of the 
territorial organisation of production in the Third Italy.
Methodology
The case studies were deliberately selected to represent a range of products, 
industrial sectors, and urban centres. They are: the knitwear district of Carpi, 
the oleodynamic components district of Modena, and the automatic packaging 
machinery district of Bologna. The products include a mature, consumer 
product (knitwear), a relatively new industrial product with a medium level of 
technological content (oleodynamic components), and a more complex 
producer product, also with a medium level of technological content 
(automatic packaging machinery). Some of these products have historically 
been produced according to Fordist production techniques, some are currently 
mass produced at the same time as they are produced flexibly, and some were
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never produced according to a Fordist regime.
Each productive complex also centres on a different type of urban centre. The 
knitwear industrial district is based in Carpi, a city of 60,000 in the Province of 
Modena (Figure 3.1). The oleodynamic components district centres around 
Modena, the capital of the Province of Modena, and a city of 180,000. The 
automatic packaging machinery example is focused around Bologna, the urban 
centre and capital of the region of Emilia-Romagna, and a city of 
approximately 500,000. By structuring the research in this manner we can 
isolate the potential effects of city size on the territorial organisation of 
production, and the general relationships between industry, city size and urban 
hierarchy.
The districts are comprised of many clustered firms, which generally fall into 
two types: the lead firm or “casa madre”, which has the direct relationship with 
the market, and subcontractor firms, which will generally be referred to herein 
as the “network firms”. One casa madre was selected in each district for 
interview, as well as a selection of firms that make up its production network.
Intensive interviews were held with the key agents of the case madri and with 
the contacts they provided for the firms in their respective networks. For 
smaller firms, the key person was always the owner-manager. With the case 
madri, the owner-directors were interviewed for Oil Control and IMA, as well 
as IMA's Director of Production. For Carma, the Director of Production was 
interviewed. The field research was conducted between March and July of 
1988.
An intensive interview process was necessary in order to obtain detailed 
qualitative and quantitative information regarding the internal organisation of 
the firms, their external relationships with other firms, as well as to establish a 
level of trust necessary to obtain more detailed information on the networks
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themselves. A standard set of questions was asked of each firm, with the 
exception of some minor variations necessary between the case madri and the 
network firms. The outline of the questionnaire is contained in Appendix 1, 
and a list of interviews is contained in Appendix 2.
3. EVOLUTION OF THE EMIUAN TERRITORY OF PRODUCTION
Emilia-Romagna is an administrative "region" located in north-east central 
Italy, with the region of Tuscany and city of Florence immediately to the south, 
and Veneto, the city of Venezia, and Lombardy at its northern border (see 
Figure 3.2). The region stretches from Piedmont to the east, to the Adriatic 
coast at its western edge.
The region consists of eight provinces, each with their own capital city, which 
together constitute the major cities of Emilia-Romagna. In turn, the provinces 
are each comprised of communi (municipalities). The municipalities generally 
correspond with the boundaries of the major cities, but outside of these areas, 
the communi are generally comprised of several towns and villages.
Despite its modest area (22,000 sq.km.) the internal geography of Emilia- 
Romagna is diverse. The Appenine mountains stretch east-west along its 
southern edge, known as the 'mountain region'. Extending along the base of 
the mountains, is the "pedemontana" (foot of the mountain) region; this is the 
location of the via Emilia, an ancient Roman road that stretches from Piacenza 
to the Adriatic coast, and which forms the major transportation axis of the 
region. The lower regions of the Adriatic coast stretch from the river Po in the 
north to Cattolica at Emilia's southern edge, including the Ferrarese basin. The 
remainder of the Region is comprised of the padana or plain, which is its highly 
productive agricultural heartland.
105
Figure 3.2
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The pre-industrial era
Indeed, agriculture has historically been the defining activity in Emilia- 
Romagna. In 1901, 65% of all regional employment was in the agricultural 
sector (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1
Employment by Sector, Emilia-Romagna (%)
1901 1951 1971 1981
Agriculture 64.6 51.8 20.0 13.4
Industrial 19.9 25.2 42.6 38.1
Services 15.5 23.9 27.4 48.5
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Istat, quoted in Capecchi, 1990.
The organisation of agriculture in Emilia-Romagna took a distinctive form. In 
1901, about 40% of those working in agriculture were waged workers (farm 
hands or labourers). The remaining 60% was comprised of workers on 
contract as share croppers (mezzadri\ or on rented land, or were small farm 
owners (Capecchi, 1990). Thus a significant part of the resident labour force 
had some entrepreneurial experience, a factor which is often cited as playing a 
key role in the later, distinctive evolution of the Emilian economy (e.g. Fua,
1985).
Though agriculture was the cornerstone of the regional economy, industry still 
had a steady presence, with the flowering in the 18th century of industries such 
as silk and hemp processing. Some of the current-day industrial districts can 
be dated back as early as the 1500s. Carpi, for example, was historically a 
woodworking centre, which led to a capability in straw braiding, and then a 
specialisation in the manufacture of straw hats. Sassuolo, a current centre for 
ceramic tile and tile production machinery, also had its roots in the 1500s, as a
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centre of pottery. The expansion of non-agricultural activities faced many 
obstacles, however, and industry was initially slow to grow. In the 40 years 
between 1861 and 1901, industrial employment grew by only 13,000 
(Tassinari, 1986) (Table 3.2). Nevertheless, by the turn of the century, 
industry accounted for 20% of employment, or about 266,000 active workers 
(Capecchi, 1990).
Table 3.2
Industrial Employment in Emilia-Romagna15 
(000s)
1861 1901 1911 1927 1937-
40
1951 1961 1971 1981
Population 
active in 
industry
253 266 336 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Industrial
Employment
n.a. n.a. 146 191 264 209 355 461 466
Source: Istat, quoted in Tassinari, 1986
The Emilian urban system was characterised by a highly developed, polycentric 
urban pattern, with the main cities oriented along the via Emilia. The pre- 
industrial urban system included many smaller towns and villages, evenly 
distributed across the region in almost perfect Christaller formation, but 
particularly in the northern half of the region, in the flat, agricultural, plain. 
These towns and villages acted as agricultural market centres, as well as 
residential areas for the farming population, where a high proportion of the 
labour force engaged in agriculture was not incompatible with an urban way of 
life. In addition to this base of small agricultural towns and villages was a 
layer of larger cities, which originated as the administrative centres for the 
small duchies and Papal states which existed prior to unification in
The source for this table is Tassinari (1986), who is quoting ISTAT data. The larger numbers in the first row seem to 
be the result of a  demographic census, and would reflect total resident population active in industry, ie. including residents of 
Emilia-Romagna employed in industry outside the region. The smaller numbers in the second row are the results of an industrial 
census, and represent jobs in the region.
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1861(Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1990). The city of Modena, for example, was the 
capital of the duchy of Modena, as was Parma the capital of the duchy of 
Parma (King, 1987).
The beginnings of industrial growth: 1900 to World W ar I
The beginning of the 20th century in Italy saw the takeoff of a belated process 
of industrialisation, which was particularly pronounced in the north-west and 
centred on the Genoa-Milan-Turin triangle. The effects of industrialisation 
were also felt in other regions, however, including Emilia-Romagna, where the 
population active in industry increased by 70,000 in the first decade of the 
century (Tassinari, 1986). While this represented a significant industrial 
expansion, with a ratio of industrial employees to resident population of 52 per 
1,000, Emilia Romagna still lagged significantly behind the rapidly 
industrialising centres of Milan and Turin, with ratios of 200 and 127 per
1,000 respectively (Tassinari, 1986).
The process of early industrialisation grew out of the existing strengths and 
activities in the region, in particular its agricultural base. Food processing and 
related industries constituted the largest share of employment, at 16% in 1911 
(Tassinari, 1986). Other key industries included agricultural machinery and 
motors, metalworking, and machine tools. These industrial specialisations 
were not in sectors which characterised the major thrust of industrial 
development in Italy generally, that is the electric, chemical, iron, and textile 
sectors.
The First World War reinforced the industrialisation of Emilia-Romagna, and 
created new centres of production between Reggio-Emilia and Bologna. In 
particular, the mechanical industries were strengthened, becoming the largest 
sector in terms of employment by the end of the 1930s, accounting for 49,000 
workers (Tassinari, 1986). Even in the first half of the 20th century, the 
Emilian mechanical sector was characterised by customisation and flexibility,
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and in Bologna, for example, the majority of industries were oriented towards 
the production of custom-made machinery or the production of prototypes of 
automobiles or racing motorcycles (Capecchi, 1990).
As Figure 3.3 shows, even in the first decades of the 1900s the region was 
highly urbanised, with the 10 communes along the via Emilia accounting for 
some 26% of total regional population (Fregna, 1985). Figure 3.4 indicates the 
distribution of population in Emilia-Romagna in 1927.
Industrialisation during this period was overwhelmingly an urban process, 
which was particularly focused on the provincial capital cities. The 
distribution of industrial activity in the first quarter of the 20th century is 
shown in Figure 3.5. Again, we can see a strong orientation along the via 
Emilia, as well as in the provincial capital cities of Ravenna and Ferrara. Carpi 
is shown as having a significant concentration in wood industries, the precursor 
of its later evolution into knitwear. By the end of the 1930s, the eight 
provincial capital cities accounted for 112,000 industrial workers (Tassinari, 
1986).
The boom period: 1950-1971
After overcoming some problems in the immediate post-war period (such as 
converting the industrial apparatus back to non-military activities), the Emilian 
industrial system had by 1951 recovered its pre-war levels of agricultural and 
manufacturing production. The region, along with the rest of Italy, was poised 
for a period of intensive industrialisation and economic expansion that was 
particularly pronounced in the 1950s, but which continued apace through the 
1960s. Industrial employment increased from 209,000 in 1951 to 355,000 in 
1961, an increase of 146,000 (Tassinari, 1986). In Emilia-Romagna, per capita 
output increased by 84% in real terms between 1951 and 1960, compared to a 
national average of 63% (Tassinari, 1986).
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Figure 3.3
The Emilian Urban System in 1927
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Figure 3.5
Distribution of Industrial Activity 
Sectors with more than 250 workers, Emilia-Romagna, 1927
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It was thus during this same period of bounding industrial productivity that 
Emilia-Romagna's transformation from an economy that was still dominated by 
agriculture (which accounted for 52% of employment in 1951 (Table 3.1)) to a 
predominantly industrial region took place. The reasons given for this rapid 
expansion are many, but some suggest that the explosion in productivity can be 
attributed to the prior dominance of backward technologies (Tassinari, 1986). 
Other explanations for the rapid industrial expansion include high profit levels 
deriving from low wages, and the rapid increase in exports. Industrial sectors 
which underwent particularly spectacular expansion included the metal- 
mechanical sector, in which 60,000 new jobs were created, chemicals (14,000 
new jobs) and textiles 22,000 new jobs (Tassinari, 1986) (Table 3.316).
ISTAT m anufac tu ring  categories have been changed in every industria l census period since 1951, m aking long te rm  sector 
com parisons d ifficu lt. Table 3 3  a tte m p ts  to  be as consisten t as possible in showing grow for individual sectors.
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The process of industrialisation was not one of productive decentralization 
from other regions, but continued to be linked with the region's agricultural 
foundations: rapid increases in agricultural productivity created a massive 
supply of surplus labour, as the population active in agriculture fell by 650,000 
between 1951 and 1981 (Tassinari, 1986); the evolution of industrial industries 
directly related to agriculture (agricultural machinery, food processing, 
packaging machinery); and the availability of capital emanating from the 
agricultural sector for investment in industry.
This period of rapid industrialisation was accompanied by a strong process of 
urbanisation. While between 1935 and 1971 the population of the region 
doubled, the urban population grew by more than four times (Fregna, 1985). 
The urban boom period was the decade from 1951 to 1961 (see Table 3.4). 
Though the metropolises of the Italian industrial triangle also experienced an 
urban boom during this same period, this rapid growth can be attributed to 
migration from the rural south (the mezzogiomo). In Emilia-Romagna, rapid 
urbanisation was the result of internal migration, from the hilly and 
mountainous southern portion of Emilia-Romagna, the Ferrarese basin, and 
some depressed agricultural areas of the plain, primarily to the major cities 
along the via Emilia (see Figure 3.6). The pattern of urbanisation was also 
different in Emilia-Romagna than the regions of Piedmont and Lombardy, in 
that the destinations were a number of cities along the via Emilia, rather than a 
single central metropolis as was the case with Milan and Turin. The 
population of the provincial capital cities increased from 1,057,000 to
1,463,000 between 1951 and 1971 (Tassinari, 1986).
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Table 3.3
Employment by Manufacturing Sector, Emilia-Romagna
1951 1961 1971 1981
TOTAL 208.616 352,713 461,990 465,974
Food and 
related
34,755 Food and 
related
51,486 Food and 
related
49,620 Food 35,109
Beverages 
and Tobacco
17,525
Tobacco 3,620 Tobacco 2,211 Tobacco 1,670
Leather 1,215 Leather 3,273 Leather 3,760 Leather 6,399
Textiles 11,666 Textiles 24,448 Textiles 34,770 Textiles 39,602
Clothing 33,435 Clothing 45,785 Clothing 48,360 Clothing 52,719
Wood 21,421 Wood 34,793 Wood 36,010 Wood 37,258
Paper 3,567 Paper 4,967 Paper 5,856 Paper,
printing,
publishing
20,600
Printing/Pub. 4,596 Printing/Pub. 6,913 Printing/Pub. 10,246
Photographic
etc.
694 Photographic,
etc.
1,304 ■Photographic
etc.
1,721
Metallurgical 1,263 Metallurgical 1,962 Metallurgical 4,990 Metal
products
74,828
Mechanical 59,085 Non-electrical
machines
49,855 Mechanical 158,180 Machines 
and mech. 
materials
96,481
Mechanical
workshops
42,931 Office
machines/
computers
879
Electrical/tel. 8,297 Electrical/
Electronic
31,067
Precision
mechanics
4,710 Precision
mechanics
6,218
Transport 8,946 Transport 15,380 Autos 13,168
Other trans. 9,488
Non-metallic
minerals
18,832 Non-metallic
minerals
32,833 Non-metallic
minerals
53,840
Chemicals 10,113 Chemicals 17,670 Chemicals 16,970
Rubber 1,848 Rubber 3,421 Rubber 3,767 Rubber and 
plastics
18,033
Plastic objects 3,189 Plastic objects 9,758
Synth, fibres 1,556 * Synth, fibres 2,137
Misc. Mfg. 2,506 Misc. Mfg. 2,181 Misc. Mfg. 4,904 Misc. Mfg. 6,600
Source: ISTAT, Censimento Generate dell Industria e del Commercio, 1951-1981
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Table 3.4
Post-war Urban Growth 
(Resident Population)
1951 1961 1971 1981
Piacenza 72,856 88,541 106,461 108,177
Parma 122,978 141,203 174,655 176,750
Reggio-Emilia 106,726 116,445 128,844 129,893
Modena 111,364 139,183 171,063 179,933
Bologna 340,526 444,872 490,036 455,853
Forli 77,508 91,945 104,892 109,815
Ravenna 91,798 115,525 131,878 137,597
Ferrara 133,949 152,654 153,119 150,265
Milan 1,274,245 1,582,534 1,724,173 1,634,638
Turin 719,300 1,025,833 1,167,968 1,103,520
Genoa 688,447 784,194 816,872 760,300
Source: ISTAT, Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1962, 1972, 1982
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Figure 3.6
Internal Migration, 1951-1971, Emilia-Romagna
reduction of greater than 1 
reduction of less than 10% 
increase of less than 10% 
increase of greater than 10%
Source: Avellini andPalazzi, 1980.
The 1970s to 1980s
For Italy, like the rest of the industrialised nations, the 1970s was a period of 
extreme economic turbulence, which included "stagflation" as well as rising 
unemployment levels. The effects of the more generalised upheaval were not 
felt evenly across Italy, however. The north-west saw the lowest levels of 
growth in value added for industrial activities, and a drop in employment of 
about 5% in the manufacturing industries (Tassinari, 1986).
During this period, the region of Emilia out-performed the nation as a whole 
economically. Value-added increased 46% between 1971 and 1981, compared 
to 33% for Italy (Tassinari, 1986). This continued economic expansion was 
felt across all sectors of the regional economy, but was particularly strong in 
manufacturing, which increased its share of total regional output from 31% to 
35% during the same period (Tassinari, 1986). This was related to ongoing
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improvements in productivity, which exhibited an average annual increase of 
4.3% between 1971 and 1981 (Tassinari, 1986). Labour participation rates in 
Emilia-Romagna were 8% above the national average, while unemployment 
rates, at 7.3%, were notably lower than the national level of 14.8% (Tassinari, 
1986).
The reasons for this sustained, above-average economic performance, 
particularly in times of more generalised economic upheaval, are of course the 
subject of considerable debate. Much of the discussion, not surprisingly, 
focuses on the distinctive manner in which production is organised in Emilia- 
Romagna, for it is this feature which most distinguishes the Emilian system of 
production from others. Though this will be discussed and illustrated in detail 
in the case studies, in general, the so-called "Emilian model" of production is 
characterised by production that is disaggregated by phase or phases, with each 
phase taking place in a small firm or firms, which form networks and cluster 
together geographically to form specialised industrial districts. There are 
several such districts in the Third Italy and Emilia-Romagna, producing 
products such as’knitwear, automatic packaging machinery, ceramics, 
motorcycles, textiles, clothing, jewellery, instrumentation, oleodynamic 
components, biotechnology, etc. Figure 3.7. shows the results of one attempt 
to identify these districts in Emilia-Romagna.
In this period, the ongoing industrialisation continued the trajectories that had 
already been established, especially in terms of the sectoral composition of 
industry. Regional industrial specialisations included the metal-mechanical 
sector (including mechanical machines and equipment, other metal products - 
primarily industrial machine tools and agricultural machinery), food products, 
ceramics, and knitwear. Most of these sectors were export-oriented, and as a 
result, Emilia-Romagna was in 1981 the third most export-oriented region in 
Italy, behind Lombardy and Piedmont (Tassinari, 1986).
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Figure 3.7
Industrial Districts in Emilia-Romagna
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( a )  F o o d s t u f f s  (P a r m a ,  R e g g i o  Em il ia )
Source: Bicmchi and Gualtieri, 1990.
These regional distinctions came to be recognised as defining a 
characteristically different type of productive system which fell into neither 
component of the dualistic core-periphery model that had been used to describe 
the Italian economy. While Emilia definitely shared little with the relatively 
under-industrialised south or "mezzogiomo", neither was it fundamentally 
similar to the industrialised northern triangle framed by Milan, Turin and 
Genoa. In the late 1970s, attention was drawn to the unique economy of the 
economic region which bridged the north and south. La terza Italia or the 
"third Italy", which included Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and the Marches, was 
recognised as a distinct region unto itself (Bagnasco, 1977).
Despite the fact that the pattern of urban growth in Emilia-Romagna was 
polycentric in nature compared to urbanisation in the north-west, which 
focused on a single regional metropolis, there were still marked territorial 
differentiations at the intra-regional scale. Industrial employment was focused
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on the three central provinces of Reggio-Emilia, Modena and Bologna, which 
together accounted for 60% of regional industrial jobs (Tassinari, 1986).
However, the most significant geographical differentiation does not take place 
on the basis of provinces, but, first, according to the various internal sub- 
regions of Emilia identified earlier (mountains and hills, mountain base region, 
the plain), and, second, according to an urban/rural dimension. The areas of 
industrialisation have been those located along the base of the mountains and 
the via Emilia, between Parma and Imola, including some areas of the plain in 
Reggio-Emilia, Modena and Bologna. But within these areas, the major focus 
of development has been on the provincial capital cities, forming industrial 
"rings" around the cities, while in other cities, there have not been signs of 
industrial agglomeration on a large scale (Tassinari, 1986). In Bologna, 
however, industrial activities have spread into the mountain regions, along the 
major autoroutes south to Florence. In other provinces, the mountain zones 
by and large have been left out of the industrialisation process (Tassinari,
1986).
By the 1980s, however, the process of industrialisation and the concomitant 
growth of the provincial capital cities was giving way to the tertiarization of 
these urban centres, with the locations for industry moving from the urban 
centres proper, to the immediate fringes ("circondario"), to the peripheries, 
and finally to the mountains and low plain areas (Tassinari, 1986). There can 
be said, therefore, to have been two phases to territorial development: a first 
phase which ended around 1970, in which industrialisation proceeded directly 
with urbanisation of the major capital cities, and a second phase in the seventies 
and eighties in which industrialisation continued, but adopted a more diffuse 
pattern, less focused on the cities proper, and more on their immediately 
surrounding areas and fringes, smaller surrounding centres, and transportation 
routes (Tassinari, 1986). This pattern of suburbanisation and exurbanisation 
can be attributed to pressure from service industries competing for central city
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space, the need for large industrial premises, and local planning incentives to 
relocate industry to surrounding towns. This is not to say that the capital 
cities ceased to played a major role as industrial centres; in 1981, there was 
still industrial employment of 155,000 in the eight capital cities, or 27% of 
regional industrial jobs (Tassinari, 1986).
Several studies have revealed significant intra-regional variations in levels of 
development in Emilia-Romagna. One such study revealed three distinct 
groups of areas, which tended to form sub-regions: I) the depressed areas, 
which coincided with the hill and mountain regions; ii) the areas of economic 
and demographic development, situated along the base of the mountains and 
the via Emilia, as well as in the poles of Ravenna, Ferrara, Carpi, Sassuolo, the 
plain north of the via Emilia, and the Modenese hills; and iii) the areas of 
relative stasis; including the Emilian plain (Montanari, 1972, referred to in 
Truffelli, 1983) (Figure 3.8).
Subsequent studies have confirmed these findings, for example, that of Monti 
et. al. (1979), who found four sub-regional areas: I) large urban centres, rings 
and industrial centres; ii) zones of transition and developed agricultural or 
tourist areas; iii) zones of average depression; and iv) zones of maximum 
depression (Figure 3.9). A general conclusion of this stream of research was 
that all the areas of major depression were localised in the mountain areas, 
especially in the western reaches, versus a clear zone along the via Emilia 
(Truffelli, 1983). It was also concluded, however, that a major dimension of 
uneven development occurred on the basis of urban versus non-urban places 
(Truffelli, 1983).
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Figure 3.8
Intra-Regional Uneven Development (I)
Area of developm ent
Areas of relative stability
Depressed areas
Source: Montanari, 1972, reproduced in Trufelli, 1983
Figure 3.9
Intra-Regional Uneven Development (II)
□
Large urban centres - 
rings and industrial poles
Zones of industrial transition  -
tou rist zones, - developed agricultu ral zones
Zones of average depression - 
agricu tura l plain zones
Zones of m ajor depression
Source: Monti et al, 1979, reproduced in Trufelli, 1983.
In Italy, the 1970s saw a dramatic turnaround in the trend toward urbanisation; 
every major northern centre lost population during this period17. This 
corresponded with a period of industrial decline, in which Milan lost 30% of 
manufacturing employment, and Turin 25% (Campos Venuti, 1986). A notable 
exception was Bologna. A slight increase in the number employed nationally in 
manufacturing in this decade was mainly attributed to industrial growth in the 
Third Italy, especially in the small and medium-sized towns (Campos Venuti, 
1986). Manufacturing employment in Bologna increased from 110,000 in 
1951, to 150,000 in 1961, to 162,000 in 1971, to 173,000 in 1981 (Zangheri, 
1986: 295). There was significant population growth in Emilia-Romagna in 
this period, but unlike the preceding decades, it was the result not of natural 
increase and internal migration, but of migration from other regions of Italy 
(Tassinari, 1986).
While in Emilia-Romagna the two boom decades saw industrialisation distinctly 
related to a process of urbanisation, and in particular, growth of the provincial 
capital cities, the 1970s and '80s developments resulted in a tendency toward 
spatial diffusion of industrial activities, which have been decentralising from the 
cities to their rural fringes (Tassinari, 1986, p. 20).
By the 1980s, Emilia-Romagna was highly urbanised. The urban system was 
extremely articulated, with three main levels to the urban hierarchy: the 
regional centre of Bologna, the provincial capitals, and the myriad smaller 
towns and villages (see Figure 3.10). At a population of 450,000, Bologna was 
still, however, not in the same urban class as centres such as Turin, Milan or 
Rome. The cities and towns are remarkably evenly distributed over the 
territory of the region, in an almost classic Christallerian pattern.
Although this decline may be overstated by statistical accounting methods, in particular, th a t the m etropolitan areas 
eventually expanded well beyond the metropolitan census areas. Attempts to correct this shortcoming resulted in somewhat different 
outcomes: Milan was shown to have grown by 3H , but the population of Turin still dropped, albeit by 2% under the revised methodology 
(King, 1987: 119).
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In the next chapters, the territorial organisation of production of three 
industrial districts in the region will be examined, so that we may uncover the 
dynamic of territorial evolution in the last two decades or so, the so called 
post-Fordist era, for which Emilian examples are often cited as evidence.
Figure 3.10
The Emilian Urban System in the 1980s
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CHAPTER FOUR
LOCALISED DIFFUSION: THE CARPI KNITW EAR DISTRICT
This chapter examines the territorial organisation of production in the knitwear 
industrial district of Carpi. First, some background on Italian knitwear in 
general and the evolution of the Carpi district is provided. Section 2 examines 
the detailed organisation of production for one lead firm’s production network: 
Carma S.p.a.. In the final section, the territorial aspects of the district as a 
whole and Carma are addressed.
I. BACKGROUND
l.l The Italian knitwear industry
The knitwear industry existed in Italy prior to World War II but in an artisan 
production form only, which consisted of small firms and the widespread use of 
homeworkers. In the 1960s, the sector expanded considerably, due to 
increased internal demand and exports. However, by the late 1960s, new 
international competitors for export markets, including those from Far East 
Asia, led to a fall in overall demand for Italian knitwear products. At this 
point, competitiveness was established on the basis of price for a standardised 
product, and competition from low wage countries reduced Italy's share of 
export markets. This was particularly true for the US export market, which in 
first half of the 1960s accounted for between 20 and 30% of Italian exports, 
but in the 70s and 80s ranged from only 1 to 7% (Maglia e Calze and SDA, 
quoted in Utili, 1988).
A restructuring ensued, resulting in an increase in the presence of private firms 
of medium to large scale, though the small firm was still predominant. In 1951, 
97% of firms in the knitwear and hosiery sector had ten or fewer employees.
By 1971, the same group accounted for only 86%, while the number of firms in 
the 11-100 employee range grew (Utili, 1988). With the restructuring, new 
poles of production emerged, including Emilia-Romagna, along with the
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neighbouring regions of Veneto and Tuscany. These areas were able to 
substantially increase their presence on the national scene in the 
knitwear/hosiery industry in the post-war period. Meanwhile, the traditional 
wool and cotton producing areas of the industrial north-west in particular lost 
substantial shares in the sector (Table 4.1). In 1981, Emilia-Romagna 
accounted for almost one-fifth of national knitwear employment.
Beginning in the mid 1970s, exports began to increase substantially, a trend 
which continued into the 1980s (Figure 4.1). By the mid 1980s the European 
Community constituted by far the largest export market for Italian knitwear, 
with 80% of exports going to EEC countries in 1984, especially West 
Germany and France (Maglia e Calze and SDA, quoted in Utili, 1988). The 
textile/clothing sector was very significant in Italy, employing well over half a 
million people in 1981 in over 70,000 establishments, while knitwear 
employment accounted for 261,00018. The average firm remained very small, 
at eight employees for the average textile/clothing firm, and six employees for 
the average knitwear firm (Table 4.2).
2.2 Emergence of the Carpi Knitwear District
The history of the Carpi textile/clothing district can be traced back to the 
1400s, having evolved from earlier weaving industries, particularly weaving of 
straw. From the 1500s until the 1950s Carpi was known in northern Italy and 
Central Europe for its export of straw hats. The earlier straw industries 
permitted a stabilisation of family income by providing an alternative source to 
seasonal, agricultural earnings, and fostered a local entrepreneurial tradition, as 
well as a skilled working class (CGIL, 1988).
18 This calculation based on ISTAT data , compiled to be comparable with the aggregation used in Bursi, 1983, for the Carpi 
textile/clothing sector statistics.
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Table 4.1
National Distribution of Employment in the Knitwear/Hosiery Industry,
1951-1981 (percent)
1951 1961 1971 1981
Piedmont 16.2 11.2 7.9 7.2
Lombardy 41.3 40.9 30.2 27.9
Veneto 10.4 9.2 15.2 15.5
Emilia-Rom. 9.5 15.1 17.7 18.7
Tuscany 4.9 6.4 7.9 11.4
Rest of Italy 17.7 17.2 21.1 19.2
All Italy 100 100 100 100
Source: Maglia e Calze quoted in Utili (1987)
Table 4.2
Knitwear Industry in Italy and Carpi, 1981
Italy Carpi Carpi/Italy
(%)
TEXTILE/CLOTHING
No. of Establishments 70,717 2,425 3.4
Employment 592,161 10,250 1.7
Avg. Emp./Establishment 8.4 4.2 -
KNITWEAR TEXTILES 
AND ARTICLES
No. of Establishments 43,884 1,654 3.7
Employment 261,361 6,820 2.6
Avg. Emp./Establishment 6.0 4.1
Source: ISTAT, 1981 Industrial Census, and Bur si, 1983.
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Figure 4.1
Knitwear Production, Exports, Imports 
(Italy)
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Source: ISTAT, Maglia e Calze, quoted in Utili (1987)
When, after the Second World War, the industry entered into an irreversible 
decline, the pre-existing organisational structures and commercial linkages 
were adopted for the new industry o f 'maglietteria' - the manufacture of 
standard jerseys. The maglietteria industry adopted the organisational forms 
of the straw industry, in particular, the use of homeworkers as the primary 
source of labour. The use of homeworkers expanded further in the 1950s, 
facilitating the formation of new entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship was also a 
result of layoffs that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s as an anti-union 
maneuver (CGIL, 1988).
By the 1970s, the use of homeworkers dropped off, and the maglietteria 
industry diversified into other clothing, textiles and especially, knitwear, as the 
outline for the current industrial district began to take shape. This consisted of 
a decentralised structure of small workshops, operating as sub-contractors,
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specialising in a single phase of production (CGIL, 1988).
Since the 1950s there has been a substantial and steady rise in employment in 
the textile/clothing sector both in absolute numbers, and in the share of total 
manufacturing employment devoted to this sector (Table 4.3).
The Carpi industrial district in 1986 was comprised of 697 artisan firms with 
dependent workers, 375 industrial firms with dependent workers, and 
approximately 900 to 1,000 family owned and operated firms without 
dependents, for a total of 1,972 to 2,072 firms in the textile/clothing sector 
(FULTA data, quoted in CGIL, 1988)19. The artisan firms with dependents 
average about 3.9 workers per firm, while the industrial firms have an average 
of 15.5 workers. The overall average, based on census data, is 4.4 workers per 
firm. Firms are small in this sector generally, but in Carpi they are half the size 
of the national average (Table 4.2).
The total number of people working in the sector was estimated at 11,000, of 
which at least 8,500 are dependent workers (i.e. not owners) (CGIL, 1988). 
This means that more than one out of every six men, women and children 
resident in the Commune of Carpi works in the textile/clothing industry, 
particularly the knitwear sector, or one out of three employed workers, or one 
out of every two industrial workers. Note that these figures do not include the 
many homeworkers and other 'informal' workers. Carpi's share of 
national employment specifically in knit fabrics and articles is higher than its 
share for the textile/clothing sector as a whole20.
Some figures are available for only the textile/clothing sector, while others are available for the knitwear sector 
specifically, which is a  subset of the former. In Carpi, however, the two are almost synonymous; in 1981, for example, knitwear 
accounted for 7 0 S  of all firms and workers in the textile/clothing sector in the Municipality of Carpi (ISTAT data  quoted in Bursi,
1983).
20 This is a  common measure of geographic concentration in a particular industry. It compares a  given locality’s share of national 
employment to its share of national employment in a  given industry. If the latter is higher than  the former, then a geographic concentration 
in that industry is said to exist. This is the approach adopted by Sforci (1989,1990) in his identification of Italian industrial districts.
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Table 4.3
Textile/Clothing Workers as a Percentage of Manufacturing Employment, 
Commune of Carpi, 1951-198121
Establishments Employment Textile/clothing workers as a 
% of manufacturing 
employment
1951 397 1,372 37%
1961 549 5,731 51%
1971 1,216 8,811 62%
1981 2,498 11,064 61%
Source: 1ST AT (census data) quoted in CGIL, 1988 - Carpi
This is because of Carpi's extreme concentration of employment in the knitwear 
sector.
Rapid growth in exports was the primary cause behind the quick expansion of 
the district, and it remains strongly export-oriented. In 1986, the textile and 
clothing industry in the Province of Modena exported almost Lit. 
950,000,000,000 (approximately £ 475,000,000 sterling) or 14.5 % of all 
Italian exports in this sector (CGIL, 1988). Most of these exports can be 
considered to come from the Carpi industrial district, and concentrated in the 
knitwear sub-sector. The largest markets for Modenese exports are the central 
European countries.
The functional area of the district includes Carpi, Novi di Modena, Soliera, 
Correggio and Cavezzo, but is focused primarily on the city of Modena and its 
immediate environs.
The figures presented here for Carpi are slightly higher than those presented in Table 4.2 because they include tinting and 
treatm ents, labels and other miscellaneous textile production activities not included in the earlier table.
2. THE CARMA S.P.A. PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM
In the Carpi industrial district, there are myriad systems through which 
production is organised. The system that will be presented below is, however, 
the most prevalent. In the late 1980s, only two firms in the area controlled 
production directly through ownership - all other major firms used indirect, 
network systems of production (Pagliani, interview, 1988). In basic outline, 
the predominant productive system consists of a 'casa madre' or 'mother firm1 
which conducts all functions except production, and a network of smaller firms 
or artisans' workshops which undertake virtually all of the production involved. 
This case study examines the productive system which revolves around one 
casa madre, 'Carma S.p.a.'. This lead firm was chosen because it and its sub­
contracting firm are generally representative of firms in the district as a whole. 
The term “network firm” will hereafter be used to refer to subcontractor, 
artisan and other secondary firms within a production network, as distinct from 
the casa madre. Before proceeding, however, a basic understanding of the 
processes involved in production is required.
2.1 The knitwear production process
In general, the knitwear production process involves the following major 
stages:
• product design;
• model-making, in paper;
• prototype making, in fabric;
• sample-making;
• selling of samples;
• acquisition of manufacturing supplies; and
• production.
The exact steps followed in the production phase will depend upon the 
complexity and design of the particular product. For example, some sweaters 
have buttons, some do not - some sweaters have embroidery while others will
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not. The steps that could be involved in production include the following, 
which are presented in the order in which they would be executed:
• 'tessitura', i.e. the manufacture of the textile itself, which in this case is a
knit fabric, and for simplicity sake this stage will hereafter be referred to
simply as 'knitting';
• finishing of the textile itself Qfinisaggio');
• pre-ironing of the textile;
• cutting of the textile into usable pieces;
• 'confezione' or making-up, which includes the basic sewing and assembly;
• dyeing;
• embroidery;
• detailing: finishing up of seams, buttons and buttonholes;
• ironing the individual pieces;
• testing and inspection;
• packaging; and
• shipping.
Not all products will involve all of the production stages listed above. In other 
cases, a product will not proceed in linear fashion through the above steps, but 
will reach a certain stage, such as embroidery, and must return to the making 
up stage for further work before it can proceed to subsequent stages.
2.2 Carma S.p.a. - The 'casa madrd
Carma is a firm located in the Carpi industrial district which specialises in 
knitwear for men, and at the time of interview employed 72 workers. In 1987, 
the firm posted sales of Lit. 17 billion (roughly £8 .5 million sterling), about 35 
percent of which was exported to EEC countries, the US and Japan. Carma 
sells its products to about 1,500 boutiques, no single one of which dominates 
sales. Carma is an independently owned, single establishment.
The firm was founded in 1962, at a time in which the knitwear industry as a 
whole was expanding in Carpi and in surrounding areas. By the mid 1970s, the
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firm employed about 300 workers, and produced a standardised, lower quality 
product for a wholesaler. A limited range of styles was produced in large 
quantities. The firm not only produced to supply immediate demand, but also 
produced for stocks, thereby allowing production in the firm to be undertaken 
on a constant and regular basis throughout the year.
During this period, all stages of production were undertaken within Carma 
itself. However, at certain particularly busy times of the year, outside firms 
were used to supplement the capacity of internal production. Within the firm, 
production was organised according to the various stages. A number of 
different groups of workers were each located in a specific part of the factory 
and responsible for a specific phase of production. Each group was controlled 
by a head or supervisor. There was no movement of workers between groups; 
each worker specialised in a given phase of production, for which specialised 
machinery existed.
Toward the end of the 1970s, new Third World and Eastern Bloc competitors 
emerged in standardized knitwear products, particularly China, Romania and 
Bulgaria. These competitors were able to produce a similar product at greatly 
reduced prices, which Italian producers could not match with their then 
existing productive structure, particularly higher wage rates. Carma was 
forced to adopt a new competitive strategy, and chose to differentiate its 
product from that of its new competitors. Carma adopted a strategy of 
moving up-market, providing a higher quality, more expensive product that 
could not be replicated in competitor countries.
A second factor which brought about the change in the product was the 
changing nature of demand. While in the 1970s a single style would have sold 
well for up to five years, because of the so-called 'fashion factor', this stable 
demand no longer existed. "Now it is fashionable for today and today only" 
(Morelli, interview, 1988). The sales system was radically altered to
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accommodate the rapid changes in demand. Continuous production for stocks 
and a wholesaler was replaced with production on the basis only of prior sales 
orders obtained by their sales representatives (ie. 'sul venduto').
The Network System of Externalised Production
At the same time, toward the end of the 1970s, Carma instituted a restructuring 
of the system of production, in order to address the now rapidly changing 
demand, competitive pressures, and to suit the new types of product. The 
organisational response consisted of shedding all production functions, and all 
of the production workers in Carma were let go. All production functions 
were decentralised to external sub-contractors (Table 4.4). At the time of 
interview, the firm employed 72, versus the 300 employees before the 
restructuring. Production was decentralised to a network of small firms and 
artisans’ workshops, many of which were started by ex-employees after the 
restructuring. Carma's network consisted of an active roster of about fifty such 
small firms, most of which are located in the immediate area, with a few in 
Veneto or Lombardy. However, a lesser number of firms would be employed 
in the production of a single order.
This decentralised production process is established, controlled and organised 
entirely from within Carma, where there is full-time production coordinator. 
The supplies are acquired by Carma, and are given to the network firms with 
the order. The product is returned to Carma for inspection after each stage.
In this manner Carma controls the quality of the product. There are no direct 
or indirect links of any kind between artisan firms involved in production of the 
same item.
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Table 4. 4
Stages of knitwear production - Carma S.p.a.
Stage o f Production Internal (Carma) External
Design / /
Paper pattern V
Prototype /
Multiple samples V
Selling V
Acquisition of supplies /
Knitting of textile /
Pre-ironing /
Cutting /
Pre-assembly V
Embroidery /
Assembly /
Ironing /
Quality inspection /
Packaging /
Shipping V
In general, the small network firms are extremely specialised; firms exist for 
each of the stages of production listed at the beginning of this section. The 
level of the social division of labour is therefore very high and in some cases, 
extreme. For example, there are firms that only make buttonholes and sew 
buttons onto garments.
The number of firms involved in the production of any one item will therefore 
depend on the level of complexity of the product. In some cases, for example
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where time is an especially important factor, more than one firm will be used to 
perform the same stage of production. Generally though, the casa madre 
strives to keep the number of sub-contracted artisan firms ('artigiani') to a 
minimum, in order to keep the administration and management of the 
production process to a minimum also.
Carma will, from time to time, employ more than one firm in a given phase of 
production. This is because the production phase itself is often very 
compressed in duration, and occurs only at certain times of the year. By 
utilising more than one firm in a given phase, an order can be split and 
production can be completed within a reduced period of time.
The Internal Organisation of Production
Carma undertakes internally all pre- and post-production phases, including 
product design, paper model-making, prototypes, selling of samples, 
acquisition of manufacturing supplies, inspection and shipping. With respect to 
the internal phases of production undertaken by Carma itself, there is not a very 
great division of labour within the firm. Internal organisation is structured 
around individual clothing collections; each collection has a designer, and a 
corresponding team of workers of all types (production workers, clerk, 
supervisor), involved primarily in the manufacture of prototypes and 
coordination of production. Jobs are not rigidly defined, and there is a 
considerable amount of movement on the production side especially, between 
the various tasks involved in sample making, and even between production 
work and administration, for example.
Moreover, because of the seasonality of production (fall and spring lines are 
produced), there are seasonal changes in the type of work required. The firm 
produces in two annual seasons, each of about six months. Each season is 
comprised of three months in which the sample making takes place, and a 
subsequent three months in which production is taking place outside the firm.
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This means that the type of work undertaken within Carma also changes every 
three months. The first three months are comprised of the product generation, 
and the next three months involve primarily exercising control over and 
coordinating production. Naturally these two diverse functions require 
different skills, yet the internal workforce does not change. The same workers 
must perform the different tasks associated with each seasonal phase.
Design and sample-making require a broad knowledge of all stages of 
production, and of all of the types of machinery involved in manufacturing. 
Computerized production equipment is used, with a direct link between the 
computer design function and production of the paper model. Carma has four 
such machines. Manually programmed machines are then used for the internal 
production of prototypes and some sales samples.
The management structure of this firm is relatively light, comprised of four 
division directors: a Director of Administration, a Commercial Director, a 
Director of Production, and a Director of Sales - which correspond to the 
broad divisions of the company. The four directors report to a board of 
owners, one of whom plays an active directorial role in the management of the 
firm. In addition to the five directors, the firm is comprised of 22 clerks, 10 
"intermediates", and the remainder of about 35 being made up of labourers.
Decisions regarding what items will be produced are made jointly. First, it is 
the responsibility of the designer to judge what will be fashionable and sell well, 
Prototypes are made of these designs, then samples are produced and brought 
to clients to be sold. The sales representatives can and do also play a role in 
influencing the clients' orders. On the basis of the orders received, the 
Commercial Director then assesses which items will be economic to produce, 
and which will not. In this sense, Carma is highly integrated with the market 
and market response itself plays a major role in determining what the company 
will produce, before it produces it.
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The remaining discussion in Section 2 describes a sample of firms from 
Carma’s network, which are representative of the main phases of production.
23 Corazzari e Bruschi 
The Internal Organisation of Production
This artisan firm produces the knit textile, in rolls or squares. The yam arrives 
from Carma with an order. There are 20 automatic rectilinear knitting 
machines, some of which are numerically controlled and some of which are 
computer controlled. The machines are programmed to produce the order, 
usually by the owner himself, Sig. Bruschi, or the one senior worker who also 
has some programming skills. The yam is loaded and the machines then knit 
the fabric, which is then checked, counted, packaged, and returned to Carma.
The firm's employees, according to Sig. Bruschi, break down into two groups: 
men workers and women workers. The four male workers operate and 
supervise the machines. Once the machines have been programmed, the 
machine operators will generally adjust the machinery for different sizes or 
types of yam, and perform simple maintenance tasks. The seven women do 
the counting, checking, and packaging of the textile. There is no movement 
between these two groups, either on a day to day basis or in terms of career 
paths. All of the employees have been trained entirely within the firm itself. 
The working conditions in this company appeared relatively good. With 
regard to worker autonomy, there was no strict supervisory structure in place.
For the worker, the degree of integration of conceptualisation and execution is 
low. The product is conceived outside of the firm itself - either in the casa 
madre or by a freelance designer working for the casa madre. 
Conceptualisation of the product is therefore really confined to 
conceptualisation of the intermediate product, i.e. the knit fabric itself, and to 
determining the best way to produce a given item. There can however, be
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some flow of information back to the casa madre regarding the technical 
aspects or feasibility of producing given products. Because the designers do 
not generally have a full understanding of the process of production, they may 
design something that is impossible or problematic to produce. In these cases, 
C&B will provide technical support and advice to the casa madre on how to 
modify the product. Generally, C&B will try to preempt problems before they 
happen, so they will review the designs with the technical office of Carma and 
make any modifications necessary from the technical point of view before they 
accept the order for production. Often, the client approaches them without a 
clear idea of what they want produced, and C&B will provide advice on the 
technical limitations of the proposed idea. This technical feedback usually 
involves only Sig. Bruschi; so while there is some cooperation and interaction 
between the two firms regarding the conceptualisation of the product, this does 
not extend to the production worker.
Flexibility
The first numerical control knitting machines appeared at C&B between 1976 
and 1979, replacing mechanical control machines, while the computer 
controlled machines had arrived on the market only very recently at the time of 
interview. The advent of numerical control, and then computer control, has 
had marked implications for the organisation of production, costs, and product.
The cost of reprogramming and downtime associated with numerical and 
computer control have been dramatically reduced. The cost of reprogramming 
a numerical control machine is estimated to be half that of a mechanically 
programmed machine - or about Lit. 500,000 versus Lit. 1,000,000 
(approximately £250 versus £500), and less time is lost in resetting the 
machines (Bruschi, interview, 1988). While an unusual pattern would have 
taken 16 days to program on mechanical machinery, the same pattern could be 
programmed on computer machinery within two hours (Bruschi, interview, 
1988).
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As the machinery has become more sophisticated, both from the point of view 
of mechanics and control mechanisms, the range of products that can be 
produced economically has grown. By drastically lowering programming time 
and cost, numerically and computer controlled machinery has made very 
complex patterns economically viable. Therefore, the range and complexity of 
product has increased substantially as a result of numerical and computer 
control.
The numerical and computer control function has also had implications for the 
process of production. Because the article being produced can now be 
changed much more frequently, the labour process also changes more often. 
The new machines are also more specialised, designed for more specific, 
precise tasks than the mechanical control machines.
The range of changes in the production process varies from changing the size 
of the piece being produced, to changing the style. Changing the size of the 
piece may occur several times a day, while the style is changed (and the 
machines fitted vtith a new program) every five to seven days.
At the time of interview, the firm was producing about 300,000 knit pieces per 
annum. The orders were relatively small, ranging from 500 pieces to 1,500 
pieces, and averaging about 1,000. Because the firm itself specialises in a 
certain type of knit fabric ('maglieria lavorata'), the orders produced tend not 
to be very large. Usually, a small batch will be produced and put forward onto 
the market by the casa madre. If the item sells well, then a second batch will 
be produced, and so on. This is permissible because the turnaround time 
afforded by the particular organisational structure is very short. So while, at 
the end of a given production period, the quantity of a given item produced 
may be relatively high, it is likely that it would not be produced all at once, but 
rather in several smaller batches.
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The firm has been able to work steadily throughout each year, with one month 
of holidays. However, in order to achieve this, labour flexibility is required. 
Some workers must work 25 to 30 overtime hours in some months, while other 
periods are relatively 'thin'. The workers must therefore be available to work 
flexible hours, to work more intensively and longer hours and weekends in 
certain periods of the year, in order to meet deadlines. Typically, September, 
October, January and February are less busy periods.
Origins and Management
C&B was founded in 1972 by the two partners (after whom the firm is named) 
who continued to own and direct the firm at the time of interview. One of the 
partners had developed some expertise in the field by working previously in a 
knitting machine repair shop, and so became well versed in the mechanics and 
maintenance of the machines. They originally started by buying two used 
knitting machines from Germany, and operated out of a shed in the countryside 
near their current location, which is the small town of San Prospero, near 
Carpi.
The company employed eleven workers at the time of interview. Their 
revenues for 1987 amounted to about Lit. 500,000,000 (or approximately 
£250,000 sterling). On average, C & B  would have about 15 clients in a given 
year, located primarily within the immediate environs, including Carpi,
Modena, Reggio-Emilia, and Bologna, but sometimes as far away as Milan.
No single client firm dominated, but four or five firms accounted for 
approximately 70% of their work.
The 'management structure' of this firm, such as it is, consisted of the two 
owner operators. Sig. Corazzari was responsible for the accounts, 
administration, and the organisation of work, while Sig. Bruschi provided the 
technical support, prepared the computer programs for the machinery, and 
maintained the machinery.
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Investment decisions and the general direction of the firm are undertaken by 
these two partners. However, according to Sig. Bruschi, decisions regarding 
the acquisition of new machinery are in essence made within the marketplace 
for the final product. Certain types of machines are best suited for certain 
types of products, and when those products are demanded in the marketplace, 
the casa madre asks the sub-contractor to produce them, and the 
manufacturers need the machines that can best produce those products. This 
can be problematic for the sub-contractor, however, in that the demand for that 
given type of product may be short lived, compared to the economic life of the 
machine, and the sub-contractor is left with machinery that is underused. 
Nevertheless, C&B follows a policy of replacing machines every five to six 
years - not because they cease to function, but because the technological 
advances require this replacement in order for the firm to stay competitive.
The External Organisation of Production
There are no formal, written, or long term arrangements between C&B and 
Carma - even though their relationship spanned many years. Each order is 
negotiated separately regarding timing and price, and a contract entered into. 
There are no formal guarantees made by the casa madre to the artisan for a 
certain amount of work over a long period of time - they contract work when 
they need to. Given the short turnaround time, this means that the artisan firm 
can plan its work only one to two months in advance. Continued relations 
depend upon the quality, reliability, timeliness and pricing of work.
For the organisation, planning and setup involved in the production of a new 
order, Carma will generally pay the artisan by the hour for his time. Then the 
artisan estimates a price per piece for the actual production, which is 
negotiated with the casa madre. The casa madre includes this component in 
its calculation of the total price for the garment it will ask when it pre-sells the 
item through its sales representatives. The artisan is committed to the price he 
has given, yet when he sets his price he does not know how many pieces of the
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article he will have to produce - this depends on the sales. If the numbers are 
high, then he will make money, but if the numbers are low, his fixed costs 
remain the same and will make less or no profit on the order.
Because C&B specialises in a type of work that not many other firms perform, 
they can command a relatively higher price per piece. With more common or 
standard items, the prices are also standard, and the artisan firm cannot 
influence the price. Despite their leverage regarding price, ultimately the price 
per item is imposed upon C&B by the casa madre. The price that can be 
obtained by the artisan firm depends upon the market for intermediate goods.
In periods of low demand, the casa madre will offer an order to the artisan firm 
at a given price, which the artisan can either accept or decline. If they decline, 
the work will simply be offered to another firm. At the time of interview, the 
type of knitwear in which C&B specialised was not doing particular well on the 
market, so the artisan firm had lost its ability to influence the prices it could 
command for its work. In such periods of low demand, the casa madre can 
and does impose lower prices upon its artisan firms.
As the artisan firms usually specialise in a single phase of production, there is a 
market created at every stage in the production process. The relationship 
between artisan firms working in the same phase is therefore one of 'ferocious 
competition' (Bruschi, interview, 1988). C&B has qq direct relationships of 
any kind with any other artisan firms involved in Carina's production network.
It deals only with the casa madre itself. Even after having worked for Carma 
for many years, C&B's intermediate product is always sent back to Carma - it is 
never sent directly on to the next artisan.
The one exception is that, during exceptionally busy periods, when C&B 
cannot handle all of the work it has been given and still meet deadlines, it will 
sometimes sub-contract its work out to another artisan in order to get the work 
done on time. In such cases, C&B will provide the sub-sub-contractor with the
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numerical control or computer program which it has prepared itself, for the 
second artisan to use with his machinery. Such instances are rare, however.
C&B attributed its success to its continual and regular investment in new 
technology. This, however, can occur only in periods of high demand, in which 
the artisans can command prices high enough to provide them with a profit 
which they can then reinvest in new machinery. Due to a slow market, C&B 
had not been able to invest in new machinery in the two years prior to 
interview. The ability to secure reasonable prices for their work was therefore 
cited as one of the major problems the firm faced, along with falling demand 
and the disappearance of some markets, such as the USA, and the emergence 
of greater international competition from countries like Spain and Portugal.
2.4 Fanny Confezione
This firm specialises in the 'confezione ’ phase of production, which consists of 
assembly, sewing pieces together, and some detailing. Pieces of knitwear 
arrive already cut, and Fanny closes the seams, applies the labels, pockets and 
collars, and does any required finishing. In some cases the item will be 
returned to Carma as a finished product. In other cases, where treatments or 
embroidery may be required, the item is left with the main seams undone, 
returned to Carma, which will then send it out for embroidery, is returned again 
to Carma, which then sends the item to Fanny for final seam closing.
Located in a modem building in a rural location about three kilometres outside 
of Modigliana (Province of Forli), Fanny Confezione is a cooperative, with a 
total of eleven members, nine of whom are workers, and two directors. The 
last available revenues were given as Lit. 200,000,000 (£100,000 sterling 
approximately).
All of the members of Fanny Confezione were originally employed within 
Carma itself. In 1980, Carma established a branch company in a separate
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building, but in 1983 informed branch employees that the operation could no 
longer be maintained and all of the workers were laid off. The 24 employees 
were faced with a choice of either losing their jobs completely or going into 
business for themselves. Eleven of them stayed on to form the cooperative that 
became Fanny Confezione. Carma maintained ownership of the building and 
machinery, indicating that the restructuring was aimed primarily at shedding 
labour. Only the number of workers in the operation has changed since 
becoming a cooperative. The same type of work is conducted, using the same 
processes, skills and machinery. However, a few related stages of production 
were lost, including ironing and buttonholing, which are undertaken by other 
specialist firms.
The two directors manage the cooperative's daily affairs. The female head 
oversees production, and the male head is responsible for administration and 
conducting business with the casa madre. They use an administrative 
consultant in Faenza, who takes care of much of the administration and 
documentation.
All aspects of the production process such as products, materials, machinery, 
etc. are virtually decided by Carma. As noted above, the building and 
equipment are owned by Carma and 'on loan' to Fanny Confezione; the 
cooperative could not afford to purchase the machines. Fanny can, of course, 
make decisions regarding the hours of work and staffing, though they have 
maintained exactly the same workers since the cooperative was formed. They 
do exercise their ability to influence the hours of work, and permit a certain 
amount of flexibility in the daily schedule, for the most part to accommodate 
the nine women workers who also have family responsibilities.
The Internal Organisation of Production
Depending on the complexity of the garment, the number of steps in 
production varies, with eight an average number. Each machine is highly
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specialised, doing one type of stitch or one function. For example, a separate 
machine is used for each of the following tasks:
• internal shoulder seams;
• external should seams;
• side seams;
• applying the collar - one basic kind of machine, for which there are about 
four different sizes, one for each size of knit;
• label application.
The garment has to follow a specific sequence, and may return to the same 
machine one or two times during the making up.
There are about 40 machines in the establishment, none of which are electronic. 
The technology has not advanced much in this sector in recent years; with 
marginal improvements, the machines are basically the same as they were 35 
years ago. The areas in which significant improvements have been made relate 
to machinery for more standardized production, which cannot be used for 
Fanny's generally small, designer orders.
All of the production workers are women. Each one received their training 
within the establishment itself, directly under the woman director, and would 
likely be classified as semi-skilled. Generally, each worker will know how to 
operate three or four machines. However, each will also usually have one 
machine on which she is particularly competent, where, whenever possible, she 
is kept, except in special circumstances, such as when someone is absent or 
there is a rush or special order. The technical division of labour is thus 
extremely high.
As the product, materials, and machinery are determined outside of Fanny 
Confezione, in the casa madre, there is no opportunity for the worker to 
participate in the conceptualisation of the product and process of production. 
There is, however, upon occasion, a flow of information from Fanny
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Confezione back to Carma, though this generally occurs only when there is a 
problem with production or a mistake in the materials provided.
Flexibility
The firm makes about 500 different articles each year (or about 10 per week). 
The number of articles made annually fluctuates, but there is no discernible 
trend in number upwards or downwards.
The number of pieces of each article made also varies, depending on the type of 
article. Fanny makes Carma's sales samples; in this case the number of pieces 
per article will range from 1 to 20, but will typically be between 10 and 20.
For regular production of designer items, from 12 to 200 or 300 pieces can be 
made. And for more standardized items produced for Carma's internal label, 
up to 1,000 pieces of a single article can be made, though these will 
subsequently be dyed different colours. These figures compare to an average 
of 2,000 pieces per style prior to restructuring.
Given the high number of different articles being produced at any one time and 
small batch sizes, and particularly at times of the year when samples must be 
produced at the same time as regular orders, the process of production must 
change very often - several times a day. This means moving workers amongst 
machines, resetting and rethreading machinery. To set up machinery for a new 
style of item can require a day. A high proportion of time is thus spent setting 
up the machinery and new production process. And the seasonality of the 
industry results in a concentration of work in June and July, when a high 
proportion of the annual revenue is earned, which covers the less busy periods.
Once the machinery is set up, the work itself is routine and repetitive. The 
workers can control the pace of their own work and there is no constant 
supervision. A very serious and professional environment prevails on the shop 
floor, as the workers sew in silence. The underlying philosophy is that there
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must be maximum concentration and attention to detail in order to ensure the 
high quality of the garment. The quality of the product effectively provides 
the basis upon which Fanny can compete with other similar firms, and in turn, 
upon which Carma can differentiate its product and compete in the 
international marketplace.
The External Organisation of Production
As Carma has maintained ownership of the plant and machinery, this gives 
them effective "ownership" (in Massey's sense of the word, as in the ability to 
make investment decisions regarding plant and equipment) of Fanny. Internal 
control over the means of production is also forfeited, at least in part, to the 
casa madre, as Carma determines the nature of machinery, and therefore, the 
labour process. The other aspect of possession, control over labour, is 
maintained within the cooperative. However, as a cooperative, there is a sense 
of shared responsibility, and there did not appear to be any need for internal 
supervision. There is indirect, external supervision to the extent that Carma 
examines each product returned from Fanny. The pace of production is also 
determined externally, by Carma, as they give orders to Fanny Confezione 
when and as they need work done, not on the basis of providing an even flow 
of work to the small firm.
Fanny works exclusively for Carma, and has always done so. However, there 
is no long-term contract - each piece of work is contracted and paid 
individually. Although Fanny is free to work for other case madri (and indeed 
have received many offers to do so), they do not see an advantage in this, as all 
case madri pay essentially the same prices for the same types of work. In this 
respect the directors of Fanny feel that there is collusion amongst the case 
madri on the prices offered to artisans.
For regular production, Fanny is paid by the piece, regardless of the size of the 
order. Because of the set-up costs involved, the profit on smaller batches is
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therefore reduced. The price is negotiated with Carma, and Fanny does 
attempt to ask a higher per piece price if the order is small, but it not always 
able to achieve it. Though they claim that they are paid better than other sub­
contractors, the directors of the cooperative feel that these prices are too low; 
indeed, they cite this as their primary problem.
All inter-firm communications are directly with Carma, never with other 
sub-contractors in the network. According to the directors of Fanny, Carma 
frowns upon any communications between sub-contractors, fearing information 
sharing will lead to higher price demands. Generally, the only contact with 
other Carma artisans is through chance encounters when intermediate goods 
are delivered to the casa madre.
Fanny does not use outside workers (i.e. domestic workers) or sub-contract 
their work to other firms. This is because homeworkers and 
sub-sub-contractors cannot ensure a sufficiently high level of quality, nor 
timeliness. Neither are they interested in expanding the number of internal 
workers to take on more work, as the cooperative nature of the establishment 
makes this difficult, and the cost is high. Expansion is not a goal; in fact, the 
main goals stated were survival, and a pension. Competition from 
underdeveloped countries was cited as a problem. This placed greater 
emphasis on the high quality and precision of items produced by the Carma 
network, in order to differentiate their product from that of other producers. 
The general picture that emerges is one of a firm that survives, rather than 
prospers, by hard work and diligence, and is dependent on and controlled by 
the casa madre in almost all aspects.
2.5 Luciana Ricami
Luciana Ricami was established in 1980, near to its location at the time of 
interview in the owners' house in Carpi. Before 1980, the owners of the firm 
worked for Carma, but in confezione rather than embroidery. They switched to
149
embroidery as they felt it seemed to have more of a future than confezione, 
which was then moving to Veneto, where the costs were half those in Modena.
After buying some second hand machinery and establishing themselves in 
embroidery, their reputation grew by word of mouth in the Carpi community, 
where 'everyone knows everyone else'. At the time of interview, the firm 
consisted of a total of eight: two directors, and six employees. Revenues for 
1987 were in the Lit. 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 range (£250,000 to 
£300,000 approximately). On average, Luciana Ricami has about 15 clients in 
a year, all of which provide roughly equal amounts of work.
The 'management structure' of the firm consists of the two owner-operators. 
They coordinate the production process and conduct relations with the casa 
madre. They also employ the services of a consultant in Carpi, who does their 
accounts and provides them with commercial advice. They do not use the 
artisans association, although they are members; they find it too expensive and 
that the assistance provided is not good.
The Internal Organisation of Production
After the article of clothing has been made up by Fanny Confezione, it is 
returned to Carma and checked, then sent to Luciana Ricami for embroidery.
In general, a sweater will arrive semi-finished, open so that it may be placed on 
the machines. It is then embroidered by machine, and sent out to have the 
embroidery threads trimmed and the paper used with the embroidery removed. 
This must be done manually, so the firm employs two homeworkers who 
engage in this work.
Unlike other stages of the knitwear production process, embroidery production 
has been subject to technological advancements, and Luciana Ricami had the 
latest available technology at the time of interview. The firm had four 
German-made electronic embroidery machines, and six operators. The
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machines are programmed externally - either by Carma or by an outside 
company that specialises in this. The job of the operator therefore consists 
primarily of placing the sweater on the machine and removing it, and 
supervising the machine while it operates. All of the workers do exactly the 
same kind of work. They have all been trained within the firm itself, a process 
which requires about three years in order to produce a fully capable worker.
The directors have some input into the embroidered component of the product 
before it is produced. They generally consult with the casa madre to determine 
what kinds of embroidery would be suitable for a given type of sweater. They 
effectively provide technical advice to Carma on the suitability and technical 
feasibility of certain types of embroidery for certain articles. For the worker, 
however, there is little integration of conceptualisation and execution. He 
simply operates a machine that he cannot program or control, and produces a 
product into which he has had no input. He has little autonomy in this regard, 
though there was no overt supervisory structure in place in the firm, and 
working conditions appeared to be good, though the machines in operation 
were very loud.
The electronic embroidery machines were purchased in 1983 and 1984. The 
main impacts of the switch from the mechanically-controlled machines which 
were used previously was found to be in the higher quality and precision of the 
product, and the ability to undertake more complex patterns. In addition, these 
machines work faster than the previous ones. They did not however, bring 
about a reduction in costs as they are very expensive. The directors claim that 
the decisions to buy new machinery are effectively made in the marketplace.
As was the case with the knitting machines, certain types of machine are best 
suited for certain types of embroidery- the demand for certain types of 
machines is therefore dependent upon the demand for certain types of 
embroidery in the knitwear market.
151
Flexibility
The type of embroidery produced changes very frequently - about 20 different 
designs per month on average, but the pattern can change up to three times per 
day. For each design, quantities in the range o f200 or 300 up to about 3,000 
can be produced. The batch size has been falling, however, thus the diversity in 
the number of different patterns produced had been rising at the time of 
interview. Big orders no longer appeared. Despite the advanced and flexible 
technology, there are costs associated with the changeover from one pattern to 
another, relating to the down time of the machinery, and other start up costs 
such as programming. Costs are therefore higher for smaller quantities.
It is impossible for the firm to work regular hours throughout the course of a 
year. The nature of the work is seasonal, and during busy periods, there will be 
longer hours or weekend work, up to 12 or 13 hours per day. There are 
regular busy periods annually, but it still remains impossible to predict or plan 
for the work cycle. At one point during a 'busy' period, all of the work was 
completed and production simply stopped - though this stoppage has never 
been for an extended period.
The External Organisation of Production
As was the case with other Carma sub-contractors, there are no long-term 
contracts between Luciana Ricami and the casa madre, and each order is 
negotiated on a price per piece basis. The sub-contractor's price demands are 
moderated by the fact that they must remain competitive with other 
sub-contractors. The relations between artisans in this same phase of 
production is therefore one of competition - on the basis of price but also 
regarding timeliness and quality of work. However, Luciana Ricami does use 
other artisans, to which it sub-contracts work when it cannot accommodate the 
workload itself Because it needs these other embroidery artisans from time to 
time, Luciana Ricami must maintain good relations with them. For example, 
Luciana will sometimes turn down work in order to provide work for other
152
embroidery artisans when they need it. The sub-sub-contractors are small 
artisan firms similar to Luciana, and employ the same kind of machinery. Like 
other Carma network firms, Luciana Ricami has no direct relations with other 
artisans involved in the production filiere. All orders are returned directly to 
Carma.
The firm claimed to have no major problems, other than finishing the work on 
time. Neither did they aspire to expansion, which they believed would make it 
more difficult to control the quality of the product, and therefore jeopardise 
their competitive edge.
2.6 Tosatti e Bacci
After the embroidery phase is complete, the sweater is returned to Carma, 
where it is checked and the pieces counted, and then sent out to be ironed. 
Tosatti e Bacci is a firm which consists solely of a husband and wife, who do 
ironing only, in a small workshop at the back of their Carpi home. The stated 
annual revenues for the firm were Lit. 40,000,000 annually (approximately 
£20,000 sterling). Tosatti e Bacci work exclusively for Carma.
The labour content of the ironing process is high - it does not lend itself easily 
to automation, particularly when the articles being ironed are frequently 
changed. Generally, the item is placed and pinned on the press, steamed, 
shaped by hand, and pressed. The machine must be adjusted for different types 
of sweater, different textiles, and different colours. Frequently, the casa 
madre relies on the ironing stage to correct any irregularities or mistakes in the 
articles that have been made at earlier stages of the production process 
regarding the sizing or shaping of products, which makes the ironing phase 
even more exacting.
The skills required for this kind of work are learned on the job, on one's own, 
through a process of exploration and experimentation, trial and error. Through
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this process, T&B have developed expertise in certain areas, for example, with 
certain problematic textiles, so that they tend to get all of the work available 
which involves this textile. Because of this specialisation, they are more likely 
perhaps than other artisans to work with a given textile for a longer continuous 
period of time, though the styles and colours they work with will still change. 
They will iron three or four different articles a day, on average. The norm is 
small orders, small quantities, and quick turnaround, often in the same day. In 
order to speed the process, the casa madre will often distribute an order of say, 
500 pieces amongst four or five artisans. While this reduces the turnaround 
time for the casa madre, it adds to the variability of the artisan's work and 
increases costs that are associated with frequently changing the articles. At the 
time of interview, the average order consisted of 25 or 30 pieces, in contrast to 
the pre-restructuring period, in which the orders were large and the kinds of 
sweaters few.
The firm began in 1966, but has gone through many transformations over the 
years, including a period in which they employed workers. A decision was 
made to restrict the firm to the husband and wife, who are its owner operators, 
workers and managers. Tosatti e Bacci rely heavily on the assistance of the 
artisans' association for administration, advice and information, regarding 
changes in legislation, trends in the industry, etc. Only the daily accounts and 
signing of bills are undertaken within the firm; all other administration is 
conducted externally by the artisans association on a fee for service basis. The 
association also orchestrates the artisans' purchases of machinery, so that they 
can purchase in higher numbers and secure price reductions. It also provides a 
point of contact and interaction for artisans in the same field and phase of 
production. The artisans' association T&B deal with is the umbrella group 
CNA - the National Confederation of Artisans, which incorporates several 
smaller organisations, including LAP AM, CASA and FAM (Artisan Family).
Investment decisions, which relate primarily to the acquisition of new
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machinery, are made within the firm itself. The casa madre, however, will 
make suggestions from time to time to T&B that a certain type of machinery 
should be acquired, for specialised work that may be forthcoming. T&B 
generally ignore such suggestions, however, as they believe the machinery to be 
too expensive and too specialised to have a full economic lifespan. They prefer 
to use only generic machines which can be used for a wide variety of articles.
If specialised machinery is required, they say, then it is up to Carma to buy it 
for the artisan. At the time of interview, the firm had automatic press 
machinery, and a vaporetta - a smaller steam machine for more precise work.
External Relations of Production
Even though the costs to the artisan will be greater if the size of order is small, 
the prices paid by Carma are on a piece basis, do not vary with quantity and are 
negotiated separately for each new order. The prices asked by the artisan 
depend upon the complexity of the piece, and the quality of the work.
There are no long term contracts between T&B and Carma; from the artisan’s 
point of view, his best guarantee of regular work is the high quality and 
reliability of his work. The work is, by definition, seasonal, and there are busy 
and slow periods throughout the year. T&B could not sustain a prolonged lack 
of work - 15 days would be the maximum. Carma recognises this, and in order 
to be able to continue to work with the artisan when they need them, will 
provide them work in 'thin' periods to keep them occupied. This they will do 
only for the better artisans.
T&B have no role in product conceptualisation, and complain the ironing 
process is often made needlessly difficult by certain design features of the 
garments. There is no prior consultation with Carma regarding the design of 
an item as there often is for other stages of production. Only when a piece is 
particularly difficult will T&B go to Carma to demonstrate the difficulty and 
the need for a higher price. But this input does not effect subsequent design 
changes in the product.
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The relationship between artisans within the ironing phase of production is 
characterised by competition. Some artisan firms will try to undercut others. 
T&B compete on the basis of reliability, honesty and quality. Previous 
attempts amongst artisans in this phase of production to organise, or agree on 
standardized prices have failed, due to a lack of consensus. T&B do not give 
out work to homeworkers or other artisan firms.
As always, there are no direct linkages between T&B and other artisan firms in 
Carma's filiere. The exception occurs when there is a particularly urgent order 
- in such cases, the order can sometimes be brought directly from the 
confezionatore (maker-up) to T&B. This poses a problem for T&B, however, 
as the pieces have not been previously checked and counted by Carma, thus 
T&B may be forced to accept responsibility for mistakes that are not their own.
The main problem T&B face is meeting the more exacting work demanded by 
the new, higher quality, costly products. T&B felt that the future prospects 
for their work were bleak, viewing their existence as being completely tied to 
and dependent upon the casa madre. "I think there are no prospects for the 
single artisan in the future, because we have to meet the interests of the casa 
madre. This is what determines the artisans' work, makes them associated or 
not, determines whether to buy a certain machine or not. Even in an indirect 
way, they decide for you...." (Tosatti, interview, 1988).
3. SYNTHESIS
3.1 The Inter- and Intra-Firm Organisation of Production
The Carma network system of production is shown schematically in Figure 4.2. 
It is a highly decentralised system, with the production of a given product 
distributed amongst the casa madre, and several small artisan firms. The casa 
madre undertakes the pre-and post-production phases, while a complex 
network of small, extremely specialised artisan firms and micro-firms undertake 
all of the production. There is then a third tier network, as many of these small
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artisan firms also have relations with other small firms, usually operating in the 
same phase, which provide quantitative flexibility. The sub-contracted artisan 
firms may also employ independent homeworkers for manual, labour-intensive 
tasks. The relationships between artisan firms in the same phase of production 
are characterised predominantly by competition, but there is also an element of 
cooperation, in that they do need each other from time to time for reasons of 
quantitative flexibility.
All contacts and transfer of intermediate goods takes place vertically - between 
a given artisan and the casa madre only. Despite the fact that many of the 
different artisans have been working for the same casa madre for many years, 
there is virtually no horizontal contact between them nor direct transfers of 
semi-finished products. The production filiere is illustrated conceptually in 
Figure 4.3.
The Division of Labour
The Carma productive system represents an extremely high social and technical 
division of labour. The social division of labour is expressed along two 
dimensions: between the casa madre and network firms, and between network 
firms. A third dimension of the social division of labour could also be said to 
exist, between the network firms and homeworkers.
While each artisan firm specialises in a single phase of production, the phase of 
production itself can be very narrowly defined, and we see firms specialising in 
the making of buttonholes and application of buttons, or packaging only. In 
addition, as we have seen in many of the artisan firms profiled above, the 
artisans tend to develop specific expertise and further specialise within a single 
phase, as a competitive strategy, in order to differentiate themselves from other 
artisans working in the same phase. This was seen in the case of Tosatti e
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Bacci, which had developed a specific expertise in the ironing of certain 
textiles, and with Corazzari e Bruschi, which specialised in very complex, 
difficult knitting patterns.
In addition to these specialisations which exist at the level of the firm, there is a 
further division of labour within the firm. In general, the machinery which 
exists in the artisan firm tends to be very specialised for certain precise tasks. 
The owner of the small firm aims to have workers develop high levels of 
competence on certain machines, in order to increase efficiency and output. 
There is little movement between tasks or different areas of the firm on a day to 
day basis, nor is there a progression from certain types of jobs to other types of 
jobs within the firm, in a long term career path. The division of labour can also 
be based on gender lines, as was the case with Corazzarri e Bruschi, where 
there was a strict division of labour between the men, who operated the 
machinery, and the women workers, who checked, counted and packaged the 
product.
In some cases, even if the worker is assigned primarily to a particular machine 
in the work process, it is not unusual for him or her not to have full control 
over that machine, particularly if the machine is programmable. In neither of 
the two firms with programmable machinery did the machine operator himself 
program the machinery. It was either programmed by someone else in the firm, 
or by an external firm specialising in this service.
The exception to this rule of very high division of labour seems to lie within 
Carma itself. This is the one case which seems to correspond more closely 
with Piore and Sabel's idea of fluidity of job tasks, and diminished division of 
labour. While there were still definite divisions of labour within the casa 
madre, the variability of work was greater, both on a day to day basis, and 
according to the seasonality of production. In addition, the nature of the 
functions undertaken by Carma, such as developing prototype products,
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demands a full knowledge of all stages of production. This fluidity of work 
takes place primarily within the production sector, as opposed to between the 
production sector and other sections of the company, such as administration or 
marketing.
In addition, the workers in the casa madre enjoy high levels of pay, especially 
compared to the workers in the artisan firms. This high pay is offered on the 
understanding that the workers will work when needed, flexible or extended 
hours, and that there will be no involvement with the union (Artioli, interview, 
1988).
Ownership and Possession
The productive system depicted above is also a hierarchical system, with Carma 
at the apex of the hierarchical pyramid. Referring back to Massey's 
terminology, aspects of ownership and possession are centred in the casa 
madre, as well as elements of the labour process itself.
To begin with 'ownership', i.e. the power to make decisions regarding 
investment, we have seen that Carma exercises complete control in some cases, 
to influence over such decisions in others. In the case of Fanny Confezione, 
Carma owned all plant and machinery, and virtually no changes or new 
investments had taken place in the five years between the formation of the 
cooperative and time of interview. It is not an uncommon practice for the casa 
madre to provide machinery 'in commodato' (on loan) to their artisan firms. In 
some cases, such as ironing, Carma would suggest certain machinery or 
equipment purchases to the artisan, who made the ultimate decision whether to 
proceed or not.
The casa madre also holds the upper hand in determining the pricing for the 
artisans' piecework. This is due primarily to the extremely competitive 
relationship that exists between firms in the same production phase, which acts
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to moderate the artisans' price demands, or at times even leads to undercutting. 
On the other hand, at least for more standard items, it appears that the case 
madri operate according to a standard set of prices for certain types of work. 
The low prices offered to artisan firms was a common complaint, and seen as 
one of the most significant problems they faced. It should be noted that the 
pricing issue, in turn, by determining the profitability of the artisan firm, has an 
impact on the ability of the artisan firm to make new investments, particularly 
in new machinery.
With respect to possession, or control over labour and the production process, 
this too is forfeited by the artisan, at least in part, to the casa madre. The casa 
madre fs demand for work in this sector is by nature cyclical, and varies even 
within the usual annual seasons. In general, the casa madre is not concerned 
with maintaining a steady, regular supply of work to the artisans; it 
commissions work when it is required, usually on short notice and with very 
short turnaround times. The artisan firm can either accept such work, or 
decline it. But a common feature of the artisan firm was irregular hours, 
overtime and slow periods. The artisan firm must usually accept work when it 
is offered, even if it is already overburdened, because it knows there will be 
periods of little work, and the extra work during peak periods is needed to 
cover the leaner times.
Finally, the casa madre exercises virtually total control over the product, and 
the artisan firms have only very limited input into its conceptualisation, if any at 
all. In the best cases, at the outset the casa madre will seek the artisan's 
technical advice on the feasibility of producing certain product designs. This 
was the case for the knitting process and embroidery. In other cases, there will 
be a flow of information between the artisan and the casa madre only when 
there is a problem with the order or in production (as in the confezione stage). 
Or, the artisan offers his input to improve the product and decrease production 
problems, but the input is ignored (ironing). Even where there is a priori
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consultation with the artisan regarding a proposed product, this consultation 
generally involves the owner of the artisan firms, and not the workers who will 
actually be undertaking the production. There is therefore, for the production 
worker, an extreme disengagement of conceptualisation and production, and 
for the artisan firm as a whole, only minimal input into the conceptualisation of 
the product. Though it had not apparently been a problem, this lack of 
integration of product conceptualisation and production could represent a 
longer-term weakness in the network system.
Looking at the other side of the coin, the degree of dependence or 
independence of the artisan firm is indicated by several factors, particularly 
relating to their client profile. The number of clients, their geographical and 
industrial diversity, and the existence or absence of a dominant few clients 
provides a good indication of the autonomy of the artisan firm (Brusco, 1986). 
Firms interviewed in this case study fell into two groups. The knitting and 
embroidery firms each had about fifteen clients annually, no single one or few 
of which dominated their revenues. On the other hand, in the making-up and 
ironing phases, both artisans worked exclusively for Carma, indicating high 
dependence.
In general, the degree of dependence or independence of the artisan firm seems 
to relate, at least in part, to the stage of production in which the firm finds 
itself, and particularly, to the degree of technological advancement of the 
machinery used in that stage. In this case study, the weakest, most dependent 
firms were found in the ironing and making-up stages, in which the machinery 
has remained virtually unchanged in the post-war period. The more 
independent firms were found in the knitting and embroidery stages where 
computer technology had been applied. It seems that firms that acquired new 
technology had a competitive edge; where there was no new technology firms 
could not differentiate themselves and their positions remained weak.
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The degree of autonomy of the artisan firms therefore varies, but is in any case 
limited by the exercise of control by the casa madre, namely over investment 
decisions, pricing, product conceptualisation, and pace of work. The most 
dependent firm, Fanny Confezione, exercised control over the daily hours of 
work, and the division of labour within the firm. The most independent firm, 
Corazzari e Bruschi, was able to control or at least influence most aspects of its 
production, within the parameters outlined above. It was also able to freely 
and easily move to new clients, if necessary - a freedom that Fanny Confezione 
would not enjoy, as Carma owned the building and machinery.
3.2 The territorial organisation of production
Figure 4.4 shows the spatial pattern of textile/clothing case madri as it relates 
to the urban system. The lead firms show an extremely high degree of spatial 
clustering in the town of Carpi, where the vast majority of firms is located. 
Other lead firms are scattered in the immediately surrounding towns, including 
Correggio, Soliera and Rio Saliceto.
Figure 4.5 represents the territorial distribution of the entire Carma production 
network. The map shows the central location of the casa madre, and the 
locations of the artisan firms to which it sub-contracts production. The artisan 
firms are both clustered within the town of Carpi, as well as dispersed 
throughout surrounding small towns, villages and rural locations. A significant 
number are located in the lower-wage regions of Veneto and Mantua, to the 
north of Modena. None are located in urban locations larger than Carpi itself.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the territorial organisation of Carma's network for a 
single product. The casa madre is located in Carpi, the functional centre of the 
industrial district, and the artisan firms are dispersed within Carpi and in the 
surrounding areas.
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The relations described above of the dominance exerted by the casa madre 
over the artisan firms are expressed spatially in the dominance of the urban 
centre (Carpi) over the surrounding towns, villages and urban areas. Aspects 
of ownership and possession are concentrated in the urban centre. That is, 
there is a remarkable degree of concentration of control functions, combined 
with a highly decentralised and dispersed network structure. This relationship 
implies the control and dominance of the single urban centre over its dependent 
hinterland of surrounding towns and villages.
It also represents a highly articulated territorial division of labour. At the most 
basic level, control, design, administration, marketing and business service 
functions are concentrated in the urban centre (in the case madri). Production 
functions, on the other hand, are more widely dispersed throughout 
surrounding towns, villages and rural areas (in the artisan firms), though some 
of these are also located in the urban centre. Many aspects of internal control 
functions, relating to management and administration, for example, which one 
would ordinarily expect to find within an independently owned establishment 
such as those of the small artisan firms, are absent in this case. Instead, they 
are relinquished to the casa madre or to private consultants or artisans’ 
associations located in the urban centre.
Within the sphere of production, there also is a highly defined territorial 
division of labour. Each firm specialises in a very specific, given phase of 
production, and these firms are dispersed throughout the hinterland, providing 
a variegated development pattern. This pattern is in contradiction to earlier 
empirical evidence (e.g. Coulet, 1978) which equated the absence of 
development poles and an even distribution of employment with an equalised 
development pattern. Rather, the evidence from the Carpi case suggests a 
differentiated, variegated development pattern.
The more distant network firms - those outside the Province of Modena - are
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generally located in lower-cost locations. The most distant sub-contractor firm 
is Fanny Confezione, which was originally established as a Carma branch plant 
in a low cost location. With the possible exception of Fanny, which still 
maintains a “special” relationship with Carma as the casa madre continues to 
own the plant and machinery, there is evidence that the more distant firms 
perform the more standardized, low cost, labour-intensive and less time- 
sensitive operations.
Towards an explanation
How can this clustered pattern be explained? In the case of Carma, certain 
market exigencies are apparent: the need for quality, design content, time- 
responsiveness, and price. It is on the basis of these product characteristics 
that Carma has been able to succeed in a very competitive market, particularly 
one characterised by low entry barriers, easy replication, and intense 
international competition, including that from newly-industrialising countries.
The main response observed in the Carma case was the transformation from a 
vertically-integrated to a vertically disintegrated system of production. Design, 
sales and marketing, and production coordination are undertaken internally, 
while all production functions take place outside the firm, in a dense network 
of small, specialised producers.
While Scott might say that economies of scope and scale would explain this 
productive structure, several questions would remain unanswered with this 
approach. First, there would be economies of scope to be gained from 
integrating production under one roof. Pieces would proceed more quickly 
between stages of production and clearly this would be a faster system, which 
is a key concern where time is an important competitive factor. Second, would 
integration not allow better control over quality? Third, the machinery does 
not lend itself either to very great variations in scale economies by stage of 
production, so an explanation of variations in economies of scale by phase does
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not support resorting to extemalisation of production in this case. Clearly, 
there must be some other explanation.
A vertically integrated productive structure could not respond to the 
unpredictability of demand, the seasonality of production, and the associated 
fluctuations in labour requirements. On the other hand, the vertically 
disintegrated system of production improves product quality because of the 
high levels of specialisation of firms under the network system. Because the 
firms in a specific phase are in a competitive relationship, they seek to 
differentiate themselves from each other by increasing their level of 
specialisation. This increases the social division of labour in the district and 
leads to improvements in quality which benefit the casa madre. Carma relies 
on the quality of its product to distinguish itself from its competitors. This 
would only happen when there is a competitive, market relation between sub- 
producers and artisans in the same phase or phases of production. It would not 
transpire under a vertical integration scenario. This is specifically the kind of 
external economy that was referred to by Marshall, and reiterated by Scott and 
others.
The decentralised productive structure permits an extremely rapid turnaround 
time, which has several advantages for the casa madre. It provides an 
additional competitive edge in the fashion industry, where responsiveness to the 
market is a major factor. It allows a marketing structure which reduces 
Carma's risk substantially. Because the turnaround time is short, the casa 
madre can sell its product through its representatives first, before production 
orders are made, and still get the product on the market in a timely manner. If 
a particular product does extremely well on the market, repeat orders can be 
made and delivered in very short periods of time. This both reduces the risk to 
Carma, and maximizes revenues.
Vertical disintegration addresses other market requirements as well, such as
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cost, which is a factor in this market, with its low entry barriers, continuing 
competitive pressure from low wage markets, and widespread competition. 
Because the artisan has contracted to produce a certain product for a certain 
price per piece, regardless of the size of order, he absorbs the cost of this high 
flexibility and product diversity. Indeed, as was shown above, the artisan 
contracts a piecework price before he knows how many pieces he will have to 
produce. A fundamental key to the Carma productive system is therefore that 
the casa madre, which essentially controls the productive structure, has 
constituted a system not which reduces the importance of economies of scale, 
but which passes on the costs of flexibility and diseconomies of scale to the 
artisan firm. It is not that minimum economies of scale are reduced or of lesser 
importance in view of this decentralised productive structure (though they may 
have been reduced by other factors, such as technology), but that the casa 
madre has effectively succeeded in forcing the artisan firm to absorb these 
costs.
This price relationship is sustained by two important factors: the use of 
geographical space as a regulating mechanism, and competition in the district. 
Worker organisation and high wage demands were one of the primary factors 
which led to the restructuring of the productive system in the 1970s. Even 
though a different product, competitive strategy, and productive structure were 
adopted at that time, the continued success of the Carma model depends upon 
low to moderate wages in production. If the artisan firms were to cooperate, 
to set standard prices, for example, or if the artisan firms were themselves to 
become highly unionized and impose rigid working schedules or high wage 
demands, the products would not be able to enter the market at competitive 
prices, and the system would fail.
The Carma model effectively inhibits unionisation, by the fragmentation of the 
workforce into small independent workshops, and prevents coordination on the 
part of artisans by pitting them against one another in a competitive
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relationship. Of course, territorial aspects such as the polycentric urban 
structure play an important role in this regard.
Fierce competition in the district between artisans or other sub-contractors in 
the same phase or phases, is combined with lack of flow of information and 
lack of organisation between these same artisans. Spatial segregation of 
network firms impedes the flow of information and resists organisation 
amongst sub-contractors. The casa madre can control the spatial distribution 
of its network system by selecting certain firms over others.
Case madri can further minimise production costs by taking advantage of 
existing uneven development, particularly in the form of cheaper labour sources 
in nearby regions. There was evidence of this in the spatial distribution of 
Carma network firms, which extended into the neighbouring regions of Veneto 
and Mantua, known to be lower-cost locations.
In other words, the spatially disaggregated network system acts to regulate the 
organisation of labour, restrict the power of sub-contractors and the potential 
for collective action or collusion on piece-work prices, take advantage of low- 
cost labour associated with uneven development, and control the ultimate cost 
of labour. This is important for Carma, given that cost is a factor in the 
competitiveness of the final product in the market. This use of territory and 
space is closely tied to the firm’s weak position in the global marketplace, and 
its resulting competitive strategy.
These tendencies toward vertical disintegration and territorial diffusion are, of 
course, ultimately countered by tendencies of spatial clustering. The high 
degree of spatial clustering observed in the Carpi industrial district has much to 
do with the constant re-invention of the product; an entirely different product 
line is created and produced every six months. This, combined with small 
batch sizes for any single product, which are often further divided amongst
172
repeat orders, creates a situation in which it is impossible standardize final or 
intermediate products, or routinize the ongoing transactions between firms. It 
is primarily this inability to routinize which causes spatial clustering to occur.
It is important to note that the network structure extends beyond firms that are 
only involved in production, to include service-providing firms, as well as non- 
market organisations, such as industry associations and local government 
institutions. Given the extremely small size of many of the knitwear network 
firms, administrative and other management functions could not be 
accommodated within the firm. Administrative functions were performed by 
private consultants or local industry associations. Industry associations, and a 
local government industry-specific agency called CITER also provided 
strategic advice, information on new textiles or technology, collective 
purchasing, etc. Access to the this localised infrastructure is another factor 
behind spatial clustering.
Finally, simple access to the district, which is the primary source of 
competitiveness is also a localising force. In the Carma case, it is clear that it 
is the organisational structure that provides the key mechanism for addressing 
market exigencies, specifically a vertically-disintegrated network system of 
production. While other elements of the organisation of production can and 
indeed come into play, such as advanced technology, or flexible work hours, 
evidence of these elements was much more uneven, and generally their 
contribution was much less significant. The decentralised productive system 
provides the basis upon which Carma can compete in the national and 
international market.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A SMALL CITY DISTRICT: OLEODYNAMIC COM PONENTS IN MODENA
This chapter examines the territorial organisation of production in the Modena 
oleodynamics district. It begins with a review of the industry and the local 
district, describes the organisation of one firm and its production network in 
detail (Oil Control, S.p.a.), and concludes with some comments and 
interpretation.
I. BACKGROUND
l.l The Oleodynamic Components Industry in Italy
Oleodynamic components and systems are used primarily in a wide range of 
mobile machinery, such as agricultural machines, earth-moving machines, or 
lifting machines, as well as in fixed machinery, primarily industrial equipment 
such as machine tools (Figure 5.1).
An oleodynamic component consists of a system which transmits and controls 
power through the use of fluids under pressure, inside a closed circuit (such as 
a metal box or cylinder). The system includes components that execute the 
function of generators (converting mechanical energy to hydraulic energy, 
sending the fluid under pressure), and/or components for the control of energy, 
and/or components for the use or distribution of energy. There are many 
different types of oleodynamic components, including valves, distributors, 
pumps, cylinders, accumulators and filters.
The first firms to produce oleodynamic components emerged in Italy 
immediately after the Second World War. It was not until the 1960s that the 
industry was firmly established, beginning a period of rapid expansion in which 
growth in sales averaged 15-20% annually (ERVET, 1986). Expansion in this
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period has been attributed to the growth and diversification of demand, which 
led to the birth of many small firms, each specialising in the production of a 
particular type of oleodynamic component.
By the 1970s, however, foreign competitors began to make strong inroads into 
the domestic Italian market, and the share of national demand satisfied by 
domestic producers began to drop, from 69% in 1976 to about 50% in 1983 
(Comune di Modena, undated). The growth of imports was attributed to the 
increasing technological capacity of the foreign suppliers, aimed at the growing 
portion of market demand for sophisticated, higher quality products. The 
foreign producers, particularly large multinational firms from Germany and 
USA able to finance R&D, sold high performance, standardized, long series 
products at very competitive prices. This reduced Italian producers' share of 
the domestic market, and contributed to their dominance in the more traditional 
and simple oleodynamic product sectors (ERVET, 1986).
The early 1980s were characterised by increasing foreign trade: while imports 
were increasing at about 7.3% annually between 1980 and 1984, exports 
increased at a rate about double this (15.2%) (ERVET, 1986). However, the 
increase in exports was primarily in the area of low cost, low tech components 
(Comune di Modena, undated).
Data for 1986 show a total of 90 major firms in the oleodynamic sector in Italy, 
with a total employment of 4,150 persons (Databank, 1987)22. The value of 
production, at factory prices, for the 90 Italian oleodynamic producer firms was 
estimated at Lit. 340 billion for 1986 (i.e. approximately £170 million sterling 
at 1986 exchange rates) (Databank, 1987). About 40% of the value of 
production was exported in 1986 (Databank, 1987).
The Databank source is the sole detailed source of information available on the oleodynamics sector in Italy, and is the main 
source used by local and regional government. It is provided by a  consulting company, and based on interviews with a  sample of firms. It 
also tends to focus on the larger companies.
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The sector is dominated by smaller firms, particularly in comparison to foreign 
competitors; 62% had less than 49 employees, while 20% of firms had 
between 50 and 149 employees (Databank, 1987). Employment, on the other 
hand, was more evenly distributed, with 19% accounted for by the under-50 
employees category, 35% in firms of between 50 and 149 workers, 28% in 
firms of between 150 and 250, and 17% in companies with more than 250 
workers (Databank, 1987).
The larger Italian oleodynamic component producers are localised in two 
regions: Lombardy (especially the provinces of Milan and Varese) and Emilia- 
Romagna (particularly Reggio, Modena and Bologna). The region of 
Emilia-Romagna was the most significant area of oleodynamic components 
production in Italy, accounting for 44% of all firms in the sector in 1986 (up 
from 38% in 1983)23. Emilia-Romagna increased its share of national 
employment in the sector in the mid-eighties, from 33% to 41% between 1983 
and 198624. Meanwhile Lombardy's share of national employment in the sector 
diminished somewhat (from 33% to 28% of employment, though its share of 
firms increased from 34% to 36%)25.
Each region has its own productive specialisation: the Emilian firms produce 
primarily gear pumps and motors, and distributors, with 80% of production 
aimed at mobile machinery such as earth-movers and agricultural machinery 
(Databank, 1987). While gear pumps and motors are relatively low cost, 
standardised and mature, distributors are generally highly customised. The 
Lombardian firms, on the other hand, produce pump components primarily for 
fixed industrial machinery, a sub-sector in which the domestic Italian market is 
dominated by foreign producers, and so the two regions are not in direct 
competition with one another.
23 Databank, quoted in ERVET, 1986 for 1983 data; Databank, 1987 for 1986 data.
24 Sources as for previous statistics.
25  • •Sources as for previous statistics.
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In the mid 1980s, original productive forms began to emerge in this sector, 
particularly in Emilia-Romagna. The characteristics of the Emilian 
oleodynamic components industry are explored in more detail below.
1.2 History and Profile of the Hodena Oleodynamic Components District
The Modena oleodynamics district was selected for detailed study for primarily 
two reasons: it offered a district in a medium-sized, provincial capital city, 
falling between the other cases study cities of Bologna and Carpi; it was 
accessible and information was more readily available, as the municipal 
government took an active interest in the evolution of the local industry.
Evolution of the District
The evolution of the oleodynamic components sector in Emilia-Romagna and 
Modena has been described as consisting of three primary phases of 
development (Comune di Modena, undated; CGIL, 1988.) The Emilian 
oleodynamic components sector can be traced to the Province of Reggio- 
Emilia, where in 1957 the first oleodynamic firm, "Irma", was started. Irma's 
products were aimed exclusively at the agricultural machinery and equipment 
sector which existed in the area and which had begun integrating oleodynamic 
regulating devices on their machinery for the first time (ERVET, 1986). The 
first firms, including those which emerged a short time later in the Province of 
Modena, such as "Roseo", followed by "Fabbi" and "Salami", developed their 
products in close collaboration with the agricultural machinery sector. Yet 
more firms developed in this initial phase (e.g. SAI, Technol, Sighinolgi), 
continuing the specialisation of components for use on mobile agricultural 
machinery, and gradually expanding their product range to include components 
with applications on a wide variety of mobile machines.
The second phase occurred towards the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s, in 
which there was an expansion and segmentation of demand, particularly in 
foreign markets. This market condition, combined with the accumulation of
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technical expertise that had taken place over the preceding years, set the stage 
for the establishment of new firms and the effective disaggregation of 
production. Some accounts describe this phase as a "haemorrhage" of 
technicians - either previous partners or employees of the first firms - 
establishing their own new companies (Comune di Modena, undated). These 
new firms often positioned themselves in competition with the big firms, 
though with respect to just a portion of the larger firm's product line. Other 
accounts stress the role of the pioneer firms in actively establishing the 
specialised new firms, through ownership or in accordance with a company 
strategy of diversification, risk reduction, or specialisation (ERVET, 1986). In 
other cases, the birth of new firms can be attributed to the identification of 
particular gaps or niches in the market, such as the case of electrovalves 
(Comune di Modena, undated).
Specific conditions are cited as contributing to the development of the sector in 
this phase, including: a diffuse entrepreneurial spirit, a high level of 
professionalism in the work force, the exploitation of reciprocal processes of 
learning and the diffusion of information, and a specialisation in the various 
phases of the productive cycle that permitted a high level of flexibility 
(Cavallini, 1988). "This type of organisational structure, which based its 
strength on the so-called "economies of contiguity", pointed firms toward those 
segments of the market that require personalised products or at least less 
standardised products" (Cavallini, 1988). Still, some older Modenese and 
Emilian firms grew to large sizes due to increases in demand from sectors 
requiring components of high quality but lesser technological sophistication.
A third phase began in the late 1970s, and stretched into the 1980s. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, the increased foreign competition in the national 
domestic market was felt directly by Emilian and Modenese oleodynamic 
producers. It was at this point that domestic market share filled by foreign 
suppliers reached a peak of 50% (Databank, 1987). The insurgence of high
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quality, competitively priced foreign goods forced local producers to redefine 
their competitive and market positions, strategic directions, inter-firm relations, 
and to improve and rationalise production techniques (CGIL, 1988.) This was 
therefore a period of restructuring, leading to new and original modes of 
productive organisation, such as that developed Oil Control.
The District in the mid-1980s
ERVET (1986) estimates that in October, 1984, there were 103 producer firms 
in the region of Emilia-Romagna in the oleodynamic components sector, 
accounting for employment of 3,615 workers - or 3.3% of all workers in the 
regional mechanical sector26. Most of these firms are concentrated in the 
Provinces of Modena, Bologna and Reggio-Emilia, with 35, 31 and 24 
respectively.
The vast majority of these firms are small or very small. Two-thirds of the 
Emilian firms had less than 20 employees (about half of which were above and 
half below 10 employees), while a total of 87% had fewer than 50 employees 
(Figure 5.2). Conversely, about two-thirds (67.5%) of Emilian oleodynamics 
workers were employed in the largest firms, while the smallest of firms (with 
less than 9 workers) accounted for only 5% of employment (ERVET, 1986).
In the Province of Modena, which is the primary location for the case study to 
follow, most firms fell into the 10-19 employees category, while only five firms 
had more than 50 employees, only one of which, "Salami", had over 100 
workers (ERVET, 1986 and Comune di Modena, undated)(Figure 5.3). The
26 There are three primary sources of d ata  on the oleodynamics sector in the region of Emilia-Romagna and the Province of Modena. 
Databank provided a  survey of Italian firms in the sector in 1983, and then again in 1986.
ERVET (1986) builds on the 1983 Databank analysis, and adds its own research to arrive a t  a  more complete picture of the sector in the 
region, primarily by including the smaller firms in the data . Hence their figure, for example, of 103 firms in Emilia-Romagna (for 1984), 
alone while the Databank figure for all of Italy is 90 firms (for 1986).
The data  a t the provincial level compiled by the Comune di Modena and presented in their report, relies primarily on information provided 
by the union, their own data  collection and interviews with firms. Their data  represents only producer firms (excluding distributors), and 
those firms th a t work only as sub-contractors (conto terzi).
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Figure 5.2
Oleodynamic producer firms, Emilia Romagna 
by number of employees (1986)
□ 1-19
□ 20-49 
3  50+
Source: ERVET
Figure 5.3
Oleodynamics Producer Firms, Modena, by number of Employees
□  20-49 
a  50+70.6%
11.8%
17 .6%
Source: Comune di Modena
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Comune di Modena (undated) estimates that total oleodynamics sector 
employment for the Province was 869 in 1984, down about 8% from 950 
workers in 1981. This was not a generalised decline, however, but involved 
primarily the older firms, while the younger ones increased employment levels.
Total output for the region of Emilia-Romagna is estimated at Lit. 293 billion 
for 1984 (approximately £150 million)27. The sector exhibited moderate 
growth between 1981 and 1984 - an average annual increase of about 6% in 
current (not real) terms (ERVET, 1986). Much of the expansion - which 
occurred during a time of decline in production at the national level - can be 
attributed to exports. The value of Emilian oleodynamic exports increased 
26% over the period, and as a share of total production, exports increased 
substantially from 21% of output in 1981 to 36% in 1984 (ERVET, 1986).
It is interesting that the smaller firms of less than 50 employees increased their 
share of total output over the same period, while the share of output attributed 
to firms with more than 50 workers decreased about 10% (ERVET, 1986). So 
the small firms - not the large- can be credited with maintaining growth in 
output during the early 1980s. But the few big firms still accounted for the 
lion's share of output: firms of over 50 workers accounted for 62% of regional 
output, while firms of between 10 and 40 workers contributed about 30% 
(ERVET, 1986).
For the Province of Modena, total output in 1984 is estimated at Lit. 75 billion 
(£37 million, approximately) - or about one-quarter of regional output in the 
sector (Comune di Modena, undated) (Figure 5.4). Provincial output had 
declined in real terms during the recession years of 1981 and 1982, but 
rebounded to exceed 1981 levels by about 10% in 1984. This improvement is 
attributed only in part to the more favourable economic conditions in 1984 - it
ERVET points out th a t there is some risk of this figure being over-estimated due to double-counting, given the high 
degree of exchange between firms in the region.
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was also due to an improvement o f  competitive capacity (Comune di Modena).
Figure 5.4
Oleodynamics sector output, 1981-84
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Sources: Databank, ERVET, Comune di Modena
Compared to the national profile for the sector, Emilian oleodynamic producers 
were relatively more concentrated in the sub-sectors of pumps (21% of the 
regional oleodynamic sector output), valves and distributors (21%), cylinders 
(19%) and motors (14%) (ERVET, 1986). Each sub-sector has its own range 
of products, markets, and production processes. Cylinders, for example, are 
the simplest among the range of oleodynamic components, but also the most 
customised, designed and manufactured according to the specific needs of 
users (Comune di Modena). Main uses include agricultural machinery, earth- 
moving machines, building and road construction machinery. The valves and 
distributors sub-sector caters to the same users, but in Modena there is special 
emphasis on distributors, and electrically controlled valves (electrovalves), the 
production of which replaced more traditional mechanical valves beginning in 
the 1970s (Comune di Modena).
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There is therefore little homogeneity within the Emilian oleodynamics sector in 
the type of product (in terms of sub-sector, quality, price, technological 
sophistication), its stage of development (whether mature or leading edge), or 
in the degree to which it is standardised or customised. As we shall see, 
standardised, long series products can be produced alongside the more 
customised.
In the Province of Modena, production was concentrated in valves and 
distributors (at 30% of provincial output) and cylinders (at 27%) (Comune di 
Modena, undated), suggesting further sub-regional specialisations in different 
aspects of the sector. Despite these intra-regional variations, at about 32%, the 
share of Provincial output exported was similar to that for the region as a 
whole, and increased somewhat (from 28% to 32%) between 1981 and 1984 
(Comune di Modena). However, the level of exports varies significantly by 
sub-sector. The valves and distributors sub-sector exported about the same 
proportion of production as the Provincial figure (31%), while for cylinders the 
share was less than the average (19%) (Comune di Modena, undated).
In the mid-eighties, ownership of firms in the Emilian oleodynamics sector 
tended to be private, independent of large national or foreign groups, and 
usually involving a local family or families (Databank, 1987). This was also 
true for the Modenese firms, including Salami, SAI, Oleodinamic Modenese, 
and Roseo. There are often ownership linkages between firms in the region, 
though it is not common for one firm to be completely owned or controlled by 
another.
No single source provides estimates of economic concentration at the 
provincial or regional level, but a rough estimate can be produced by 
combining Databank figures for sales of the largest firms with ERVET and 
Comune di Modena estimates for total regional and provincial output for the 
same year. Adopting this methodology, the following table results:
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Table 5.1
Economic Concentration of Oleodynamic Producer Firms 
Share of Total Sector Output 
Emilia-Romagna and Modena, 1984
Emilia-Romagna Modena
Lit (billions) % Lit (billions) %
Top firm 19 6 12 16
Top 1-4 firms 58 20 27 35
Top 1-8 firms 95 33 - -
TOTAL 293* 76**
* ERVET (1986) ** Comune di Modena (undated)
From these rough figures we can see that while there is a group of larger firms 
operating in the oleodynamics sector in Emilia-Romagna, there is not an 
exceptionally high degree of economic concentration. This value is higher for 
the Province of Modena, in which there is one very large firm (Salami) and a 
few large firms. For the most part, as was noted above, the sector is 
characterised by very small to medium-sized firms, and while there is 
occasional participation of some firms in the ownership of others in the same 
region and sector, this does not translate into direct control of one firm over 
one or several other firms. Neither is the regional picture dominated by foreign 
ownership or the presence of multinationals amongst the producer firms, 
though there are some examples.
Turning to the labour process and aspects of the internal structure and 
organisation of firms, the Modenese oleodynamics sector is dominated by male 
workers, particularly those 25 to 45 years of age, while women represent about 
19% of those employed (CGIL, 1988). About 70% of employment is in 
blue-collar categories, and 30% in white-collar or clerical roles (CGIL, 1988).
The level of unionisation in the Modenese oleodynamics sector is about the 
same as that for the province as a whole; 62% in oleodynamics versus 61% for
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the Province of Modena (CGIL, 1988). This proportion is quite high, 
especially considering the small average firm size. The composition of 
membership indicates a greater presence of ’impiegati' i.e. clerks and 
white-collar workers, compared to the all-industry Provincial data. 
Nevertheless, the level of blue-collar union membership is high, at about 80% 
of all male workers and 66% of female workers. Membership amongst 
workers with clerical/white-collar qualifications in the two largest firms (Salami 
and Oil Control) is also good (CGIL, 1988).
The introduction of advanced production technology was perceived as having 
various effects, depending on the market segment, product strategy chosen by 
the particular firm, the technologies adopted, and the organisational structures 
(including the criteria of internalisation vs. extemalisation of specific firm 
functions). In the area of management, the process of informatizzazione or 
computerisation of elementary information functions was more advanced. On 
the shop floor, the introduction of innovations had brought about an 
occupational polarisation, with a limited number of workers with authority, in 
charge of more skilled functions, including programming the machines, versus a 
large number of low-skilled workers primarily in charge of loading and 
unloading the machines, and with minimal control (CGIL, 1988).
The productive process is characterised by disaggregation, with production 
usually taking place through a network of highly specialised producers, 
generally under the control and direction of a lead firm or "casa madre" 
(mother firm). The lead firm takes on the roles of product design, coordination 
of the production process, quality control, and marketing strategy.
The productive relations between firms have been described, however, as 
surpassing simple, traditional, hierarchical sub-contracting relationships, 
"achieving forms of division of labour according to the diverse capacities and 
productive specialisations, and of real cooperation..." in areas such as product
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development (Comune di Modena, undated: 88). The evolution of 
cooperative links in the mid-1980s is heralded as signalling a reaggregation and 
integration of different production activities. While there is evidence of 
"filiazione dalla casa madre" or the lead firm directly establishing spinoff 
firms, accords and coordination between financially and legally independent 
firms are more common (Comune di Modena, undated).
2. THE OIL CONTROL PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM
As noted above, there are myriad types of oleodynamic components, and the 
sector is divided into several sub-compartments based on these product 
distinctions. In the case study below, we will explore the productive system 
associated with a network of firms that produces oleodynamic valves. The lead 
firm is called "Oil Control S.p.a.", and heads a network of firms located 
primarily in the Province of Modena.
Though there is a range of types of productive structure existing in the Modena 
district, the most common type is similar to that of the Carma model, involving 
a lead firm and a network of subcontractors. However, in the Modena district, 
interlocking ownerships amongst lead firms are quite common, perhaps as a 
means of presenting a more complete product range on the market.
Oil Control’s network is unique in that its relationships with sub-producer firms 
run much deeper than the traditional sub-contractor/client relationships seen 
with Carma. In this case, the second tier firms were created by Oil Control to 
fulfil specific production functions, and evolved with the casa madre. The firms 
are further linked by a pattern of interlocking ownerships, with Oil Control 
owning controlling shares of the network firms, who in turn have a financial 
interest in Oil Control. The network firms which are involved in joint 
ownership arrangements with Oil Control will hereafter be referred to as the 
“family firms” (as indeed Oil Control calls them), to distinguish them from 
other firms involved in production but not linked through ownership. So while
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the Oil Control example may be somewhat unique, it will provide a case that 
helps to isolate the effects of ownership on the territorial organisation of 
production.
L I The Process and Organisation of Production
The process of production varies depending on the type of valve to be 
produced. The process described below represents a schematic view - a typical 
case of a more complete valve or "block" consisting of an external body or 
aluminum block, with various cavities inside. The cavities contain control 
devices, cartridges, and single valves. The main stages of production are:
• marketing;
• evaluation of technical feasibility of a given product;
• design;
• production planning;
• acquisition, of raw materials and standard components;
• production, including:
fabrication of the oleodynamic "box" or container from steel or 
aluminum bars;
drilling or boring of channels in the box; 
manufacturing of the individual parts, such as valves and 
cartridges;
• assembly of the specialised steel components, standardised components 
and aluminum block;
• testing, including tuning, weighing; and
• shipping.
First, it should be noted that the process of production is not a strictly linear 
process, as the above outline would suggest. For example, many different 
manufacturing processes can be undertaken simultaneously. Second, the 
specific production process will naturally vary depending on the exact nature of 
the product. Third, and most important, the production process does not take
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place within a single firm, but is dispersed amongst a network of firms.
Certain functions are performed "internally", that is, within Oil Control, while 
others are undertaken externally in specialist firms. Indeed, this is probably the 
singlemost important defining characteristic of the system of production.
The Oil Control network can be seen as consisting of three levels. At the top is 
Oil Control itself, the casa madre, which is responsible for sales and marketing, 
product development, production planning, testing, along with some 
manufacturing and assembly. In the second tier are a small number of family 
firms, each which specialises in a particular phase of manufacturing. These 
firms are: TARP, Edi-Systems, CCO, and TCB. In a third tier are a number of 
sub-contractors and suppliers, which interact only with the second tier 
enterprises.
2.2 The casa madre - Oil Control, S.p.a.
Oil Control S.p.a. is a firm of approximately 90 employees, which specialises in 
the production of oleodynamic valves for mobile machines. It is located in the 
small town of Nonantola, some 10 km. east of the city of Modena, in the 
Province of Modena. The firm is autonomous and privately owned, by a small 
group of partners.
The valves produced by Oil Control fulfill primarily a function of controlling 
load. This serves a security role, for example, by ensuring the stability of heavy 
machinery should another component break. Their most typical product is the 
"balancing valve", as well as valves that control the motion of a machine. 
Balancing valves account for approximately 65% of Oil Control's sales, 70% of 
which is comprised of valves for earth-moving machinery, and 30% of which 
controls suspended loads, primarily for lifting machinery.
In 1986, total sales for the firm amounted to Lit. 11.9 billion (about £6 
million), having demonstrated a remarkable average annual increase since 1982
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of 34% (in current lire), from Lit. 3.8 billion. The steady growth of the market 
for Oil Control's product is linked, in part, to the widening application of safety 
standards to mobile machinery in Europe and elsewhere. About 50% of Oil 
Control's sales was exported, of which about 75% went to the (then) EEC and 
other European countries, 15% to Australia, and the remainder to a variety of 
destinations including Canada, the US, Israel, Mediterranean countries and the 
Far East.
History
Two of Oil Control's current owners started the firm in 1973. They had both 
worked in the largest oleodynamics firm in the province, "Salami", before 
setting up their own sub-contracting company in the late 1960s. One of these 
partners was the director of the technical office at that firm and developed a 
significant experience and expertise in design.
After having established their own firm, the partners began looking for a 
product that they could produce themselves directly for the market. They 
observed the success of an Italian firm that imported certain kinds of 
oleodynamic products from the U.S.. They also judged that this firm knew 
little about the possible applications for its product, and that the potential for 
this kind of product in Italy was not being exploited.
The product was aimed especially at the Italian market, and Emilia-Romagna 
itself. The Emilian market particularly tended to consist of small firms, 
representing a fragmented demand, which contributed toward the notion of 
producing customised products. Adapting the product to fulfill the precise 
needs of clients was therefore a fundamental idea behind the formation of Oil 
Control in 1973.
Most valves produced by Oil Control are designed and developed for a specific 
client and for a specific function. They began by producing valves for 
controlling load and motion, particularly for the mobile machinery sector, and
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especially for lifting machines. Often, this meant providing solutions for a 
client's particular problem, and hence a high degree of customisation of the 
product. Oil Control's products differed from those in the marketplace 
provided by the large multinational corporations operating in the sector, which 
concentrated in other kinds of oleodynamic components, such as pumps or 
cylinders. "The fact is that the great multinationals were not interested in 
Italian firms. We produce a kind of component whose function is to improve 
and fine tune the machines, and usually it must be customised, or modified 
according to the kind of machine, so it is a kind of product that the 
multinationals are not interested in." (interview, Storci/Ferrari, 1988).
Indeed, Oil Control has a very high number of components in production - 
about 5,000, of which 2,000 are manufactured essentially in their entirety. 
About 1,000 to 1,500 components are planned and designed on average each 
year. These numbers suggest the extreme variability of production and high 
degree of flexibility of the productive structure. The productive cycle is 
organised around lots of small to medium size of from 500 to 2,000 pieces, 
repeated from 3 to 12 times in a year.
Because Oil Control's products are developed to respond to the particular 
needs of a user, a close relationship with the client is required. The direct and 
intimate relation with the client, and the consultant service offered to the client 
by Oil Control are seen as the keys to the success of the firm.
Because of the high degree of customisation, and the close contact with the 
client that this requires, the evolution and improvement of the product is 
continual, and becomes a natural offshoot of this relationship. The quest for a 
solution to a particular firm's problem leads Oil Control to conduct research 
and experiment - which in turn can lead to improvements that are more widely 
applicable. The constant innovation and experimentation with the product is 
evidenced in the fact that in its short life, the firm has deposited over 30 patents
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for the European market. As each product has a very specific function, such 
new discoveries tend only to increase the firm's product range rather than 
eliminate existing products. The orientation towards resolving a particular 
client's problems constitutes a major stimulus for product innovation.
However, the firm does not only produce customised products; standardised 
oleodynamic valves are produced in about equal measure. These are produced 
with little to no contact with the client, on different, dedicated machines, in 
long series, regular production, are warehoused and sold through catalogues 
and other indirect means, and therefore with little knowledge of the final uses 
to which the valves will be put.
The firm's main competitors are Italian, and include primarily other firms in 
Emilia Romagna, such as Comatrol and Oleostar, both of Reggio-Emilia.
These firms form part of larger industrial groups: Hidroirma and Casappa, 
respectively. The US also produces competitive products, but they do not have 
a large presence in Europe. Some British producers have recently developed a 
capacity in the oleodynamic valves sector, including Sterling Hydraulics and 
Integrated Hydraulics.
Oil Control believes itself to be the "leader" firm in its sector in Italy.
Competing firms produce their oleodynamic valves externally; only design and 
sales are undertaken internally. Production and assembly are executed by 
independent firms, and the casa madre cannot exercise as much control over 
the productive process compared to Oil Control's productive structure. "So 
they don't have direct control over production. According to Fiat philosophy, 
this is the right way, but for oleodynamics we consider it a handicap. Even if it 
is more expensive, it is more important to directly control production to control 
the quality" (interview, Storci/Ferrari, 1988). The competition also tends to be 
less specialised in oleodynamic valves, and attempts to use standardised, rather 
than customised components in their final products.
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Oil Control's competitive position can therefore be said to rest upon the 
differentiation of its product from other major producers, in particular avoiding 
markets dominated by the large multinationals, and its continual development 
of new uses, applications, and extensions to the product range to meet 
changing, specialised market demand. This differentiation rests on two pillars: 
the high quality and customisation of the product.
Oil Control has a commercial network which has been created over the years, 
which extends all over the world. Representatives essentially buy Oil Control's 
standardized products, and sell them in individual markets. The final price is 
therefore not decided by Oil Control itself, but by the various representatives.
If the client has specific problems that require a customised valve, then Oil 
Control must intervene directly through their consulting section. The 
representatives, however, are all qualified technicians that can serve as 
intermediaries. Oil Control has its own commercial structure in one foreign 
country only - England - where it has established Oil Control U.K.. This direct 
commercial structure was one that was seen at the time of interview as likely to 
be extended as a part of a strategy for dealing with continuing European 
integration in 1992.
The Internal Organisation of Production
The overall management of Oil Control is headed by a three-member 
"administration council", which consists of three of the partners who jointly 
own the family firms. This small group is the governing and decision-making 
body of the firm. One partner presides over the technical aspects of the 
product, guiding the commercial technicians, and overseeing sales, marketing 
and product design. A second partner is responsible for production in general, 
and the operation of the workshop. The third partner is senior manager and 
responsible for administration, though the other partners also oversee the 
administrative function and are primarily responsible for the general 
management of the firm. Though this represents a substantially centralised
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management structure, one of the goals at the time of interview was to 
decentralise the decision-making apparatus within the firm, with the two active 
partners acting more as "consultants" to other managers and employees.
As noted above, not all of the functions involved in the production of Oil 
Control's oleodynamic valves are undertaken within the firm itself. Of the list 
of steps outlined above, the main stages undertaken internally by the casa 
madre are:
• marketing and sales;
• product evaluation and design;
• development of prototypes;
• acquisition of materials and standard components (for itself and external 
producers);
• some production phases, e.g. the forming of the steel container block or 
box;
• assembly (adding the standard pieces acquired);
• testing; and
• warehousing and shipping.
The internal organisation of the firm reflects these functions. A Technical 
Office is responsible primarily for design of products and experimentation. A 
small office of "Times and Methods" had recently been initiated within the 
Technical Office, but the planning, organisation and scheduling of production 
was still primarily left to the workshop, where the pieces are studied again from 
the point of view of the productive cycle, the specifications for each piece are 
entered into the data bank and translated into control programs for the 
production equipment which can be accessed from the work centres. The 
management of the data and programs to control the machinery is therefore 
currently undertaken in the workshop. There is also an Office of Production, in 
which production of standard products only is organised in accordance with 
orders and statistics. The administrative office also includes the sales office.
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Oil Control has been working to develop an integrated computerised 
information management system. At the time of interview, they had recently 
switched to a single system that took care of virtually all aspects of information 
management, from planning the workloads of the machines and stocks to 
billing and managing orders. The firm has a direct computer link to Oil Control 
UK. Orders are sent directly by computer from England to the factory in 
Nonantola, where production planning begins. This also allows Oil Control to 
work with minimal stocks, and reduce costs as much as possible.
In the pre-production phases, there are several types of worker. Due to the 
high technological content of the product, the sales office requires workers 
with an elevated degree of technological knowledge; these employees are 
referred to as "commercial technicians". There are technicians who engage in 
product design, according to the needs of the client, while other technicians 
analyse the design and determine the best and most efficient productive cycle 
for the piece. At the time of interview, the firm had two CAD stations, and 
were awaiting the arrival of two more. However, the CAD function was not 
directly linked to the production equipment. Another type of worker develops 
the computer programs for the computer-controlled production machinery that 
will execute the required piece.
Actual production involves primarily machine operators. The machine 
operator's job consists of preparing the machine for production, including 
organising the pieces that will be worked (in groups, rather than single pieces), 
selecting the appropriate tools (with the help of a worker who specialises in 
this task), loading the appropriate control programs, and supervising the 
machine in operation. Once prepared, the machine can operate on its own for 
several hours, so a single machine operator can be responsible for more than 
one machine, a situation that was not possible with traditional machines.
Oil Control requires two broad types of production machinery, reflecting the
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two main categories of product: standardized and customised. Dedicated 
machinery is used to produce the standardized products, and is used only for 
this purpose. These "transfer machines" were highly productive, and used to 
produce long series, of thousands of standard pieces, often requiring one or 
two months to do so. These machines were relatively low cost, but required a 
highly skilled operator.
On the other hand, flexible machines are used to produce the customised 
products, and these machines account for 90% of Oil Control's stock of 
machinery. According to the partners, Oil Control has always followed a 
program of investments in high technology, especially in computers, and has 
been systematically adding computerised machinery to its inventory since the 
late 1970s. Included are both NC/CNC machines and computerised work 
centres. The latter have the ability to store programs, and execute automatic 
tool selection. At the time of interview the firm had five computerised work 
centres, one computerised grinding machine, and one cleaning centre planned 
to resolve pollution problems. These machines did not form part of a network 
linked to other machines, or to administrative functions, but were isolated 
production centres. However, there were cases of partial integration, 
particularly in the first phases of production, where for example the cutting of 
the bars and grinding the valve were linked by robot.
As the firm's strength is customised oleodynamic valves, Oil Control produces 
a large number of small components. The flexible, computer-controlled work 
centres and machinery play a critical role in permitting the diversity of product, 
short production runs (usually 5 to 100 pieces), and the frequent product and 
process changes that these imply, while maintaining production efficiency. 
These machines are also credited with significantly reducing turnaround times 
("today you start the production of one piece and tomorrow you can give it to 
the client, even if there are manual operations involved" (interview, 
Storci/Ferrari, 1988)).
197
Of the 65 workers involved directly in production, there are eight or nine who 
program the machinery - the "periti industrial/", or industrial technicians 
(generally graduates from a technical high school). There is a single 
"attrezzatore", who selects the proper tools for the machines. The attrezzatore 
must ensure that the tool is operating correctly and that the resulting pieces are 
correct, and have not been influenced by build-up of material on the machine, 
for example, and that the appropriate lubricants have been used. A total of 
about seven or eight of the direct production workers are seen as being highly 
skilled, and with a high level of experience.
Workers at Oil Control generally have some kind of diploma, most often from 
a technical high school. Their staff includes only two engineers with a 
university degree, and one other employee with a university degree in business, 
who assists in the general management and administration of the firm. The firm 
has a policy of not hiring highly skilled and experienced workers; rather, they 
prefer to assume workers straight out of school, and look primarily for a 
positive attitude rather than specific job skills. Most new workers are assumed 
as apprentices under the "contratto di formazione di lavoro"28.
As most new workers are recent graduates of high school or technical school, 
much of the worker's training takes place within the firm. This is not just a 
case of on-the-job learning, but Oil Control also provides more structured 
training through courses, both within and outside the firm. There are two 
streams of courses, one for those workers who are in contact with the clients, 
such as the engineers and the technical-commercial staff, and the second stream 
comprised of courses for production workers. The latter courses are organised 
by Oil Control's engineers, and deal primarily with technical issues.
New production workers also receive on-the-job training by working for the
This is an apprenticeship program in which the state covers tax and insurance contributions for the worker, which essentially 
lowers the cost of the worker to  the employer.
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first two years on traditional machinery. In this way, the owners feel, the 
workers develop a greater understanding of the work process, the proper tools, 
materials, lubricants, etc. and the principles at work. Even computer 
programmers whose eventual job will not be to directly operate a machine are 
subject to this training, so that they gain an understanding of the entire 
production process, of the actual pieces that emerge at the end of a working 
process, and can relate that to how the machine has been programmed. This 
training period is necessary for all production workers, even though technically, 
only a few days' training would be sufficient for a new worker to learn how to 
operate a computer-controlled machine. New workers are trained with other 
workers using the same kind of machinery, and with the assistance of the 
technicians and designers.
According to the president of the company, the long term career path of the 
worker is not dependent upon his level of qualification upon entering the firm, 
but rather upon the level of skill he demonstrates and particularly his 
"willingness". There are examples in the firm of section heads that have only 
intermediate higher education, while the more highly trained periti-industriali 
may take much longer to reach the same position.
There seems to be a fairly high degree of movement of workers between 
different tasks, particularly in production. This generally consists of the 
technical, programming and design staff also operating the machines in 
production, rather than the machine operators occasionally performing 
programming functions. In fact, the machine operators do not generally 
program their own machines - this is the role of the technicians. With the 
automated, computer controlled work centres, the function of the machine 
operator is primarily the loading and unloading of batches of parts on the 
machine. So while the operator's function is narrowed in one sense - that he no 
longer programs the action of his machine - the fact that the machine can 
operate by itself for several hours means that the operator can look after more
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than one machine at a time. However, the "work centres" also have automatic 
tool selection and mounting, replacing yet another function that was previously 
performed by the machine operator himself.
For the production worker, there was only a limited degree of integration of 
conceptualisation and execution, through two primary channels. First, the 
production worker tended to and in fact was encouraged to work with the 
designer and the computer programmer in the execution of the components. 
This consultation took place after the component had been designed, however. 
A second channel for worker input was the regular firm meeting, which all 
production workers and management attend, to discuss organisational and 
technical problems and their resolution. Workers were asked to identify 
problems, and to suggest solutions. Management stated that it did take the 
views of workers into account when making decisions on these matters, and 
when workers' views were not acted upon, the rationale behind the decision 
was presented to the workers. "If you make the worker state their opinion on 
how to resolve the problem, you must take their opinion into account, and if 
you choose another solution you must be sure that it is the right one, and you 
must explain the decision to them and the reasoning" (Storci, interview, 1988).
The External Relations of Production
As noted above, most of the production functions are undertaken outside the 
casa madre. Production can be broken down into two primary types of 
component. First, there are standardised pieces, which are acquired from 
outside suppliers. These are generally smaller pieces such as washers, springs, 
caps, etc. which are simply ordered as is from existing suppliers. The second 
kind of component encompasses all other pieces required to produce the 
valves, both in the case of standardised and customised valves. These pieces 
are produced within the network of small firms linked to Oil Control.
The "family firms" in the Oil Control family consist of:
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• Edi-Systems, Modena;
• TARP, in Sant'Antonio di Pavullo;
• TCB, Nonantola; and
• CCO, located in Modena.
Each of the firms is devoted to a particular area of production or 
manufacturing process. CCO specialises in particular manufacturing processes 
in component-making, especially rolling; TARP in the production of sub­
components and valves that form part of the final oleodynamic "integrated 
block"; Edi-systems in electrovalves, and TCB in thermal treatments. As a 
partner of Oil Control puts it, each firm represents a "microscopically 
differentiated production" (interview, 1988).
These network firms started to be formed shortly after Oil Control itself was 
founded, with the first one started three years thereafter. In general, they were 
each actively established by Oil Control as part of a wider organisational 
strategy and to fulfil a specific need. Two of these firms will be described in 
more detail below, Edi-Systems and TARP. Because of their significant 
differences, the internal organisation of each will be described separately below.
23 Edi-Systems 
The Internal Organisation of Production
Created in 1980, Edi-Systems specialises in electrovalves. The founder of the 
firm had gained his training and experience by working at the major local 
oleodynamic firm, Salami, for 10 years, as a mechanical engineer. Following 
this experience, he became a salesman for a U.S. oleodynamics manufacturer 
(Smith), which was exporting electrovalves to Italy, and in so doing he 
identified the potential for producing similar valves locally at a lower cost. 
Edi-systems was created for this purpose.
Oil Control's interest in this area appears to be twofold. First, it saw the
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opportunity, through Edi-systems, to diversify its product range by the addition 
of electrovalves. Secondly, Edi-systems offered the potential to explore what it 
saw as the emerging market area of electronically-controlled valves, which 
were an extension of the electrovalve.
Edi-Systems' major product is electrovalves, although they also produce other 
kinds of valves. Part of the range of valve products is standardised, long series 
production and a part of it is customised. The electrovalve itself is a 
standardised "cartridge" in the oleodynamic component. Integrated blocks are 
also produced, and account for the lion's share of the firm's revenues. The 
main users are primarily the agricultural machinery and mobile machinery 
sectors, which account for 90% of revenues, while the remaining 10% is used 
in industrial production machinery, including the ceramics machinery sector.
The market is divided into three types of orders: single commissions, repeat 
commissions, and production on spec. The normal mode of operation is to 
work only on commission, even for the standardised products. For a piece that 
is already in existence the turnaround time is about four to six weeks.
The competitors that were cited were primarily local firms, including Oliostar, 
Cometrol and Oilsystem, all of Reggio-Emilia. Numerous foreign competitors 
were also noted, including those from the U.S., England, Germany and France.
The relationship between Edi-Systems and Oil Control is a unique one. In 
some ways, Edi-Systems acts as a supplier to Oil Control, and is in a secondary 
position. Yet with respect to its own internal organisation of production, it 
also takes on the role of a casa madre, in that it designs and develops products. 
Moreover, it does not undertake any actual production in-house, but sub­
contracts all of the production functions to external producers. This 
organisational form has been in effect since the inception of the firm; 
production has never occurred internally. In-house functions include only:
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• design
• development of prototypes and experimentation
• assembly
• testing.
Given that there is no actual manufacturing that takes place in Edi-Systems, 
most of the staff are not production workers. Of the 25 employees, there are 
two directors: one for administration, and one for marketing and sales. There 
are three engineers in the technical office, one of whom is a highly skilled 
designer. The sales and marketing office has a staff of two. Two employees 
are responsible for experimentation, one of whom is a mechanical technician. 
Two employees oversee the acquisitions of parts and materials, and another 
controls the warehouse. Computers were much in evidence, from the CAD 
stations used in design to the fully computerised administration, orders and 
stock systems.
Direct production at Edi-Systems involves only the making of prototypes, and 
assembly of the final products using parts commissioned from sub-contractors. 
The production of prototypes involves a single lathe operator. There are eight 
assemblers, including one "assembly coordinator" who is responsible for the 
planning and distribution of work. One worker is responsible for hydraulic 
testing and inspection. Given Edi-Systems' specialisation in developing new 
valves and non-production aspects of the process, the skill levels are quite high. 
The accountants and mechanical engineers have university degrees, and there 
are seven industrial technicians. Formal training is not perceived as being 
sufficient, however, so there is also an intensive internal training program for 
all workers, which requires one and a half years, on the theory and practice of 
oleodinamica.
The external relations of production
Edi-Systems uses Oil Control's marketing and sales network as their primary
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access to the market. Edi-systems products appear in the Oil Control 
catalogue, and the two firms coordinate on marketing and sales activities. Oil 
Control, in turn, considers this relationship as an opportunity for product 
research, in particular for the development of knowledge and potential 
products in oleodynamic components controlled electronically.
Despite its relationship with Oil Control, Edi-Systems exhibits a high degree of 
independence, developing and overseeing production of its own products. Its 
own network of production sub-contractors includes TARP, as well as other 
local firms in the Provinces of Modena and Reggio-Emilia. There are about 
seven such firms in all, including three specialising in lathe-work and others 
involved in different manufacturing processes.
2.4 TARP
The Internal Organisation of Production
TARP is a firm of 60 employees located in the small mountain town of 
Sant'Antonio di Pavullo, in the southern part of the Province of Modena. The 
firm specialises in the production of components for the oleodynamic valves, 
including cartridges which are inserted into the integrated blocks, and small 
valves. Annual revenues for 1987 were in the range of 4 billion lire (£2 
million). Since its founding, the firm has been owned by a group of five 
partners, only one of whom plays an active role in the management of the firm; 
this partner effectively heads the firm and is its top manager. He oversees all 
day-to-day operations, as well as investment decisions, though these are made 
in consultation with the other partners.
The firm was initially founded in January, 1977 and moved to Sant'Antonio di 
Pavullo from Modena, in a building shared with Edi-Systems, in October of 
1980. The reason given for setting up the firm in this small town was that the 
active partner and his wife were originally from Sant'Antonio, and it had always 
been a goal to return there.
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The firm was essentially self-financed from the start. It did not rely on 
government assistance nor help from development or industrial associations. 
Rather, it raised capital privately, securing loans against private possessions. 
Now that the firm has achieved a level of stability, it has fewer problems 
obtaining financial assistance from banks.
On average, TARP produces 2,000 different kinds of pieces each year. These 
pieces are the basic components which are assembled into valves; each valve is 
comprised of from 10 to 15 pieces. The average lot size is about 5,000, but 
ranges from 100 to 50,000. There are usually about four placements every day 
(over two shifts). Despite the "flexible” NC technology, smaller lots are more 
expensive to produce due to the costs of equipping of the machine, and a 
premium is charged for these small series to reflect the setup costs.
The production process followed at TARP is generally as follows. An order is 
received by the Production Office, including specifications for the component. 
The production planner then analyses the piece, and determines what the 
production process for that piece will be. He will also determine what standard 
pieces will be required from other sources and orders them. Production itself 
usually involves the following stages:
• lathe-work
• boring/ drilling of cavities
• secondary lathe operations
• thermal treatments
• grinding
• coupling/matching of parts
• assembly
• testing.
Primary and secondary lathe-work account for about 60% of the work process, 
while grinding and thermal treatments account for the remaining 40%. All of
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these processes are conducted in-house, with the exception of thermal 
treatments, for which there is no internal capacity. This function is performed 
at TCB, the firm in the Oil Control "family" established by Oil Control for this 
purpose.
TARP has an extremely lean support structure; 54 of the 60 employees work 
directly in production. Under the owner/manager, there are five or six section 
heads - one for each major production process undertaken by the firm, 
including lathe-work, grinding and testing. The remainder of the employees are 
involved primarily in administration, which is undertaken internally, except for 
special tasks such as for calculating the VAT and for the annual declaration of 
revenues, which are performed by a private consultant. In addition, the firm 
makes use of a generic consultant from time to time. The consultants are 
located in Modena and Reggio.
As noted above, the firm is organised around the various production processes. 
At the time of interview, TARP had some of the very latest and highest quality 
production equipment available, augmented by traditional equipment for 
specific tasks. Their inventory includes:
• for lathe-work, 20 traditional machines and 7 NC machines;
• for secondary lathe-work, all are transfer machines built especially for
their needs;
• for grinding, two NC machines;
• and a large number of other traditional machines for specialised tasks.
The firm began acquiring NC equipment in 1981 and added one or two of these 
machines each year. There is one central computer which manages the 
programs for the NC machines. This computer stores programs for all the NC 
machines, sends the appropriate program to the NC machine for a given 
production procedure, and then receives the program again when the procedure 
is completed. This saves enormous amounts of set-up time for repeat orders,
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for which all that must be done is to call up the appropriate program from the 
central computer.
The machine operators, which make up almost the totality of the firm's 
employment, tend to be extremely specialised. It is a policy of the firm to 
specialise workers on individual machines, so that they can develop a high level 
of competence. "We teach him a particular task, and then we leave him there 
for a long time, because he needs a long time to acquire skills" (interview, 
Venturelli, 1988). Despite regular changes to the production process, the 
workers remain highly specialised and devoted to very specific machinery and 
tasks.
TARP is unique in that a large number of its production workers are women; 
there are 23 women employees in the firm, and 21 work directly in production. 
The hiring of women has been a deliberate policy of the firm's management. 
However, the management also believes that women are more suited to the 
more repetitive and less demanding tasks.
Generally, workers are assumed straight out of a technical high school, usually 
with a five-year diploma. All workers receive on-the-job training. TARP tends 
not to hire workers with a great deal of previous experience, but looks instead 
for young workers with a "love for work".
The introduction of NC machines tools is perceived to have made it much 
easier to train new workers. The quality of work achieved with NC machines 
is less dependent on the worker himself, because the machine performs many 
functions previously undertaken by the operator. Thus the training time for an 
operator of an NC machine is six months, compared to ten years for a 
traditional machine operator. The operator of a traditional machine must know 
applied mechanics and the mechanics of the machine, while the NC machine 
operator is more like a computer operator. At TARP the machine operator
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plays a greater role in programming the machine; the manager feels that it is a 
"great mistake" if the programme is made up by a programmer in the office and 
the worker has only to equip the machine.
Other perceived impacts of NC technology include the ability to produce 
extremely complex pieces, and very significant saving in production time, due 
to reductions in the time required to set up the machine for a new procedure 
and the fact that NC machines are more similar to one another. This last point 
is seen as very important when small series are being produced. The NC 
machines are not viewed as leading to reductions in costs, however, as they are 
very expensive to buy, maintain and operate. A final perceived impact of 
computerised production technology is a reduction in the number of steps 
involved in production, because NC machines are able to do many more 
operations compared to traditional machines.
The External Organisation of Production
Oil Control maintains a financial interest in the other firms in its "family" 
network. Nevertheless, the firms seem to operate quite independently. Oil 
Control does not play a direct role in the management of TARP, certainly not 
in the day-to-day management. But there is common ownership amongst the 
two firms and Oil Control could conceivably have influence over major 
decisions regarding investments, for example, or budgets.
The firm does not produce its own products, only those of Oil Control. Oil 
Control undertakes all of the design functions for the components, and 
provides the specifications to TARP. TARP has no input into the design of the 
components which it produces. TARP's manager indicated that there is not 
really any exchange of information between the two firms regarding 
production. If there is a problem in production, there is no inter-firm response 
to solving the problem. And as TARP have no input to the design process at 
the outset, they have little opportunity to prevent the occurrence of problems
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through a joint design process.
TARP does not work exclusively for Oil Control, though its primary 
commitment is to that firm and their work takes precedence. Oil Control 
accounts for about 60% of TARP's total revenues. When it has extra capacity, 
TARP undertakes production for five or six other firms in the Province and the 
Region, sometimes for other artisan firms.
There are no formal contracts or long-term arrangements regarding the 
provision of work to TARP, though the joint ownership arrangement does 
effectively secure TARP's workload. It is difficult for Oil Control to provide 
TARP even with a longer-term prediction of workload. The casa madre does 
provide TARP with a "maximum program" with a three or six month outlook, 
but this only provides an indication of the possible future work. There is no 
formal guarantee or commitment of work by Oil Control.
TARP is a member of a single industrial association - API - the Association of 
Small Firms. This organisation essentially fulfills an information-providing role, 
circulating information bulletins and reports on issues of interest to small firms.
With respect to its relations with other network firms, TARP has stated that it 
does not have direct relations with the other firms in the Oil Control family. 
However, Oil Control indicates that the family firms are responsible for 
organising their own production process, which would suggest that at least in 
the case of thermal treatments performed by TCB, TARP would have a direct 
relationship with that firm.
In extreme cases, particularly when their workload exceeds internal capacity, 
TARP sub-contracts excess work out to other small artisan firms located in 
Bologna and Modena, but find that usually this results in more difficulty than 
assistance. This is because the sub-contracted firms do not supply the level of
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quality required and often do not meet deadlines, and TARP has little leverage 
it can exert over these external firms. However, in addition to the need for 
quantitative flexibility, and perhaps more frequently, TARP sub-contracts other 
firms to provide qualitative flexibility, particularly in cases in which other firms 
have specialised machines more suited than TARP's to a particular production 
process. Undertaking such work inside TARP would be less economical than 
sub-contracting in this case.
2.5 The Third Tier
The third tier of firms consists primarily of artisan firms, which do not have a 
direct ownership relation with Oil Control, but provide quantitative and 
qualitative flexibility. One such firm, "RGP", acts as a sub-contractor to 
TARP. RGP was interviewed in order to round out the profile of the system, 
and is fairly typical of the sub-contractor / artisan firms.
RGP is an independent firm owned by two partners, and with eight employees. 
Annual revenues for 1987 were Lit. 250,000,000 (£125,000, roughly). The 
firm was established in Lama Mocogno, in the hilly southern reaches of the 
Province of Modena, as this is where the two owner-partners lived.
The firm was founded in 1980, and specialises in lathe-work, working solely 
for other companies. One of RGP's partners worked in Milan for ten years as 
a seller of machine tools, and so was very knowledgeable of the machines, and 
of those used by competitors.
The firm is managed entirely by the two owner-partners, who make all 
investment and other key business decisions, independently from other firms, 
such as major client companies. The management of the firm is influenced by 
the competitive environment; competition is stronger for more common, 
generalised work, but weaker for specialised or precision work. RGP's 
competitive strategy was one of differentiation, based on acquiring high quality
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machines that differ from those of its competitors, in order to compete on the 
basis or providing specialised, precision work. Aside from providing a 
competitive edge, this was also viewed as more lucrative, as precision work 
commanded higher prices.
All administrative functions are conducted externally, by the industry 
association to which the firm belongs, LAP AM  (Pavullo office). The firm's 
policy of hiring only apprentices is a form of assistance, as the contributions to 
tax and benefits are reduced, and their wages are also lower than those of 
qualified workers. RGP has also made use of a national government program 
that offers a low-interest loan for the acquisition of new machinery.
Though RGP specialises in a single manufacturing process (lathe-work), it also 
performs milling. RGP's stable of machinery includes ten automatic lathes, 
which perform various shaping operations on metal and steel rods as they turn. 
These automatic machines are mechanically programmable, however, not 
computer controlled. The continual introduction of new machinery was seen 
primarily as permitting new types of transformative processes which were not 
previously possible. There are no computer-controlled machines in the 
establishment. There are also manual lathes, for which each piece must be 
worked separately by hand, as well as manual secondary lathe machines, and 
milling machines. There are no computers in the firm of any kind - either in 
production, managerial or administrative functions.
All of the workers began in the firm as apprentices. The workers tend to stay 
in the firm for long periods, compared to other firms in which firms actively 
sought apprentices in part to keep costs down, and replaced them with new 
apprentices when they became qualified. Part of the reason for this approach is 
the close-knit local culture, which makes it very difficult to lay off any worker.
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In general, the workers are responsible for operating the machinery, loading the 
pieces and supervising the automatic machines. Only one of the workers does 
the attrezzatura (preparation and equipping of the machine), along with the 
two partners. All workers know how to operate all of the machines, however. 
Skills cited as necessary for the work included a knowledge of design 
(especially how to read a design for a part), and of calibration of the machine.
RGP produces about 200 to 300 different pieces annually. This number has 
not changed in recent years. About 100 pieces are standardized, and are 
ordered repeatedly from year to year. Lot sizes vary from 500 to 6,000 pieces, 
but the preferred lot size is from 1,000 to 3,000. There is considerable 
variability in the production process. On average, retooling occurs two or three 
times a day, and must be undertaken for each new series. The variability in the 
production process does not come without costs, however. The main cost 
incurred with shorter runs is the cost of retooling which generally requires 
three to four hours per machine.
The External Relations of Production
The firm does not manufacture products of its own design or initiation - it 
works only as a sub-contractor. On average, RGP would have about ten 
clients annually. However, these ten firms tend to be in different sectors;
TARP was the only client in the oleodynamics sector. Other clients included 
Ferrari, the ceramics machinery sector (which predominates in not-to-distant 
Sassuolo) and the medical machinery sector (there is a bio-medical district to 
the north). In general, no single client accounts for over 20% of RGP's 
revenues. The owners felt that attributing too great a share of total firm 
revenue to a single client would leave RGP vulnerable. Client firms tended to 
be located in the region, in Modena, Bologna, and Reggio-Emilia.
There are no long-term contracts between RGP and its clients; each order is 
arranged independently. Prices are set for each order by TARP, leaving RGP
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in the position of accepting or declining the work at the quoted price. In some 
cases, there are discussions between the two firms regarding price.
Neither do RGP make use themselves of sub-contractors; all of their orders are 
filled internally. Both of the partners take it upon themselves to coordinate 
orders and relations with the clients. There is consultation with the client 
regarding the production process when a problem is encountered. In addition, 
there is consultation with the client on the design of the products themselves, in 
which RGP provides input on the transformation processes. The owners felt 
that the designers do not take the production process into account when 
designing products because they are not familiar with the machines and their 
tolerances, and that they can therefore design dimensions or parts that are not 
achievable on the machines. In other cases, they design parts that would be 
unnecessarily expensive to produce. RGP offers suggestions to the client 
regarding more economical use of the machines. However, it is likely that this 
upward flow of information applies primarily to clients other than TARP, as 
TARP's pieces are designed further up the production hierarchy by Oil Control.
RGP does not have direct contact with other firms involved in TARP/Oil 
Control production. As noted above, its relationship with other artisan firms 
similar to itself is characterised by competition, particularly for more general 
orders which can be fulfilled by many artisans.
In the longer term, the market for RGP's work has proven to be somewhat 
unstable, despite the sectoral diversity of its client base. Even in periods of 
high demand, there is a reticence to take on new workers, because of the 
cultural difficulties involved in layoffs. Periods of high demand are managed by 
the two partners themselves playing a greater role on the shop floor, and 
working longer hours.
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3. SYNTHESIS
The Oil Control filiere is shown in Figure 5.5. The picture that emerges of the 
Oil Control network is of a disaggregated production process organised around 
a highly articulated network of specialised producers. In all, the network 
consists of about 20 to 25 firms involved directly in production (excluding 
suppliers of raw materials and standardised parts): the casa madre itself, the 
four "family firms", and about fifteen to twenty third tier sub-contractors 
(Figure 5.6).
Within the productive network, skill levels are high, there are extensive on-the- 
job training programs, and there are active programs of acquiring the latest 
types of automatic production equipment. There is a remarkable consistency in 
this throughout the system; these characteristics were apparent from Oil 
Control itself, through the "family firms", to the third-tier subcontractor.
3.1 The Inter* and Intra-Firm Organisation of Production
The Social and Technical Division of Labour
Of the distinctive characteristics of the Oil Control network, one of the most 
striking is the "microscopic" degree of specialisation. First, the oleodynamic 
sector itself is a specialised one. Oil Control produces products within one 
sub-compartment of this sector - hydraulic valves. The social division of 
labour further occurs between Oil Control and Edi-Systems, each specialising 
in a particular aspect of the product range, and between these two lead firms 
which undertake design and marketing, and the network of artisans and small 
firms that undertakes the actual production. These network firms are 
themselves specialised by phase of production or manufacturing process. In 
the third tier of the network, we arrive at a point where a company specialises 
in a single manufacturing operation, and further specialisation or fragmentation 
of the productive process is virtually impossible.
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Figure 5.5
The Oil Control Filiere
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Within Oil Control and the producer firms, the technical division of labour is 
also pronounced, with workers tending to specialise on certain types of 
machines. The advent of computer-controlled machine tools has had mixed 
effects on the technical division of labour. On one hand, computer-controlled 
machinery allows a single worker to operate several machines at once, but 
seems generally to be accompanied by a de-skilling, removing several of the 
traditional machine-operator's functions, such as tool selection.
Such a fragmented, specialised system requires means of reintegration if 
production is to be executed successfully. In this case the reintegration is 
achieved by means of Oil Control's coordination of the overall production 
network, and through joint ownership relations between the casa madre and 
the family firms. Because of the reciprocal ownership arrangements amongst 
these firms, their relationships are characterised by cooperation. The family 
firms are guaranteed work so long as Oil Control itself has orders; they do not 
have to compete with other firms for this work. At the same time, they have an 
interest in producing a high quality product, on time, for Oil Control, to ensure 
its continued success in the market, and their own existence. The reciprocal 
ownership arrangements could be seen as a mechanism of ensuring joint 
interest in the production process and in the success of the final product in the 
marketplace.
To a certain extent this is true of sub-contractors without special relationships 
with the casa madre. But in the case of joint ownership, the onus is placed 
more upon the casa madre because of its ownership interest in the family firm. 
The artisan firm, on the other hand, has little control over the final success of 
the casa madre's product, except insofar as it can guarantee the high quality of 
the components it supplies.
However, outside the inner family of firms, the other firms in the network are 
not involved in joint ownership arrangements, and are not so much part of the
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cooperative aspect. These firms must compete against other suppliers or 
specialised producers for work from Oil Control or its family firms. The 
overall network is therefore characterised both by relations of cooperation and 
relations of competition, depending upon the firm's position in the network.
Ownership and Possession
Despite the joint ownership structure, all of the firms in the network also 
exhibited a high degree of independence. Each was entirely responsible for 
their own internal management and organisation of production. Ownership in 
Massey's sense did not extend between firms; each firm made its own 
investment decisions independently. One of the family firms, Edi-Systems, 
developed and designed its own products, though TARP relied on designs and 
specifications provided by Oil Control. Both TARP and RGP had clients other 
than Oil Control, and would more than likely survive in the event that Oil 
Control ceased to provide them work.
Control over the labour process, or what Massey calls 'possession', was also 
determined entirely within each firm. However, the family firms and the other 
network firms could not exert control over the general distribution of work 
over the longer term; they could only respond to Oil Control's orders by 
adjusting their internal labour processes. Aside from being in a responsive 
position only to the overall flow of orders, the family and other network firms 
had a high degree of control over their internal labour processes.
The network system essentially precludes the integration of conceptualisation 
and execution, as these functions take place within different firms. 
Conceptualisation takes place in Oil Control and Edi-Systems, while all 
production functions occur within the network firms. With rare exceptions, the 
network firms have little input into the product conceptualisation and design. 
For the production worker in the family or network firm, the relationship with 
the product design is remote. For the worker within Oil Control or Edi-
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Systems, however, there is at least some integration, in that the prototypes are 
produced internally, and the production process controlled from within these 
firms.
3.2 The territorial organisation of production 
Territorial patterns
Beyond the acknowledgment of the tendency of productive systems such as the 
Modenese oleodynamic sector to localise, scant attention has been paid to the 
spatial aspects of the system and to the territorial pattern of production. As 
mentioned previously, firms tend to be concentrated in the three Provinces of 
Reggio-Emilia, Modena, and Bologna. Figure 5.7 shows the location primarily 
of lead firms in the oleodynamics sector in the Region, though it also includes 
some smaller firms. There are two strong, tight clusters, however, in the 
provincial capital cities of Reggio nellEmilia, and Modena, where most of the 
firms in these provinces are located. In Bologna a different pattern is evident, 
with firms being dispersed in a ring around the city, and virtually no firms 
located in the city of Bologna. There is also a “tail”, trailing off in an linear 
fashion along the via Emilia. In general, the larger firms tend to locate within 
the urban centres of Modena, Reggio-Emilia and the suburban Bologna ring, 
while smaller firms tend to be more scattered in surrounding towns and villages 
(Figure 5.8).
When firms located only in the Province of Modena are examined, including 
many smaller and artisan firms, a strong pattern of localisation in and around 
the town of Modena is apparent (Figure 5.9). However, a number of firms are 
also dispersed in smaller towns and villages around Modena.
This pattern of extreme localisation is particularly startling, given the fact that 
another concentration of firms within the same sector (oleodynamics) exists in 
the neighbouring Province of Reggio-Emilia. Yet these two districts function
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Figure 5.7
Oleodynamic Producer Firms in Emilia-Romagna Source: ERVET, 1986
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Oleodynamic Producer Firms in Emilia-Romagna, by size
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Oleodynamic Producer Firms in the Province of Modena
Source : Compiled by the Comune di Modena from various sources.
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Figure 5.10
Firms in the Oil Control Network
virtually independently of one another, with little interaction or interlocking ties 
between them. The one exception is the use of some Reggio-Emilian sub­
contractors by Oil Control firms, such as Edi-Systems. In fact, the relationship 
between oleodynamic firms in Modena and those in Reggio-Emilia is 
characterised primarily by competition; Reggio-Emilia is first and foremost the 
location of direct competitor companies.
The location of firms in Oil Control’s network is presented in Figure 5.10 The 
first thing to note is that, despite the disaggregated production process, the 
firms in the Oil Control network are highly localised. Of the firms interviewed 
all are located in or near the city of Modena, with the exception of TARP and 
RGP in more distant Pavullo. So despite the high degree of disaggregation of 
the production process, there is a high degree of spatial agglomeration and 
proximity amongst these firms. Yet they are not centralised around one urban 
location but dispersed amongst the central city, small towns and villages. There 
is less of a direct relationship between particular functions, skill levels, 
technologies, etc .and the position of particular places within the urban 
hierarchy.
By and large the Modena district is highly centralised immediately around the 
city. This is where the more high skilled, innovation, design, control and 
coordination functions tended to be performed in or near the centre of the 
district, in Modena and Nonantola. Two of the case study firms were among 
the few located somewhat outside the closely forged district, in the periphery. 
These consisted of one firm that required a low-cost, un-skilled, female 
workforce (TARP), and a dependent sub-contracting firm.
Towards an explanation
How can this territorial organisation of production be explained? Oil Control's 
successful insertion into the international market rests on primarily two aspects 
of its product: quality and customisation. As a result of this strategy of
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product differentiation, the firm maintains a strong market position, and is able 
to charge a premium for its products. Oil Control often creates products to 
solve problems where no products existed before, and product duplication by 
other firms is difficult. The strategy relies on a high degree of integration with 
the market. However, a significant share of the market is also local, 
particularly in the local agricultural machinery industry.
The productive system is vertically disintegrated, with Oil Control undertaking 
design, production control and sales and marketing, while separate 
establishments perform the different phases of production. It maintains a 
strategic alliance with Edi-Systems, which produces a different part of the 
product range and also controls its own external production network. Aside 
from these structural similarities with both Carma and IMA, the Oil Control 
system is unique in its intertwining ownerships between the various firms.
Why was this specific territorial organisation of production established and not 
another one - either fully integrated or governed by the more usual sub­
contractor relationships of outsourcing? On one hand, the Oil Control 
structure is very much like a multi-national corporation, with joint ownership 
of different establishments, each undertaking different functions. But instead of 
being dispersed across the globe to take advantage of specific conditions in 
relation to the functions performed (eg cheap labour) all the establishments are 
localised within a single province and a 15 kilometre radius of one another.
Why especially break apart the productive system, only to reunite it under 
reciprocal ownership arrangements?
A "diseconomies of scope" explanation which is often cited generally for the 
existence of disaggregated production systems, but especially in Emilia 
Romagna, is that a fragmented production system is a means of breaking the 
strength of organised labour, which until the late 1960s had exerted a powerful 
role. This rationale does not appear to hold true in Oil Control's case,
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however, as union membership levels are still quite high, even within the small 
firms, and there is a high degree of responsibility toward maintaining workers 
once they are hired.
And while it is true that there are significant fluctuations in demand, and that 
demand cannot be predicted, even over the short term, the intertwining 
ownership arrangements suggests that this cannot be the reason for the 
vertically quasi-integrated system of production, as no additional flexibility is 
secured. The joint ownership means joint responsibility for workers; the casa 
madre is partly responsible for the worker in TARP, and vice-versa.
Given the ownership relation between firms, there can be only two reasons that 
would explain this particular productive structure, in terms of its superiority 
over vertically integrated or vertically disintegrated alternatives. First, it 
provides the ability to achieve and control product quality, and second, it is the 
result of the search for a workforce with specific characteristics.
High product quality was seen by the owners of Oil Control as a primary aspect 
of their competitiveness. The specialisation of firms in the Oil Control "family" 
promotes higher quality and productivity levels in each phase; each firm can 
concentrate on limited tasks. At the same time, the two lead firms, Oil Control 
and Edi-Systems, can pool their production needs and share the resources of 
the manufacturing firms (TARP, CCO, TCB), which increases the ability to 
achieve economies of scale in these production firms, where the advanced 
flexible machinery is expensive, or where the minimum scale of a specific 
process is unlikely to be economically supportable by a single firm (e.g. CCO's 
heat treatment processing). For example, by acting as a sub-producer for both 
Edi-Systems and Oil Control, TARP was able to operate on a double-shift 
schedule, which supports the economic viability of their advanced production 
equipment. This might not be the case with a vertically integrated structure. 
That is, specialisation and high quality can be achieved at the same time as
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economies of scale in production are maximised by combining the production 
demand of the two lead firms.
This relationship is further solidified by the reciprocal ownership arrangements 
between the firms. There is a shared interest amongst all firms in ensuring 
high quality product that will succeed in the market. Oil Control owners 
complained that when work was sub-contracted out to non-family firms, the 
quality was often not acceptable. Indeed, Oil Control believes its ownership 
structure to provide a competitive edge with respect to quality, compared with 
its competitor firms, which are mostly local.
Unlike other productive systems, because of the ownership relationships, the 
network firms are less subject to cutthroat competition within the district.
There is also more of a partnership relationship between all firms in the family, 
rather than a control relationship exerted by the casa madre over the network 
firms. In other words, the breaking apart of the production process allows for 
specialisation which produces the high quality required, and joint ownership 
provides the means of re-integration and control.
The directors of Oil Control confirmed in interview the importance of the 
quality factor in setting up this particular productive structure. They felt that a 
vertically decentralised system in which needed components were sub­
contracted from existing producers would not guarantee the required level of 
quality. The productive structure established, with each firm specialised in a 
particular phase of production, and with added control through joint 
ownership, was seen as important in ensuring the high level of quality that 
formed the competitive basis for the products on the market.
In short, Oil Control views its market position as relying less on price and more 
on the quality of its product. The quality of the product can be assured both 
through the high degree of specialisation of the various productive units in
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individual phases of production and through the reciprocal ownership 
arrangements, which provide an added measure of control over production 
quality and ensure a shared interest in the success of the final product. These 
results could not be achieved under either a single, vertically integrated 
operation, nor under vertical disintegration that relied upon traditional sub­
contractor relations.
A second reason for the system of vertical quasi-integration is that, even under 
a reciprocal ownership arrangement, this system allows the exploitation of local 
uneven development, specifically territorial variations in the labour market. Oil 
Control directors cited as a rationale for their productive structure the 
availability of a workforce with specific characteristics, particularly, they said, a 
workforce looking for long term employment. We have also seen how the 
family firms have specifically targeted low-cost labour, with no prior job 
experience, and a 'love for work" as the main criterion. The assumption of this 
kind of labour is facilitated by the advanced production equipment, which is 
primarily computer-controlled and can be operated by low-skilled workers. 
However, it is evident that for these functions, a low-cost, agreeable workforce 
was sought. Such a workforce was to be found not in the pedemontana 
region, where Oil Control itself is located, but in the depressed mountain 
region, which has been generally outside the process of industrialisation, has 
higher levels of unemployment, and in which pools of low-cost, often female 
labour exist. As we have seen, this is where TARP had recently located, in a 
very small, isolated mountain town. As noted earlier, TARP is relatively 
unique amongst industrial firms in its use of female labour to operate 
production machinery.
In other words, the establishment of separate enterprises, though still linked 
through ownership, allows local uneven development to be exploited in the 
production process. The extemalisation of certain phases of production was 
designed to take advantage of local yet marked uneven development, in the
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form of spatial variation of labour force characteristics, especially excess and 
female labour in the mountain region.
It may be that at the time of interview, the advanced technology such as that 
found in TARP was relatively new to the district, especially the work centres. 
To the extent that the introduction of this type of advanced production 
machinery proceeds in establishments involved primarily in production, a 
pattern of peripheralisation to low-wage locations or district spreading might 
be expected29.
Oil Control’s vertically quasi-integrated productive configuration therefore 
responds to the need to achieve a high level of product quality, and in part, the 
search for a pliant, low-cost workforce. The fluctuation in production process 
that results from customisation, on the other hand, is accommodated internally, 
within individual enterprises, through flexible labour (e.g. dual shifts), and in 
particular, advanced, computer-controlled production technology.
While still highly localised, the territorial pattern of Oil Control’s network was 
perhaps less tied to the tightly clustered district found in the city of Modena. 
Given its interlocking ownership structure, it is perhaps more of an 
independent, closed production system and less dependent on the district per se 
and the sub-contracting firms to be found there, or upon the shared 
infrastructure that exists in Modena, and is thus more free to construct a 
different territorial organisation that relies less on access to these concentrated 
resources. Instead, firms in the Oil Control network rely on access to each 
other.
Other firms in the district, however, generally do not share in joint ownership 
arrangements of production establishments, and rely on the more typical sub­
ln establishments th a t design and market their own product higher skill levels are required and a central location might be
sought.
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contractor relationships with specialist producers and artisan firms, and the 
other resources that support production that tend to be found in the urban 
centre (local government, industry associations, etc.). Access to these firms 
and resources is made especially critical in the context of constant product 
innovation which is characteristic of the district. As we saw with the Carma 
case study, the constant invention and re-invention of the product, ongoing 
problem-solving, infinite product range, and small batch sizes result in an 
inability to standardize transactions. Above and beyond the now universal 
demand for quality, customisation and timeliness, the constant innovation and 
resultant inability to standardize components or transactions between firms 
creates a situation in which geographical clustering is essential to the operation 
of the district and production.
Local competition comes into play here, both between the sub-contractor firms, 
and between the case madre. The highly localised collection of competitor 
firms in the same industry acts as a propulsive force, promoting ongoing 
innovation, development of new products, differentiation, and adoption of the 
latest production technology, all of which perpetuates and reinforces spatial 
clustering.
It is curious that while in the Provinces of Reggio-Emilia and Modena, the lead 
firms were very tightly clustered, almost exclusively in the capital cities, but in 
Bologna, they were scattered in a ring around the city. This is likely due to the 
fact that Bologna is a larger, more services- intensive city, than the smaller, 
provincial capital cities, and industrial establishments cannot compete 
successfully in the urban land market for central city space.
This pattern suggests that small and medium sized cities such as those found in 
Emilia Romagna are particularly conducive to clustering and district formation, 
because the urban land market in these smaller locations actually permits very 
close proximity of related firms, institutions, consultants, etc. in central
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locations. In larger metropolitan areas, industrial workshops would be forced 
out to the suburban rings or beyond, which are typically low density and more 
expansive, acting to separate related uses.
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CHAPTER SIX
A METROPOLITAN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT: 
AUTOMATIC PACKAGING MACHINERY IN BOLOGNA
This chapter examines the territorial organisation of the automatic packaging 
machinery industry in Bologna. Following a general introduction to the 
industry and the district, it focuses on the productive system of one firm, 
Industria Macchine Automatiche S.p.a. (“IMA”). IMA is fairly representative 
of the many automatic packaging machinery companies located in the area, 
although it may be among the larger firms. The range of IMA’s network firms 
presented herein is quite varied, and likely representative of the range of 
smaller metal-mechanical firms located in the district. The chapter ends with a 
description of the territorial pattern of the district.
I. BACKGROUND
l.l The Automatic Packaging Machinery Industry in Italy
The industrial sector this chapter deals with is that concerned with the 
manufacture of automatic packaging machinery for various other industries. 
These are machines that execute many different forms of packaging, for foods 
and tobacco, powders, liquids, pills and capsules - in boxes, bottles, bags, 
wrapping and all other forms of packaging for final products destined for 
consumer use.
Production in this sector in Italy is estimated at Lit. 1,300 billion for 1984 (or 
roughly £650,000,000 sterling). Approximately 65% of this total is exported, a 
rate almost double that of Italian manufacturing industries as a whole, which 
exported 37% of output in 1984 (ERVET, 1987). Italy is the second largest 
producer and exporter of automatic packaging machines in the world, with a 
market share of about 19%, trailing West Germany with 35%. However, in the 
late 1970s and first half of the 1980s, Italy was increasing its share of the global
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market, while West Germany's share was falling (CGEL, 1988).
In Italy as a whole there were an estimated 528 firms in this sector in 1981, 
with a total employment of almost 14,000 (ERVET, 1987). Most of these 
firms were small; over 90% had less than 50 employees, but they accounted 
for only 35% of total employment. Firms of over 500 employees were 
responsible for 27.2% of employment in the sector (ERVET, 1987).
The international position of the Italian automatic packaging machinery 
(hereafter referred to as "APM") industry has always been good, as it is a 
world leader in certain specific compartments of the industry, where it has had 
little competition. In the 1980s, however, large multinational groups (notably 
the Germans) began to challenge the Italian firms' dominance, particularly 
through significant investments in developing the use of electronics in the 
machines. This is an area in which the Bolognese have traditionally been weak, 
excelling instead in the technical and mechanical aspects of the industry (CGIL, 
1988).
1.2 History and Profile of the Bologna Automatic Packaging Machinery 
District
The first firm, "ACMA", was founded at the beginning of the 1920s. Soon 
after four other firms appeared in Bologna, and these five still exist today, and 
are leaders in the sector. Of a sample of 47 APM firms in Emilia-Romagna, 
these five were founded before 1935, only one was started between 1936 and 
1950, thirteen appeared in the 1950s, twelve in the 1960s and 14 in the 1970s. 
The 1980s saw a diminution in the number of new firms, with only two of the 
sample founded in that decade (ERVET, 1987).
Of the first five entrants, only one, ACMA, was established explicitly for the 
production of APM, while two others, Sasib and Zamboni, were in the areas of 
railway materials and food products, respectively. It was only in the 1930s that
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these firms began to produce APM.
The birth of many of these firms is attributed to the departure of planners and
technicians from the 'founder* firms, who set up their own firms with a concept
for a better or different kind of product.
It must be emphasized that one of the factors that greatly 
favoured such a process was the existence of a diffuse and 
efficient network of mechanical supplier firms, from which the 
new firms could demand a large part of production, conducting 
internally only the operations of planning, assembly and testing.
It is obvious that in such a context the necessity of effecting 
considerable fixed investments and the risks connected to that 
were strongly redimensioned (ERVET, 1987: 71).
Indeed, Bologna is centre to an extensive metal-mechanical sector, which 
serves a wide range of final industries. In 1981, there were 79,285 employed in 
this sector in the Province of Bologna (ERVET, 1984).
The District in the 1980s
In 1981, the industrial census counted 284 of the nation's 528 APM firms 
(54%) in the region of Emilia-Romagna. The region also accounted for 68% of 
all national employment in the industry in 1981, and 68% of national output 
(1984 figure) (ERVET, 1987).
By far the largest concentration of firms and output in the APM industry in 
Italy is located in the Province of Bologna, and more particularly, in and 
around the city of Bologna. The Province of Bologna itself accounts for 52% 
of all firms in Emilia-Romagna, 69% of total regional output, and 69% of all 
workers in the regional industry (ERVET, 1987: 70)30. The Province of 
Bologna would therefore represent roughly 47% of both national employment
Data from ERVET, 1987 for or within the Region of Emilia-Romagna referring to the number of firms, employment, 
output and exports, and levels of concentration is based on a survey of a population of 121 APM producer firms conducted by ERVET 
between March, I98S and April, 1986. The total universe of APM producer firms in Emiila-Romagna found by ERVET consisted of 
IS2 firms. Further research was undertaken on the basis of interviews with a sample of 47 of the 121 firms, providing qualitative 
and historical information.
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and output - approximately 6,500 workers and Lit. 611 billion31. The Province 
of Bologna would also account for about 148 APM firms (or 28% of the 
national total)32.
Almost 90% of Emilian firms had less than 50 employees - 58% had less than 
ten employees, figures similar to those for Italy as a whole (ERVET, 1987:
29). However, the largest Emilian firms (over 500 employees) accounted for 
40% of total employment versus 27% for Italy as a whole (ERVET, 1987:
29). This is related to the fact that many of the firms in Emilia-Romagna are 
amongst the oldest, and are therefore likely to be larger than newer firms. 
Nevertheless, average firm size dropped by half between 1971 and 1981 in this 
sector in Emilia-Romagna, from 66 to 32 employees (ERVET, 1987: 26).
The export propensity in Emilia-Romagna is even higher than the national 
average for the APM industry, and is estimated at about 71% of total sales 
(ERVET, 1987: 3 1)33. Western Europe is the largest export market, 
accounting for about one-third of exports, with India/South-east Asia, Africa 
and the USA taking the following three positions, with about 13% or 14% each 
of total exports. In the early 1980s, exports to the USA had doubled, while the 
share of exports to Western Europe declined by about 10% (ERVET, 1987: 
62-63).
The two major client industries for Emilian APM firms are the tobacco 
industry, and the food industry, each accounting for just over one-third of total 
sales. Other important sectors include pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and 
chemicals/detergents (ERVET, 1987: 53)..
The Province of Bologna accounts for 69% of Emilia-Romagna's 68% share of both national employment and output, equal 
therefore to a  Provincial share of national employment and output of 47%.
32 That is, 52% of the 284 firms in Emilia-Romagna.
33 The remaining d ata  in th is section refer to the region of Emilia-Romagna as a  whole, but as we have seen, the Province of 
Bologna accounts for the lion's share of regional employment, output and firms. These figures will therefore fairly accurately describe the 
Bolognese situation.
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A critical and revealing aspect of the Emilian APM industry is found in its 
pattern of ownership. Despite the level of maturity and world dominance of 
many of these firms, the most-common form of ownership remains the 
family-owned firm. Over one-half of firms were directly controlled by a single 
family - either in whole, or through a majority interest. In a remaining one- 
quarter of cases, the ownership was shared among two or three families.
About one in four firms were controlled by finance companies but in most of 
these cases, the finance company headed a local family-owned group. Only 
two of a sample of 47 Emilian APM firms were owned by national industrial 
groups, and two by American companies (ERVET, 1987: 74).
At the same time, these sample firms were linked with 25 other firms, either 
directly, through controlling shares, or through their respective finance 
companies. The large majority of these firms are localised in Emilia-Romagna 
and operate in the same sector.
Despite the large number of small firms and strong product differentiation that 
characterise the APM industry in Emilia-Romagna, there is quite a high level of 
economic concentration. The largest firm accounted for 20% of total sales, the 
top four firms, 43%, and the top eight firms 55% of total sales (ERVET, 1987: 
67). This is attributed to the presence of a few very large firms that operate in 
all sectors of the market. The level of concentration is even more marked in 
the sub-sector in which the case study firm, IMA, finds itself. In this 
sub-sector, of 22 firms, the top firm accounted for 43% of sales, and the top 
four represented 82% of sales (ERVET, 1987: 69). The sub-sector therefore 
seems to be oligopolistic in nature.
Employment in the Emilian APM industry increased 2.7% between 1981 and 
1985, compared to a decline in regional manufacturing employment as a whole 
of 7% during the same period (ERVET, 1987: 75). In the Emilian APM 
sector, of 5,829 employees, 45% were clerks and technicians, and the
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remaining 55% were labourers. The proportion of technicians and clerks 
versus labourers were almost equal in IMA's sub-sector, at 49% versus 51%, 
respectively (ERVET, 1987: 76). Of the clerks and technicians, 29% were 
planners/designers (28% for IMA's sub-sector).
About one out of two workers in the industry belongs to the union, but 
incidence of unionisation is lower amongst technicians and clerks. The union 
contracts exist at the level of the firm, not territorially. The unions have not 
succeeded in building a continual alliance with workers in the small artisan 
firms. Other issues include wages, profession levels, shifts and hours of work, 
which the union feels its has made good progress on. Recent figures indicate 
workers in 25 firms involved with the union, for a total of about 3,000 
individuals (CGIL, 1988).
Under the typical organisational structure of the local industry, production 
takes place in a decentralised, network system, with a division of labour 
between the casa madre and smaller artisan firms involved in the actual 
production. The casa madre firm executes the following functions internally:
• planning and design of the product;
• assembly;
• testing;
• commercial functions and marketing.
The remaining functions are generally performed outside the casa madre, in a 
network of small firms and artisan firms. These phases include mechanical 
processes and development of electronic components (CGIL, 1988).
2. THE IMA PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM
2J The Casa Madre - Industria Macchine Automatiche S.p.a. (IMA)
History and Profile
IMA was founded in 1965, and after two moves from nearby locations, settled
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at its current location in Ozzano, a small town just outside of the city of 
Bologna, in 1972. At the time the firm was being established, there was an 
economic development plan in effect for the area. The government offered 
special fiscal incentives, and assistance in building factories. In addition, 
proximity to Bologna, which was viewed as an important centre for 
communications, was cited as an important locational factor.
The firm progressed through three stages of evolution (interview, Leoncourti, 
1988). The first was the owner-operator stage, in which the industrialist played 
the many roles of planner, director-general, and owner, and in which 
decision-making was very rapid, but not thoroughly evaluated. The second 
phase was that of the 'managerial firm', in which a more structured 
decision-making system was organised, and formalised data collection and 
analysis techniques were introduced. This led to precision in decision-making, 
but much slower reaction time. The third phase, in which IMA found itself at 
the time of interview, focused on 'practicality', that is, combining the need for 
thorough evaluation and timeliness, with a view to balancing the two 
requirements in practical manner and through a practical industrial structure.
Marked changes occurred in the 1980s in the system of production. Until the 
early 1980s, the case madri produced standardised machinery, for the 
warehouse, not by order. Competition was based first and foremost upon cost. 
The production process was ruled by the production technicians, who 
determined output based upon economies of scale in production, and optimum 
output per worker. However, this system was abandoned because of the high 
carrying costs of the unsold stock of machines, which outweighed the 
insubstantial savings from producing several machines at a time. Fragmentation 
of the market and consumer demand for more customised APM also came into 
play. By the mid 1980s, IMA thus began to produce machines on the basis of 
orders only, one or a few at a time. The keys to competitiveness were now 
customisation, quality of product and timeliness of delivery.
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The firm employed 430 workers at the time of interview, and specialised in the 
manufacture of two types of automatic packaging machinery. The first type of 
machine packages tea in bags and then boxes it. IMA estimates that it accounts 
for about 50% of tea packaging machines sold in the world, and therefore 
places itself as the world leader in this sector. The second kind of machinery 
produced is that which does 'blister packaging1, e.g. the kind of packaging that 
is commonly used in the pharmaceuticals sector for tablets and capsules. IMA 
claims also to be one of the top producers in the world for this product.
Annual revenues for 1987 were Lit. 55 billion, with revenues for 1988 forecast 
at Lit. 60 billion (approximately £27.5 million and £30 million sterling, 
respectively). This represents an increase from annual sales of Lit. 24 billion 
(£12 million) in 1982, when total employment in the firm was 320 workers.
The firm is extremely export-oriented, with approximately 95% of all 
production sold in foreign markets such as Germany, USA, USSR, Canada, 
China, France, and England. The firm has approximately 50 to 100 clients on 
average in a year. For tea packaging machinery, there may be roughly fifteen 
clients that are more important, in that they buy machinery regularly or they 
buy more than one machine at a time. On average, about 100 IMA packaging 
machines in total would be produced and sold in a given year. The client roster 
is mainly comprised of pharmaceutical industries, tea companies, and some 
sub-contractor packaging companies (which specialise in packaging for 
manufacturers). Individual clients do tend to change on an annual basis, except 
for the very largest ones, as the machinery has a very long life.
IMA produces about ten different models of machine. The number of models 
produced has increased steadily from when the firm started, when only a single 
type of machine was produced. IMA finds that whereas once it was able to 
dictate the product to the market, this is no longer possible. The market's 
demands are much more specific and exacting, which has led, in part, to the
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increase in the number of models. Clients have also become much more 
explicit about what kinds of features they want to see in their packaging, and 
therefore in their packaging machines. There are myriad varieties even within 
the same type of packaging, and the machines IMA makes must accommodate 
this. In addition, there are different safety and other requirements that must be 
met in the different countries to which IMA sells its products, which further 
imposes the need for customisation and diversity of product.
The quantity produced for each machine is quite small - from sue to twelve 
machines on average. Even with these low numbers there are still economies 
of scale - if more than one of the same type machine is produced, economies of 
up to 30% of the total cost can be saved. The optimum lot size was placed at 
about eight or ten machines.
In 1985, IMA initiated a plan of expansion through acquisitions. IMA is part 
of a larger industrial group headed by "Imafin", a financial holding company, 
and is 89.57% owned by that company (II Sole, 21 Jan., 1988) (Figure 6.1).
In July of 1988, Safifa, a firm which produces cardboard, bought a large 
number of shares of IMA (though still a minority interest), further diversifying 
the group. IMA itself is the central firm in the group; decisions regarding the 
distribution of profits and investments are made here. IMA also maintains a 
marketing and distribution arm, "Soteco", with various geographical branches.
In addition, IMA has acquired other producers of automatic packaging 
machinery, each of which produces a different kind of machine. In all but one 
case, it holds a 97% interest in these companies (e.g. Cestind, Sogest, Cosmec, 
Farmomac, N. Zanasi). There are no functional or production-related 
relationships amongst these firms, only an ownership relationship. The 
exception is that the Technical Office of one of the firms, Cestind, and IMA 
collaborate on some projects. There is a further firm in the group, "Sied" 
which is an IBM computer distribution company, which provides for IMA's
241
242
Figure 6.1
IMA Corporate Structure
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information management and computer needs. The final relationship between 
the firms in IMA Group is that they share some common suppliers, and are 
developing a common procurement policy in order to reduce costs.
The program of corporate acquisitions was seen as necessary to respond to 
clients' requests for other kinds of machines that IMA could not supply. For 
example, IMA produced machines for only a single kind of packaging for the 
pharmaceuticals industry. Through acquisitions, it hoped to expand its 
packaging machines from blister packaging to include bottle-filling machines, 
boxing machines, and machines that could package powders, pills and capsules, 
thereby filling out the product range for that client sector.
The Internal Organisation of Production
The following stages are involved in the production of automatic packaging 
machines:
• marketing;
• study;
• planning and design of the components;
• production of the components;
• assembly;
• customisation;
• testing.
These stages refer to the generation of prototype machines; once a prototype 
has been developed and regular production begins, the study, planning and 
design phases are not necessary. However, the above phases also comprise 
many sub-stages. For example, the production phase includes acquisition of 
materials and dies (forms), entering into agreements, production of the 
components, testing and inspection, and warehousing.
Not all of the phases listed above are undertaken internally by the casa madre. 
In general, they undertake only the pre- and post-production phases, including
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planning, marketing, research and study, and development of prototypes.
Some production is undertaken internally, but only to cover urgent orders.
The acquisition of materials and coordination of the production process 
through agreements with producer firms is also undertaken internally. The 
product consists of a base machine, which is standard, and a customised 
component. The production and mounting of the customised component of the 
machine, and final testing and inspection of the machine are also executed 
within IMA. Essentially all of the standardised, regular, 'series' production is 
executed outside the firm.
IMA's workers can be divided into three main groups: manufacturing (which 
includes the Technical Office), management of the warehouse and stocks, and 
acquisitions. Each group contains different types of workers. At the lowest 
level there are those who do some manufacturing and control the stocks. The 
next level is the coordinator, and then the manager. For each position there 
are four different levels, except two levels for managers, which correspond 
with the national standards set by the unions.
Of the 430 employees at IMA, 180 are directly connected to production - in 
assembly, application, and mounting of the customised component of the 
machine. In the production section, the majority of workers are labourers, 
primarily machine tool operators. The more advanced machine operators 
control the more complex machines. Engineers produce the computer tapes 
which control the machines. In general, the machine operators are not capable 
of programming the machinery they oversee. Even in the few cases in which 
they may have some programming ability, the logistics of production do not 
permit them to do their own programming, as it is often a lengthy and complex 
process that precedes actual production, and can take up to one month.
The firm had begun to look for more multi-dimensional workers who can not 
only operate machines, but who had decision-making ability. Attitudes and
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skills were viewed as more important than raw labour power. A greater degree 
of integration between workers was emerging due, in part, to a change in the 
structure of the firm involving the decomposition of a centralised 
administration.
There is no mobility of workers between the various departments of IMA, 
though the management think that this would be desirable. There is, however, 
a certain amount of mobility within the production division, between the 
various machines. It is also usual for the worker who has worked on the 
production of a component to be involved in the assembly of the machine, or to 
work on the adjustment (fine-tuning) of the prototype machine.
IMA maintains a diversity of production machinery, including both numerically 
controlled and traditional equipment. These are the general types of 
mechanical machinery, and are not very specialised, such as lathes, grinders, or 
milling machines. IMA maintains about five of each of these machines.
The first numerical control machines were acquired starting in 1982, and have 
been found to be particularly suited for series production of some standard 
components. The main impact of the NC machines was stated as an increase 
in the number of workers, because of growth induced by the machines. The 
other impact cited was the need for more engineers, and therefore a 'heavier' 
firm structure with a greater proportion of more qualified employees.
Decisions regarding the acquisition of new technology are investigated by a 
special office in the company. They decide upon the most appropriate kinds of 
machinery, arrange the purchase of new machines, and organise changes in the 
production process that the new machines precipitate.
Only one of the individual machine tools is controlled by computer - a milling 
machine which can receive instructions directly from a computer in the
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technical office. IMA does, however, have a CAD-CAM system, and a 
network of about 100 personal computers.
Management Structure
IMA is headed by a Director- General, who oversees the firm as a whole. 
Under the Director - General, the firm is divided into four main divisions, each 
with its own Director: Production, Administration, Technical Office, and 
Personnel. The General Direction decides what kind of products to produce, 
while the Technical Office decides how the machines should be produced.
The Technical Office is primarily responsible for the planning and design of the 
prototype machines, while the Production Division is responsible for 
coordinating the actual production. This includes manufacturing, planning and 
the coordination of outside production, and some assembly. Naturally there is 
close collaboration between these two divisions. The production division is 
further divided into sections corresponding to the various stages of production. 
Marketing and sales functions are undertaken outside of the firm, by Soteco.
The levels of management begin with the 'capo di parte’ or section head, then 
proceed to inspector, and director - of a sub-section of one of the four main 
divisions. IMA prides itself on its policy of promoting from within, and cites 
the case of an assembler with little formal education who subsequently became 
the Director of Assembly.
The organisation of the Technical Office is somewhat different. The structure 
of this department was reorganised several years ago, and the role of'project 
leader1 was introduced. The project leader organises the relations between the 
officials in the planning office and the outside firms.
The External Organisation of Production
As noted above, the actual production of IMA's automatic packaging
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machinery is undertaken outside the firm itself, through a network of small 
firms and artisan firms that manufacture the components for the machines, and 
also do the assembly. IMA's active production network is constituted by about 
100 such small mechanics firms. However, their aggregate roster of supplier 
firms, including all firms that have been used in the past, are in current use, are 
planned for use, or could be used, includes about 800 firms.
There are no long term contracts or commitments between the casa madre and 
the network firms. Despite this, relationships may and often do endure many, 
many years. IMA orders pieces from the artisan firms when it needs them, but 
does usually show the artisan firms a work plan for future months so that they 
will be able to plan their own work. This is not a written commitment of work, 
but a "moral commitment". "In many parts of Italy this relationship wouldn't 
work, in Piedmont or Milan, for example, but here there is still an agricultural 
economy, and a handshake still has value" (Miselli interview, June, 1988).
One exception to the rule of no long term contracts is found when an artisan 
works exclusively for IMA. These artisans have specialised machinery suited 
to IMA's requirements. IMA provides these firms with sufficient work so that 
they can work continuously, with no gaps in production, in order that the 
exclusive relationship can be maintained.
For the casa madre, the greatest requirement regards timing. If the artisan 
maintains speed and timeliness in his work, this is his guarantee of further 
work. According to IMA, to guarantee work to the artisan is "dangerous", 
because this would place the artisan in a position of power and could affect the 
production process. Because of this situation, the casa madre/artisan relation 
was described by IMA as a 'love-hate relationship'.
Artisan firms are researched by the casa madre and selected on the basis of 
their professionalism, timeliness, the quality of the product, and their price.
247
Emphasis is placed on the precision of the components produced. IMA will 
compare a component produced by an artisan with their own prototype 
component produced internally, in order to judge the quality of the artisan's 
work, and what the price should be.
IMA's relationship with the artisan regarding the productive cycle varies.
Some artisans IMA will provide with the materials and the order, while they 
will acquire semi-finished goods directly from other artisans, without providing 
the materials. The tendency is toward the latter kind of relationship, as this 
saves time, planning and administration for the casa madre.
The external production process is controlled and organised within IMA, under 
the Director of Production. After working for several years to develop a 
computer system to aid in the coordination of the production process, the first 
results of this endeavour were just beginning to be seen at the time of 
interview. The computerization of the production control process was seen as 
a necessary step in reducing the long production time. Previously, production 
control was done manually and only at the end of production. However, at the 
time of interview, only the individual stages were computerised, e.g. there was 
a separate system for planning, and a separate system for production 
management, with no linkages between the two. Nevertheless, computerisation 
has made it easier to monitor the production process, and 'snapshots' of the 
process are made every two to three weeks. A full-time position was created 
and devoted to monitoring the production process and artisans' deliveries, 
providing the opportunity to recoup any lost time. In some rare cases, the 
artisan firms are linked to IMA by computer, but most often, according to 
IMA, the artisan does not want to buy a PC.
With the advent of computer production management, IMA introduced a 
practice of just-in-time inventorying. But this is not only a case of arranging 
delivery of the components for a certain day when they will be required for
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production, but of arranging for the production and delivery of the components 
with only a few days lead time before they are required in production. The 
production management computer program follows the production process and 
determines when certain components must be ordered. Then, usually the same 
day, the precise type and number of pieces required for the machines in 
production are ordered, and delivered. In other words, this is not simply a 
just-in-time delivery system, but also a just-in-time manufacturing system, 
which demonstrates the extreme responsiveness, flexibility and rapid 
turnaround of this system of production. For the artisan firm, this system 
implies very small orders comprised of a number of different components. 
Moreover, though the artisan may have to produce the same piece say, 20 
times, he is not likely to be able to produce all 20 pieces at once under this 
system, thereby causing him diseconomies of scale.
The other firms which make up the IMA corporate group do not undertake any 
of the production functions for IMA. Instead, IMA organises a network of 
small artisan firms which undertake all production of components and assembly 
functions. Similarly, each of the other producer firms in IMA group organises 
their own network of artisan firms independently.
The number of firms involved in the production of a single machine is likely to 
be quite high, given the complexity of the machines, the high degree of 
customisation, and the vast number of components required to produce a single 
machine. The artisan firms tend to specialise, usually in different types of 
processes or different components. For example, the artisans interviewed for 
this study specialised in milling, gear-making, finished components, and 
assembly.
About 95% of IMA's network firms are located in the Province of Bologna and 
Imola, with the remainder in Tuscany, and between Veneto and Milan. In 
general, IMA tries to use firms that are located in the very immediate area, in
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order to maximise connections. Only in special cases, where no appropriate 
local production capability exists, or where larger, more capital intensive 
facilities are involved (e.g. foundries) will IMA go farther afield.
In general, there are no direct links between the various artisan firms in the 
network. The exception occurs when an artisan firm finds that it is not capable 
of producing a certain piece, and the artisan will ask for a second artisan's 
assistance (i.e. qualitative flexibility). This relationship is not one that is 
instigated or controlled by IMA, however; it occurs only between the two 
artisans. It occurs particularly for exacting processes or treatments, where 
extreme precision and specialised production equipment is required.
Unlike the Carma case, where production was initially undertaken within the 
firm and subsequently restructured and externalised, IMA has, since the firm 
began in the 1960s, relied on external producers for production. There have 
always been a number of machines within IMA, used primarily for the 
development of prototypes and customised components. What has changed is 
the ratio between internal and external workers, from an initial ratio of about 
one to one, to a current ratio of about one to ten. This has more to do with the 
relative expansion of production compared to product development functions 
as the sector matured and expanded, than a conscious decision on the part of 
the casa madre to increase the external component. That is, it is simply that 
the functions executed externally expanded more rapidly than the internal 
functions.
IMA attributes its success to the high technical level of its product and the 
ability to produce products that were particularly 'right for the moment'. For 
example, the IMA machines are much more compact than its competitors': one 
of IMA's machines is about lm by 6m in size, while the similar machine 
produced by a competitor is 24m long by 6m wide. IMA's other strength, 
especially for tea packaging machines, is that they produce a full range of
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machines, while each of their competitors generally produces only one kind of 
machine.
IMA's product strategy depends on the sector - tea or pharmaceuticals. For tea 
packaging machinery, in which IMA is the world leader, the strategy is to 
constantly renew and improve the machine, in order to maintain leadership and 
stay ahead of the competition. For pharmaceuticals, were the competition is 
particularly strong, the strategy is to compete on the basis of technical 
improvements, rather than price cutting, so as to enlarge market share.
A sample of firms performing different functions in IMA’s network are 
described below.
2.2 Gianni Andald
The firm of Gianni Andalo produces finished components, primarily for 
mechanical equipment of all types. At the time of interview, the firm had 
recently hired three workers, bringing the total employed to 18. Revenues 
were Lit. 1.5 billion (£750,000) for the previous year. Sig. Andalo is the 
owner and operator of the firm, which is located in Imola, in the Province of 
Bologna.
The Internal Organisation of Production
The firm undertakes the usual mechanical finishing functions, including cutting, 
milling, lathe-work, and grinding, as well as assembly, measurement and testing 
of the finished pieces. The raw material used is generally steel bars, which are 
then cut, and the raw pieces formed using one or more of the milling, lathe or 
grinding machines. The pieces may also have to undergo thermal treatments or 
surface treatments, for which there is no internal capability, so the pieces must 
be sent out to other artisans for these processes. Then they are assembled, 
tested and measured, and returned to the client firm.
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Fourteen workers are directly involved in production. Of these, ten are 
characterised as 'super-skilled', and the other four are less qualified apprentices 
or workers assumed under a 'contratto di formazione'. All of the workers were 
unskilled when they began to work for the firm, and have been trained 
completely within the company.
The firm has four NC machines, all linked to a central computer. It also has a 
number of other traditional machines, such as two grinding machines. The 
workers tend to move about the firm, working with different kinds of 
machinery and different materials. The client will provide the specifications for 
the piece with the order. The machines are programmed by Sig. Andalo 
himself, or with the help of an external programmer.
Andalo's strategy regarding the use of the machines, particularly the use of the 
NC machines, is not to strive to produce large quantities of the same piece, but 
rather to produce the best individual piece - "...not the philosophy of mass 
production, but maximum flexibility" (Andalo, interview, 1988). At the same 
time, he tries to achieve high aggregate levels of output. This, Andalo believes, 
is the optimal way to make use of NC machines. The use of a central computer 
for programming and control of the machine tools reduces the programming 
time, and places the programmer in a key position in the firm. Andalo strives 
to achieve economic flexibility through a variety of channels, e.g. in the way the 
computer programs are managed and modified, in the machines and the PC, 
and in the choice of tools for the machines that can be used for many different, 
consecutive production processes.
Indeed, the firm produces a large number of small series pieces. From January 
1 to June 26, 1988, the firm had completed 265 orders, each of which could 
have contained orders for one to twelve different pieces. The quantities of 
each piece generally produced range from a single piece to about 100. 
However, because Andalo produces pieces for mechanical equipment, which is
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a 'lumpy1, expensive product produced in very small quantities, the quantity of a 
given piece produced by his firm will be quite small, at around ten pieces.
Despite the apparent flexibility in the division of labour and technology, the 
hours of work remain rigid and a strict schedule of regular hours is maintained. 
This, Andalo claims, puts him at a disadvantage compared to other small firms 
in the same sector which have more than one owner. In these cases, the 
owners themselves can work flexible hours, which can make the firm itself 
more flexible and provide shorter turnaround times.
The 'management structure' of the firm consists in essence of Sig. Andalo 
himself, who makes investment decisions regarding new plant and machinery, 
and undertakes the basic day-to-day management. Administration functions are 
also undertaken within the firm.
The firm has about ten regular clients, not including those who submit orders 
on an infrequent basis. There is a conscious strategy of avoiding a situation in 
which one or two clients dominate, in order to reduce the vulnerability of the 
firm. However, such a situation cannot always be controlled, because orders 
depend on how the clients' products are doing in the market, and the clients 
often are subject to business cycles, as they tend to be concentrated in the 
'lumpy' products of expensive machinery. When a long-standing client receives 
a large order, Andalo cannot refuse the work.
Andalo has also produced its own products from time to time. For example, it 
had won a contract to design and produce an instrument for use by the Italian 
coastguard, to measure the holes in fishnets for compliance with the law.
These in-house products account for a small proportion of the total revenues, 
and are viewed mostly as a way to attract new clients. The marketing of such 
products is seen as very difficult, and producing directly for a final market 
involves a greater risk than producing on the basis of orders.
253
History
The owner began the firm in 1968-69, after having worked for eight years for a 
state participation company, “Savio”. For the first two years Andalo continued 
to work as a sub-contractor to Savio. In recognition of a need to diversify his 
client base in order to maintain the security of the company through economic 
downturns, clients in new sectors were sought. The company diversified its 
client base to include the sectors of textile machinery, automatic packaging 
machinery, ceramic tile machinery, the nuclear energy industry, the precision 
instruments industry, and automation and robotics.
The firm is located in Imola, because this is where Sig. Andalo came to work 
for Savio from his home some 10 km. away. He settled in Imola, not 
considering alternative locations when he established his own firm after leaving 
Savio. The firm has moved twice since its foundation, but has always remained 
within 500 metres of Savio.
Aside from the skills learned at Savio, Sig. Andalo has been primarily 
self-taught. He does, however, make it a practice to continue with regular 
education, and enrols in two courses every year, one on management, and one 
relating to technical matters. The technical courses have dealt with issues such 
as surfaces of materials, emulsive oils and the environment, and computers, 
while the management courses have covered topics such as communication, 
relationships with financial institutions, procurement, and publicity.
The External Organisation of Production
There are no formal or long-term contracts between Andalo and IMA. Neither 
are there direct links with other small firms or artisans involved in IMA's 
network. The order comes to Andalo, is produced, and returned to the casa 
madre. As noted above, however, Andalo does sub-contract some phases of 
production to other artisans or small firms for specific treatments or processes 
which cannot be performed internally, but this is not coordinated in any way by
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IMA.
The relationship between Andalo and other firms in the same sector seems to 
be one of intense competition. Andalo employs a competitive strategy of 
specialisation, not by sector or manufacturing process, but by batch size. That 
is, he specialises in small and very small orders, often single pieces, and in very 
difficult or complex pieces, which other firms are less interested in. As outlined 
above, a firm structure and a policy regarding the use of NC machines that 
accommodates this was strategically adopted, unlike other artisans which still 
seek to achieve long series production, even with the more flexible NC 
machines. In short, he has sought to embrace small orders and flexibility and 
adapt the structure of his firm to it rather than attempt to overcome it.
A second strategy which Andalo employs gives a further indication of the 
competition between small firms. Andalo is constantly seeking out new types 
of machinery, and experiments with it. He tries to prevent his competitors 
from learning what kinds of machinery he acquires, and as a condition of 
purchase will ask the supplier not to sell the machine to another firm in the area 
for a period of one year. "So I try to defend myself with these kinds of 
strategies - best quality, and I look for the best kind of equipment, and I don't 
let my competitor know what kind of machine I buy. I am often a 'mouse' - 1 
experiment with new machinery for the first time" (Andalo, interview, 1988).
23 Ramazza
This is a small firm of six employees which specialises in the making of gears 
for machinery. It is owner-operated, by Sig. Ramazza, and had total annual 
revenues of between Lit. 450 and 500 million (approximately £225,000 to 
£250,000). The workshop (which is under the owner's home) is located in the 
small town of San Lazzaro, near Bologna.
The firm was begun in 1955 by Sig. Ramazza and his brother. They had both
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worked from a very early age (14 years) in a metal/mechanical firm in Bologna. 
Sig. Ramazza worked there for 12 years, picking up skills and an understanding 
of the production process. In 1955, this firm failed, and Sig. Ramazza and his 
brother decided to set up their own workshop in nearby San Lazzaro, where 
they lived at the time. Some of the first metal/mechanical establishments had 
been set up in the area, and parcels of land were available for industrial uses. 
They set up shop in a basement, with a small loan, and slowly began to acquire 
machinery one piece at a time. The firm has been in the same location since 
1969.
The Internal Organisation of Production
Production is generally organised in the following way. IMA brings the order 
and the raw materials to Ramazza. The order specifies the kind and number of 
pieces, and a delivery date. The production of the piece is then organised by 
Sig. Ramazza. They begin with the unrefined steel metal, which then must 
undergo 'normalisation' with thermal treatments. The piece may then have to 
be tempered (i.e. heat treated to bring the steel to the desired elasticity and 
hardness). The piece is then shaped on the lathe, pre-milled, and then the teeth 
of the gears are formed. The piece may then undergo a second thermal 
treatment, and the teeth themselves will be ground.
There is no capacity for thermal treatments inside the firm; this must be done 
externally, but is organised by Sig. Ramazza when he receives the order. Once 
Ramazza receives the order, he is responsible for organising all aspects of its 
production; IMA has no role in this.
All of the six workers and Sig. Ramazza himself are directly involved in 
production. Two workers are classified as lathe operators, and three are 
milling machine operators. The sixth is an apprentice who has not yet 
specialised in a certain type of operation.
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The tools and machinery employed in the workshop include a hacksaw for 
cutting the pieces of steel, a drill, two or three milling machines, four lathes, 
and several different types of grinding machines for gears and gear teeth.
None of the machines are numerically controlled, but one is automatic (i.e. 
mechanically programmed).
The workers learn their skills on the job, though generally they will also have 
some technical training before arriving at the firm. As noted above, the 
workers are specialised in certain types of machinery. Two of the workers are 
relatively more skilled, and can change their positions. The degree of diversity 
of work an employee enjoys depends upon his level of skill; the more skilled 
workers take part in a wider range of tasks, while the less skilled are confined 
to fewer, less critical tasks, such as preparation work.
Ramazza tends to produce small batches of a wide variety of pieces. Orders 
for the same piece may range from one to about fifty pieces, but are often less 
than twelve. This is attributed to the nature of the automatic packaging 
machinery sector, in which the product machines are produced in small 
numbers.
The production process must constantly adapt to the changing requirements of 
the diversity of pieces being produced. Different pieces require various 
processes, some are more complex than others and require the use of many 
more machines or external treatments. Some require parts of the process to be 
done by hand.
This constant changing of product and production process adds costs to the 
production. The machines must be reset for each different type of piece, which 
adds a high fixed cost to small or single orders. This means economies of scale 
in production are rarely achieved. However, Ramazza tries to achieve a pricing 
of the piece that reflects the higher per unit costs.
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Ramazza finds the manual machines that make up his inventory of equipment 
more suited to production in limited series compared to NC or CNC machines. 
He believes that electronic machines would only be useful for him if he had to 
produce long series. "As the orders are small, I keep on producing the pieces 
in my way, the clients are satisfied and so am I... If I produced 1,000 pieces I 
would buy automatic machines and try to have competitive prices, but here it 
doesn't matter" (Ramazza, interview, 1988).
Sig. Ramazza is responsible for the day-to-day management of the firm, and 
virtually all decision-making, including investment decisions. The 
administration and accounting functions are done by his wife. They do not 
make use of the artisans' associations or other agencies, but have in the past 
used outside sources of financial assistance to finance the purchase of 
machinery.
The External Organisation of Production
Ramazza has about 50 or 60 clients annually, but most of these are irregular, 
coming only once or twice a year with 'emergency' work. IMA is the 
dominant, stable client, and accounts for about 50% of Ramazza's total 
revenues. The clients are all located in Emilia-Romagna, mostly in Bologna. 
The same clients tend to be maintained from year to year. On an annual basis, 
the firm is able to work continuously and regularly, though there is a certain 
'cyclical' nature to the production process.
The firm has, in the past, produced pieces of their own design, generally in 
conjunction with a client firm that has a certain kind of problem, but no plans 
or design for a component that will resolve it. In addition, Ramazza provides 
equipment maintenance and repair services to other companies in the area.
In the 25 years Ramazza had worked for IMA, there had never been any 
written contracts or long-term agreements amongst the two firms. The casa
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madre had consistently given the small firm the equivalent of three or four 
months of work, every year. In Ramazza's view there is no need for a written 
agreement. If IMA or other major clients suffer a downturn, Ramazza is able 
to turn to other clients to pick up the slack, or initiate work on their own 
products, until orders arrive. When the orders arrive, work on internal 
products ceases. Generally this strategy has been successful in dealing with the 
variability of work, and the lacunae in production have not lasted more than a 
week or so.
There is little exchange of information between IMA and Ramazza regarding 
matters relating to the production process, or, say, potential improvements to 
the intermediate product. Occasionally the casa madre will ask for information 
regarding the production process, but the materials and specifications are 
decided within IMA, with no input from the artisan firm. This means for the 
workers at Ramazza, there is little opportunity for an integration of 
conceptualisation and execution.
There are no direct filiere linkages between Ramazza and other firms involved 
in IMA's productive network process. The orders are delivered to and 
retrieved from Ramazza by IMA. The artisan firm does not pass on its 
intermediate products directly to another artisan firm in the filiere.
Ramazza does, however, have direct production relations with other firms that 
provide both qualitative and quantitative flexibility, but such relationships are 
organised by Ramazza, and do not involve the casa madre. In terms of 
qualitative flexibility, Ramazza sends pieces out for processes for which he has 
no internal capacity, such as thermal treatments, and certain grinding and 
shaving processes for the gear teeth. Ramazza also provides qualitative 
flexibility to other small artisan firms, including those that work for IMA. They 
solicit Ramazza's assistance in the gear-making process and in slotting work.
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From time to time, Ramazza has also employed four or five outside artisans 
when he has had too much work and deadlines could not otherwise be met. 
This is relatively infrequent, however, and he prefers to accept work that can 
be conducted internally, without resort to other artisans. The relationship is 
reciprocal, and Ramazza has also provided quantitative flexibility to other 
artisan firms from time to time. These secondary artisan firms are located in 
Bologna, and San Lazzaro.
Ramazza's production has not changed radically over the years. The firm has 
always worked with very small orders. For the most part, new technology has 
not been aggressively adopted, nor has Ramazza sought to alter his client base.
A major problem cited was the demands placed upon the artisan regarding the 
timing of delivery - a timing which Ramazza found extremely demanding. This 
is attributed to the fact that IMA now produces by order, not for the 
warehouse, and so turnaround times are being constantly reduced. At the time 
of interview, Ramazza's deadlines were usually thirty or forty days. Ramazza 
complains that such a schedule is often difficult to achieve, particularly given 
the increasing complexity of the components. The casa madre places great 
pressure on the artisan firm to complete components on time, warning that the 
assembly process will stop if the pieces are not delivered on the date specified.
2.4 Meccanka Sard
Meccanica Sarti is an owner-operated mechanical firm, which specialises in 
precision mechanical processes, in particular milling, rather than in specific 
intermediate products. The firm is located in suburban Bologna, employs 40 
workers, and had annual revenues of between Lit. 1.5 billion and Lit. 5 billion 
in 1987 (£750,000 and £2.5 million, approximately).
The firm was started by the current owner's grandfather in 1932. The current
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owner, Sig. Sarti, began working in the firm in the early 1970s, after attending 
technical school. The company has remained in the same location for the last 
25 years. At the time Sig. Sarti began working for the company, the work 
performed was much more diverse, including carpentry, grinding, lathe-work, 
and many others functions.
The Internal Organisation of Production
Meccanica Sarti has nine NC work centres, as well as three NC milling 
machines. In addition, the firm maintains testing and measuring equipment, to 
confirm the precision of the finished pieces. The firm began acquiring NC 
machines in the early 1970s. At the time, Meccanica Sarti was relatively weak 
in milling; the acquisition of NC machines was intended to overcome this 
weakness. These initial machines served the changing market well, so a 
decision was made to continue acquiring this kind of machinery. Meccanica 
Sarti began to specialise in the milling process, and acquires a new NC machine 
tool every year. The NC machines were also seen as improving the precision 
of the work and the replicability of the piece.
Most of the 38 production workers are machine operators. Because there is a 
high level of automation, particularly with the 'work centres', the function of 
the machine operator is primarily to load and unload the machine, and 
supervise its operation.
All of the workers are taken on directly out of school, are trained within the 
firm, and are often sent by Meccanica Sarti to attend specialised courses. 
Workers from other firms are never assumed. There appeared to be a 
considerable amount of fluidity within production with the workers "all doing 
everything". However, there was a plan underway at the time of interview to 
restructure the nature of work in order to reduce the number of tasks for which 
each worker is responsible. This was to allow the worker to perform a few 
specialised tasks with high levels of competence, and improve the organisation
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within the firm, making sure the worker knew his responsibilities, who his 
superior was, etc.
Data on the range of different types of pieces produced annually was not 
available. However, Sig. Sarti stated that one of the goals of the firm was to 
follow the market (for intermediate goods) closely, and characterised the firm 
by its "extreme adaptability to the market". The series size ranges from single 
pieces to quite large lots. At the time of interview, the firm had current orders 
for lots varying in size from three pieces to 1,500 pieces, and "all the numbers 
in the middle".
Though the lot sizes produced here are larger than for other APM artisans, 
there is still a considerable degree of product variability, which translates into 
ongoing changes to the labour process. Generally, the machines must be 
reprogrammed at the start of every day. There is also considerable flexibility in 
the hours of work. At present, the firm works in two full shifts, one daytime 
and one evening. This creates problems for the firm with the unions. In fact, 
the flexibility afforded by the two shifts was seen as one of the keys to the 
success of the firm, in particular in its ability to always accept work offered, 
and as a competitive strength in comparison to other firms that work a single 
shift and rigid hours. It is not unusual for the firm to produce beyond the two 
regular shifts, working into the early morning or on weekends. According to 
Sig. Sarti, this is a state of affairs that the worker has always accepted.
On a longer term basis, Meccanica Sarti also succeeds in working consistently, 
without gaps in production. Aside from the strategy of never declining work, 
the other approach is to take on slightly more work than the machines are 
capable of handling. In this way, if orders arrive late or other problems arise, 
the machines are still operating at full capacity.
All management activities and investment decision-making are performed solely
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within the firm, by Sig. Sarti himself, though sometimes in conjunction with 
some of the more senior employees in the case of acquisitions of new 
technology. Of the forty employees in the firm, fully 38 are directly involved in 
production. One of the remaining two does all of the administration functions. 
There is no recourse to outside consultants or associations for assistance of any 
kind.
The External Organisation of Production
The firm has approximately 100 clients, in three primary sectors: automatic 
machines such as those produced for IMA, transportation, and textile 
machinery. These three sectors account for about three-quarters of Meccanica 
Sarti's annual sales. Most of the clients are located in Emilia-Romagna, but 
there are also other foreign clients, in France and Germany, for example. The 
firm works only on a subcontract basis for other firms; it does not produce its 
own products.
There are no formal or long-term agreements between Meccanica Sarti and 
IMA, (nor with any other case madri). Prices for each order are determined in 
advance, and are negotiated between IMA and Sarti. Unlike other cases we 
have seen in which the price the artisan can ask does not vary with the total 
number of pieces in the series, Meccanica Sarti charges different prices, 
depending on the lot size. "We have a price for each kind of order so we are 
able to produce from one to 1,000 pieces" (Sarti, interview, 1988).
In the past, the price for an order was determined 'a consuntivo', i.e. after the 
work had already been completed - a final balance. The amount of time spent 
and the value of the pieces was discussed by the small firm and the casa madre, 
and a price determined. However, this after-the-fact approach frequently led to 
disagreements between IMA and Sarti. An approach was adopted in which 
Sarti provides an indication of the likely final price before the work has begun, 
and also indicates the size of order that will be required in order to achieve that 
price.
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Another advantage Sarti has regarding price (compared to other sub-contractor 
firms) is a direct result of his strategy of client selection. Clients and client 
sectors in which quality is more important than price are deliberately selected. 
"We prefer firms that produce durable goods, they will appreciate the 
importance of quality components in their machines, and they are able to 
sustain certain costs for their pieces. Agricultural machinery is not like this, so 
it is of no interest to us." (Sarti, interview, 1988). Such a strategy gives the 
small firm some additional leverage in price negotiations with the casa madre, 
which allows it to recoup in whole or in part the costs associated with 
producing in short series.
Meccanica Sarti conducts 95% of its work inside the firm itself, and views this 
as necessary for protecting the high quality of the product. However, a small 
proportion of production is conducted outside the firm, in cases where specific 
technologies other than those available internally are required.
The relationship between small or artisan firms specialising in the same phase of 
production is characterised predominantly by competition. Some small firms 
will try to compete on the basis of price, by attempting to find out the prices a 
firm like Sarti charges, and undercutting them. Or, often a casa madre will 
send out a limited tender to several firms for a certain piece of work, and will 
choose the respondent with the lowest price.
Meccanica Sarti has lost work in this way, but their competitive strategy is not 
one based on price but on the quality of product. The choice of phases of 
production in which to specialise, technology, and the organisation of the firm 
around the technology are critical in achieving this competitive edge, and these 
are the tools Sarti employs to compete against other firms in the same sector. 
The high level of sophistication of the NC milling machine tools and work 
centres require an in-depth technological knowledge, and a productive 
organisation that supports and exploits the technology. These are qualities are
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not easily achieved by all firms, and are not achievable in certain production 
processes, such as lathe-work, where the technology is not as complex. In this 
way, Sarti tries to compete with other firms through sophisticated technology, 
internal firm organisation, and high product quality - features which are not 
easily achievable or reproducible by other firms.
Meccanica Sarti attributes its success to following its own path, policies and 
line of reasoning, as well as a consistent plan of investment in new technology. 
However, they are now at a point where they have invested substantially in the 
years leading up to the time of interview, and further growth through more 
investment and addition of equipment would necessitate restructuring the firm. 
So the firm had adopted a policy of improvement without further expansion 
(i.e. maintaining the same machinery and work force), and embarked upon a 
program of restructuring the labour process, more narrowly defining tasks and 
increasing the technical division of labour.
2.5 Vignoli-Roda
This is a firm of six employees which specialises in the assembly of automatic 
packaging machinery. It is owned and operated by Sig. Vignoli, and is located 
in San Lazzaro. This location was seen as favourable as it is near to IMA, but 
more importantly, is near to a technical school which is the primary source of 
labour for the firm.
The firm was founded by Sig. Roda in 1961. Sig. Vignoli joined the firm in its 
second year, and was made a partner five years later. Sig. Roda then left the 
firm, and currently works in IMA's planning office. Sig. Vignoli underwent 
some initial training at a local technical school before entering the firm, but 
most of his skills and knowledge were learned on the job.
The Internal Organisation of Production
The firm works exclusively for IMA and only undertakes assembly of
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automatic packaging machines. All of the components are sourced and 
delivered by IMA, in order that the high quality of the product can be assured. 
Vignoli-Roda assembles the entire machine except the electronic component, 
tests it, and provides it to IMA ready for installation of the customised 
component and final testing.
As the focus is upon assembly, there is little machinery or equipment present in 
the firm. Some tools are kept on hand, such as a lathe and drills, so that 
components that are not quite right can be modified on the spot. If the defect 
is more severe, however, it is returned to IMA.
All of the six employees are directly involved in the assembly of the machines. 
Vignoli-Roda acts as a kind of training school for IMA, taking on young men 
directly from the nearby technical school, which has a three year program.
Once trained (and expensive) the workers are passed on to IMA. Many of 
these young workers fall under the 'contratto di formazione professionals.
This both keeps Vignoli-Roda's labour costs to a minimum, and also serves to 
provide IMA with skilled workers, already very familiar with the product. This 
relationship between IMA and Vignoli-Roda is the result of an informal 
agreement between the two firms. In exchange for providing IMA with skilled 
workers, and keeping assembly costs low by using less experienced labour, 
IMA ensures that Vignoli-Roda works continuously. This arrangement is not 
the subject of a written contract, but is just an 'agreement' between the two 
firms.
For this reason, and also due to the nature of assembly work itself, the workers 
at Vignoli-Roda are not highly specialised. The emphasis is on training, so the 
young workers must cover all parts of the assembly process and all workers do 
essentially the same kinds of work.
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Vignoli-Roda assemble all but the two very largest machines of IMA's product 
line (due to space limitations) - about six common models. The total number 
of machines assembled in a year falls between 30 and 40, depending on the 
complexity of the particular models. A complicated machine may take up to 
three months to assemble. For less complicated models, an order of eight 
machines may be assembled in two months.
The hours of work appeared to be flexible, often extending into the weekend. 
Because the workers are not very experienced, Sig. Vignoli must always be 
present to supervise the assembly process. "So it's a great sacrifice, I can't stay 
home if I am sick, for 20 years I have never stayed home" (Vignoli, interview, 
1988).
Over the longer period, the firm is able to work consistently throughout the 
year. This is necessary, because of the relatively low price they are paid by the 
casa madre for their work. "We couldn't keep these prices without a guarantee 
of work, without continuous work" (Vignoli, interview, 1988). However, this 
guarantee of work is not a written commitment. At the beginning of each year, 
IMA provides Vignoli-Roda with its production plan for the year, and 
estimates the number of hours of work the artisan will receive monthly.
Vignoli then organises his firm according to IMA's projection, e.g. taking on 
new workers, if necessary. Gaps do sometimes occur, however, for example 
when the delivery of components required for assembly is late. Such gaps are 
filled either by taking holidays at that time, or IMA will provide alternate work 
to the firm.
The firm's management structure essentially consists of Sig. Vignoli, who is 
responsible for day-to-day management, production coordination, investment 
and staffing decisions, and supervising the assembly process. His wife does all 
of the internal administration, and their accounts are done externally, in part by 
the artisans' association, and in part by an independent accountant.
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The External Organisation of Production
There are no formal written or long-term agreements between IMA and 
Vignoli-Roda but, as noted above, there are obviously strong ties between the 
two firms and there is an unwritten agreement involving the provision of 
training for IMA workers and low pricing in exchange for continuous work.
Vignoli-Roda determines its price on an hourly basis, the rate being the same 
for all the types of machines. The price is therefore determined after the 
assembly has been completed, rather than before work commences.
Though investment decisions are taken finally by Sig. Vignoli, the casa madre 
is usually consulted in the case of major investments. Because the firm works 
exclusively for IMA, the casa madre is asked to provide projections, in order 
that Vignoli-Roda may get an indication that the investment will be worthwhile.
Vignoli-Roda is usually responsible for undertaking the first production 
assembly (as opposed to prototype assembly, which is conducted within IMA) 
for new IMA models. In such cases Vignoli is able to offer suggestions for 
how the machine might be modified to make assembly easier. There is a certain 
amount of inter-firm collaboration on design in this regard, and Vignoli stays in 
close contact with the technical office at IMA. However, this input tends to 
relate primarily to minor modifications to the design to improve assembly.
Vignoli-Roda has no direct linkages with any other artisan firms involved in 
IMA's production; it deals only with IMA itself. All assembly is completed 
within the firm, no external artisans are ever used, for example, in the assembly 
of sub-components. Internal assembly is seen as necessary in order to maintain 
the quality of the product.
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Because the firm works exclusively for IMA and is essentially guaranteed an 
adequate amount of work, Vignoli-Roda has almost no relations with other 
firms in the same phase. Their relationship is neither one of competition nor 
cooperation, but might best be described as isolationist.
Little has changed in this firm in the last twenty years - the same client has 
always been maintained and they have always specialised in the same phase of 
production, which has not been subject to technological advances. "We have 
always worked in the same way" (Vignoli, interview, 1988).
Vignoli's modest business goal is to follow the path of his ex-partner: find a 
new partner to take over the firm, and pay off debts. A move to nearby 
expanded premises was being planned at the time of interview, which would 
permit the firm to assemble the full range of IMA products, including those that 
were too large to be assembled at the existing premises.
3. SYNTHESIS
3.1 The System of Production - Inter-Firm Aspects
A detailed schematic picture of the IMA network is presented in Figure 6.2. In 
the IMA productive system, the social division of labour takes place at two 
levels. First, there is the division of labour between the casa madre and the 
network firms. IMA undertakes the product design, prototype development, 
coordination of the production process, some assembly, and marketing. The 
network firms undertake the actual production of the automatic packaging 
machines.
The second aspect of the social division of labour occurs between the network 
firms. In other case studies, each small firm generally specialised in a certain 
phase or phases of production, as was the case with Meccanica Sarti.
However, specialisation in the APM district also occurred along other 
dimensions too: certain types of components (e.g. Ramazza), batch size or
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complexity of work (Andalo). In one way or another, each of the firms was 
highly specialised.
For the above reasons, we can say that the social division of labour in the IMA 
system is very pronounced. Because of the complexity of the product, the 
production filiere is also highly complex (Figure 6.3).
The social division of labour is conditioned by the nature of the market for the 
intermediate goods produced. For the most part, the nature of the relationship 
between firms in the same phase of production is one of competition. The 
network firms adopt specialisations as a competitive strategy, as a means to 
compete against other, similar firms.
There is also in IMA's productive system a regular recourse on the part of 
network firms to other small or artisan firms offering specialised services. This 
third tier network of small firms provides qualitative flexibility, is coordinated 
from within the second tier network, and forms a consistent component of the 
productive structure. This differs from other cases, such as the Carma case, in 
which the third tier was only an occasional feature, and provided primarily 
quantitative flexibility to the primary firms.
The competition between network firms in the same phase of production is 
therefore mixed with elements of cooperation: between these same firms when 
they need additional capacity; between firms in different phases for specialised 
production processes; and of course between the network firms and the casa 
madre. A final aspect of the network system relates to economies of scale. It 
has been demonstrated that the individual firms produce very wide product 
ranges, mostly in short series. This is due primarily to the nature of the 
product, i.e. a lumpy, high value good, which itself is not produced in large 
series. Though there are varying approaches amongst the network firms 
toward the use of flexible machinery, particularly NC machine tools,
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Figure 6.3
The IMA Production Filiere
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the small and diverse orders do incur higher costs than standardized, long-run 
production, primarily because of the time involved in re-programming and 
re-setting the machinery. This is true whether the approach is to try to produce 
the best single piece, while maximizing total output on a machine (e.g. Andalo), 
or whether NC machinery is seen as ill-suited or unnecessary for short-run 
production and traditional machines are employed (e.g. Ramazza).
Unlike other productive network systems (e.g. Carma's), IMA does not - or is 
not able to - pass on the costs of diseconomies of scale to the network firm.
In most cases, the network firm was able to charge a price which reflected the 
actual costs incurred - including one-time or other set-up costs.
Ownership
There is no direct legal ownership relationship relation between the casa madre 
and the network firms, either in the sense of outright ownership, nor in the 
sense of partial ownership, say of building or equipment. Each firm surveyed 
was fully independently owned. Neither is there much ownership control in 
Massey's sense of ownership (that is, power over investment decisions) 
exercised by the casa madre over network firms. In all cases investment 
decisions were made completely internally. The exception was Vignoli-Roda, 
which had IMA as a sole client, and consulted the casa madre regarding major 
investment decisions, but the final decision remained within the network firm.
Possession
As defined by Massey, possession relates to how the physical means of 
production are to be used, and control over the authority structure within the 
labour process (i.e. supervisory structure). IMA's possession over network 
firms is quite limited. The casa madre does determine the product, with only 
minimal input from some network firms, but the internal labour processes of 
network firms are left up to the firms themselves. On the second aspect, there 
is, of course, no direct supervisory linkage between the casa madre and the
273
network firm. The casa madre does, however, check the network firm's 
product, and sets the appropriate delivery dates, which amounts to a kind of 
indirect supervision and control.
Regarding other aspects of the labour process, such as conceptualisation and 
execution, this system of production offers little integration for the network 
firm. The product is conceptualised and designed within the casa madre, with 
only minimal input from the producer firms, and when this did occur it would 
be only after the design process was complete. The casa madre also 
determines, to a significant extent, the pace of work, because it fully controls 
when orders are made and due.
To summarise, the IMA system is characterised by a very elaborate social 
division of labour, both between the casa madre and the network firms, on the 
one hand, but also in the division of labour between network firms themselves. 
The casa madre controls the entire system, coordinates production, determines 
whether and when to sub-contract work to certain firms, etc. It can alter or 
modify its network of production firms as it pleases. However, it has little 
control or influence over the internal organisation of those firms. This outcome 
differs with that for other cases, such as the Carma case, in which the casa 
madre was able to exert control in both senses.
Looking at this another way, the network firms in this case are significantly 
more independent than was apparent in the Carma case. This can be attributed 
in part to the fact that the network firms have a greater number of client firms; 
on the whole, their client firms were more diversified, representing many 
different industrial sectors. The APM network firms also exhibited a degree of 
initiative, capability and independence in the fact that some had developed their 
own products for sale on the market. The higher number and diversity of 
clients means both that the network firm is more able to weather an economic 
downturn in one or more sectors, and, should one client discontinue his orders
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to the firm, additional work could be picked up from other clients. The fact 
that the network firms did not absorb the costs of diseconomies of scale 
associated with short production runs is further evidence of their relative 
independence. This is also related to the strong competitive position of IMA 
on the world market, and its ability to charge a premium for its product quality 
and customisation.
3.2 The Intra-Firm Organisation of Production 
IMA
As described above, IMA is a large, complex firm, with a highly defined 
organisational structure. The technical division of labour is quite pronounced, 
with a primary distinction between production (i.e. prototype producers) 
workers, and planners and designers. Each group is further broken down into 
many sections, each with specific responsibilities. There is, by virtue of the 
complexity of the firm and the production process, little movement on the part 
of the worker between the various functions of the firm, broadly defined. On a 
long-term basis, however, it appears that there are opportunities for upward 
career mobility from the shop floor to directorial roles.
Again, because of the high degree of complexity of the product, there is little 
opportunity for an integration of conceptualisation and execution on the part of 
the IMA worker. First, IMA does not produce the machines internally - only 
the prototype. Secondly, even with respect to the production of the prototype, 
the production worker would have little input into the conceptualisation of the 
product. Product design and planning are undertaken by an elaborate team of 
highly qualified engineers, supported by computers. This latter group plays a 
central role in the firm, and their relative numbers are increasing.
The skills associated with the production of IMA's automatic packaging 
machines therefore vary greatly, from the semi-skilled production workers,
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machine tool operators and assemblers (who tend to learn on the job), to 
highly skilled designers, planners, computer programmers, and production 
coordinators (who tend to have university degrees).
Network Firms
Aside from the division of labour between casa madre and network firms, and 
in production between network firms themselves, there is a further division of 
labour within the network firms. Even in the smallest firms, there was an 
attempt to specialise certain workers for certain machines and tasks, though 
there was at least amongst some workers, a degree of interchangeability. In 
one case where there appeared to be more fluidity of workers amongst the 
various machines and tasks (Sarti), there was a move underway to restructure 
the labour process to create more well defined tasks and responsibilities for 
individual workers, in order to increase their competence and productivity.
For network firms, there is little opportunity for integrating conceptualisation 
and production with respect to IMA's product. Only in one case, in which the 
firm worked exclusively for IMA and therefore had a special relationship with 
the casa madre, was there a flow of information regarding the design of the 
machine back to the casa madre. Even in this case the information regarded 
only small adjustments or improvements to the design, and occurred after the 
design phase was completed. In general the network firms are not consulted 
during the design phase regarding the design or production of specific 
components, or the machine as a whole (from the assembler's point of view).
The functions performed in the network firms would generally represent skilled 
or semi-skilled jobs. There is some need for higher level skills and/or 
programming skills in firms with NC or computer-controlled machinery. 
However, there was no incidence of highly skilled, university educated 
engineers working in these firms. Most workers were taken on at a young age, 
directly from a technical school, and were trained on-the-job.
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33 The Territorial Organisation of Production
The most striking feature regarding the geographical organisation of 
production is the high degree of spatial centralisation of the productive system. 
There is a very high degree of centralisation of the leading, case madri firms in 
this sector in and around the city and Province of Bologna (Figure 6.4). The 
APM industry is clearly centred around the city of Bologna and its suburbs, as 
well as immediately surrounding towns and villages. Other APM firms are 
located in the major cities, such as Parma, and clearly along the via Emilia axis. 
Several Bolognese firms are located in the city proper, but most are located in 
the suburban ring that extends around the city. There is a small cluster of firms 
in Parma as well, in which firms are localised in the city, not in suburban or 
fringe locations.
Figure 6.5 shows the same firms distributed by size. In general, there is a 
relationship between central city location and firm size: the bigger the firm, the 
more centrally located it is likely to be. The largest firms are located in the city 
of Bologna, and other large firms are located in Parma. Small and medium 
firms are scattered more toward the urban periphery and in smaller intervening 
towns and villages.
Figure 6.6 shows the location of the network firms interviewed. There is a 
correspondingly high degree of spatial concentration of network firms, which 
are closely located in neighbouring towns along the via Emilia34. In addition, 
IMA indicated that the vast majority of their network firms were located in the 
immediate area - in the Province of Bologna, and Imola, with a small number in 
Tuscany.
This is a metropolitan industrial district: a highly spatially concentrated system 
and a tightly defined industrial district, focused primarily around the central 
Emilian city of Bologna.
A full list of the location of IliA's 100 network firms was not available.
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Figure 6.4
APM Case Madri, Emilia-Romagna Source: Data from ERVET, 1987.
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IMA and Network Firms Interviewed
Given the relative independence of network firms in this district, with many 
potential client sectors to work for and the ability to charge a premium for 
short production runs, the industrial relationship does not translate into a 
situation of city/hinterland dominance/dependence. Rather, there is a high 
degree of city/town/village inter-dependence Neither is the productive centre 
in Bologna dominated by a control centre outside the region; full ownership 
remains local and the city of Bologna represents the apex of the APM system.
However, the larger firms are where the higher paying, more skilled design, 
engineering, and management functions tend to be located and the production 
process controlled and coordinated, while production functions are more 
dispersed.
Towards an Explanation
The competitive basis of IMA's automatic packaging machines rests upon their 
technological content and continual updating, quality, customisation, product 
range, and timely delivery. Competition is both global and local; Bologna is the 
world’s largest concentration of automatic packaging machinery producers, but 
there is also global competition from Germany, the U.S. and elsewhere.
IMA's productive structure is one in which the casa madre undertakes design, 
sales, and customisation, and controls a large network which undertakes all 
production and basic assembly. IMA's production has always been organised 
on this kind of a network basis, dating back to the firm's origins in the 1920s.
In part, this can be attributed the existence, even at that time, of a substantial 
and highly developed metal-mechanical sector in Emilia-Romagna, particularly 
in Bologna, that could undertake all production functions, minimising set-up 
costs for new firms such as IMA.
A significant change did occur, however, in the early 1980s, when IMA 
switched from its long-standing system in which production was based on
281
achieving economies of scale, and machines were stored in the warehouse until 
subsequently sold, to a system in which production only occurred on the basis 
of prior orders. This change was brought about because the economies of 
scale achieved by producing the optimal number of machines at the same time 
were outweighed by the costs of carrying unsold inventory. This placed a new 
emphasis on the ability to manufacture and deliver the product quickly.
After moving from speculative production to an advance sales approach,
IMA’s production process could no longer be regularized, because demand 
was unpredictable, particularly given the "lumpiness" of the final product. The 
network system of production is seen by the directors of IMA as providing the 
firm flexibility in the face of this unpredictable demand. A vertically 
disintegrated productive system permits the casa madre to deal with the 
irregularity of demand and lumpiness of the product in a way that would not be 
possible if production were internalised. A huge internal workforce would be 
required, and it would be impossible to regularise the production process to 
keep these workers consistently employed throughout the day, week and year. 
As we have seen,- some months several machines can be produced at once, 
while in other months, there may be no machines at all in production. The 
labour needs associated with this would also vary significantly, from no 
workers to perhaps 1,000 workers. Through vertical disintegration in the 
district, IMA can maintain a minimum of workers inside the firm (even though 
this minimum currently amounts to 400). Aside from providing maximum 
quality, then, the vertically disintegrated production system provides 
quantitative flexibility; the casa madre can increase the number of orders or 
order size for individual network firms, or increase the number of network 
firms involved in a given phase of production as required to have production 
undertaken in a timely manner. In other words, in the context of an industrial 
district, the vertically disintegrated productive structure provides quantitative 
flexibility.
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IMA's relatively broad product range is a result of its corporate structure and 
the relationships it has forged with other APM producers. But IMA's own 
internal product range requires a flexible and responsive productive structure, 
which can continually change product and alter production process in 
accordance with very small batch sizes. Unlike Carma's situation, however, 
IMA's strong market position allows a premium to be charged for a customised 
product, and the network producers can recoup the costs of diseconomies of 
scale from IMA. In other words, IMA's network structure and relations with 
the industrial district provide overall quantitative flexibility and qualitative 
range, but the network structure itself does not solve the problem of small 
batch size.
Furthermore, even if IMA were somehow successful in predicting the quantity 
of demand, it would be very difficult if not impossible to predict the nature of 
demand. One of the apparent trends in the industry was that clients were 
becoming much more precise about the kind of machines they want, and the 
requirements they must meet. Each machine therefore has a customised 
component, geared specifically to the client's product, which cannot be 
determined in advance of the order.
Customisation is linked to the specialisation of the different establishments in 
the network. The customisation capability resides within IMA, where the 
product is designed and where the relationship with the client takes place.
IMA can specialise in the design, customisation and administration of 
production, without having to concern itself with production itself. It makes 
sense for customisation to reside and remain in the casa madre, where there are 
economies of scope with design and sales.
The high degree of specialisation throughout the system ensures maximum 
proficiency, skill and product quality. The casa madre is able to concentrate 
on design and customisation, while the network firms are able to refine their
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particular role in the production process. As we have seen, the level of 
specialisation, social and technical divisions of labour are extremely high, and 
continually evolving under the competitive pressures between artisan firms in 
the district. The casa madre has an extensive pool of local expertise upon 
which to draw, in the dense agglomeration of metal/mechanical firms which 
exist in the Bologna area. We have seen that IMA's full network roster 
numbers some 800 such firms.
It is worth noting that the fluctuations are not as pronounced in the tea 
packaging machinery sector, where IMA is more established and has a larger 
market share, hence a more stable demand. In the pharmaceuticals packaging 
machinery sector, however, where IMA’s position is not as strong, there is 
greater variability in demand.
Time-based competition was increasingly important, given that production took 
place only in response to orders, and because of the complexity of the product, 
often required several months to a year. IMA attached a high level of 
importance to the prompt delivery of components by artisans, and indeed 
required very demanding turnaround times. Again, the vertically disintegrated 
productive structure can play a key role in time-based competition, as the 
network can be expanded or contracted in any given phase, and orders divided 
amongst many firms, if necessary, to speed production. Of course, the spatial 
concentration of network firms is also key for time-based competition, and as 
we saw, 95% of network firms were within the immediate area of Bologna and 
San Lazzaro.
Again, we see that it is the organisational structure, specifically a vertically 
disintegrated, network system of production within a district environment, that 
provides the main means for dealing with competitive and market imperatives. 
The contribution of elements residing within individual firms, such as labour 
practices or technology, played only a minor role, and there was considerable
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variation in the adoption of new technologies or use of flexible labour 
practices. Access to the district will therefore be an important consideration 
for firms. In this case, the pattern of agglomeration was established very early, 
with a significant cluster of metal-mechanical firms which served the APM 
industry in existence as early as the 1920s.
Once a productive system has been disaggregated, it must however be 
recombined in some fashion in order to continue to function. In the Bologna 
APM district, the system is recombined through market transactions for 
intermediate goods. Aside from the now usual market pressures of time, 
quality and customisation, the APM industry must deal with the constant re- 
invention and modification of the product, small batch sizes, and an inability to 
routinize the myriad transactions that are required. Under such circumstances, 
spatial clustering is a key aspect of the competitiveness of the system, as it 
allows for flexible and fast movement of goods and information between 
companies.
In this regard, a shared culture, mutual trust, and common norms of behaviour 
seem to play a strong role in the functioning of the district, permitting very 
informal transactions, the proverbial “handshake”. Most firms that worked for 
IMA seemed to have long term relationships with the company but under very 
informal arrangements, and in many cases, the price paid for work was only 
determined after the work had been completed. These types of transactions 
allow the production process to operate under intense market and competitive 
pressure, and the cultural norms and trust act as a way of standardizing 
transactions.
There is an apparent relationship between centrality and firm size: the larger the 
firm, the more centrally-located and urban it tends to be. This is a reversal of 
common patterns found in most advanced industrial cities, where larger 
industrial firms tend to be located in suburban locations. This may be
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accounted for by the fact that the larger firms tend to also be the oldest, pre­
war firms, including ACMA and Sasib, which existed in Bologna before the 
development of extended suburban rings. The decentralised production system 
also explains their ability to remain in these locations even though output has 
expanded enormously; expansion of production requires expanding the external 
network rather than the internal facility. As the city grew, younger firms, on 
the other hand, would have been precluded from central city locations by high 
land values, and set up instead in the suburban rings, or other medium-sized 
towns. This is the apparent pattern for the medium-sized companies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
NETW ORKS, DISTRICTS, CITIES, REGIONS
In this concluding chapter it is argued that the industrial districts described in 
the case studies are indeed examples of post-Fordist production, but that there 
are some deviations from the post-Fordist ideal that has frequently been 
portrayed in the literature. Then, an explanation is offered for the particular 
territorial organisation of production seen in the three industrial districts, which 
ties the districts directly to the logic of post-Fordism, as well as certain key 
contingent factors. Key characteristics which unite the three case studies as 
one type of district and allow them to be distinguished from other species of 
district are proposed. In the penultimate section, the implications for cities and 
regions are explored. The chapter closes with a summing-up of the thesis.
I. THE THIRD ITALY: POST-FORDIST BUT NOT PERFECT
Can the systems of production that have been described be called post-Fordist? 
Are they consistent with a new regime of accumulation, with a distinct dynamic 
and characteristics? This section adds to the empirical literature on post- 
Fordist districts, and finds that while in broad outline there are consistencies 
with the “textbook” model of post-Fordist production35, there are also certain 
significant departures.
1.1 Markets
Post-Fordism is often associated with the break-up o f mass markets, and the 
attainment of market saturation for certain products (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
The case studies suggest that changes in the market have been fundamental and 
far-reaching - stemming in part from new sources of competition in emerging 
industrial nations. This was also found to be true not just in sectors like 
knitwear, that had previously been organised along Fordist lines, but also in the
Primarily as described by Moulaert and Swyngedouw (1989) (see Chapter One, Table I .I .) , but also by Piore and Sabel, (1984).
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automatic packaging machinery sector, which had been characterised (even 
during Fordist times) by small production runs. The case studies suggest new 
markets characterised by a number of conditions, outlined below:
* Variability in distribution o f demand over time There appears to be 
increasing variability in the distribution of demand over time, in terms of the 
quantities of a given product that may be demanded in any given period.
The quantity and arrival of orders for automatic packaging machinery was 
always relatively unpredictable, given its lumpiness and high cost.
However, IMA's replacement, in the early 1980s, of a system in which 
machines were produced consistently and on the basis of achieving 
economies of scale with a system in which production occurred only once 
orders were secured, suggests that the earlier method was no longer 
competitive. There is also evidence of built-in market cyclicity. In the 
knitwear case study, there was a switch to a non-standardised product, 
which meant new cyclicity according to fashion seasons.
* Variability in the qualitative aspects o f demand Even if the quantities of 
certain products demanded at any given time were roughly knowable, there 
is an added element of variability in the specific nature of demand. This is 
evident in the Carma case, for example, where new international sources of 
competition forced a total rethinking of the product and repositioning in the 
global market. The nature of demand became extremely unpredictable, 
especially in this case where fashion and taste were involved, necessitating 
a change in the commercial system to begin production only once orders 
had been secured, and further, to produce second or third rounds directly in 
response to market reactions.
* Greater demand for customisation o f products A greater demand for 
customisation of products resulted from competition in final markets, which 
placed increased emphasis on product differentiation, brand recognition,
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etc. The Oil Control product, for example, is by definition customised, 
designed to respond to specific client needs. In the case of IMA, a 
requirement for a higher degree of customisation in the automatic 
packaging machines emerged - itself the result of intensified competitive 
pressures in the final demand sectors (tea, pharmaceuticals). It could also 
be said that the increased incidence of customisation is also the result of 
supply-side forces, in that computer-controlled technology makes 
customisation more cost-efficient, and permits it where it would not have 
been economical otherwise.
• Time-based competition The great importance attached to timely market 
delivery was evident especially in the cases of knitwear, where there was 
extreme pressure to get goods to market, and automatic packaging 
machines, where production only after orders were received led to a need 
to minimise the usually long production time required for this complex 
piece of machinery. Indeed, in all of the case studies, speculative 
production was non-existent, having been replaced with an approach in 
which production takes place only on the basis of prior orders. In a volatile 
marketplace, this is an effective risk reduction strategy, but it places a high 
degree of emphasis on the ability to produce and deliver goods to market 
quickly.
• Greater emphasis on product quality In all of the case studies, high 
product quality was seen as a key competitive factor, and a means to 
differentiate particular products on the market.
What these new market conditions signal is a fundamental change in the basis 
of competition, from competition primarily based on achieving the lowest 
possible price for a standardised product, to competition based on a number of 
factors, primarily high quality, timeliness, and customisation. For the 
producer, this creates a situation which makes it extremely difficult to predict
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production requirements over even the short term.
1.2 Product differentiation and range
While the post-Fordists and flexible specialisationists have maintained a 
broadening product range and increased product diversity (Piore and Sabel, 
1984; Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989), others question these trends or even 
suggest that an opposite trend of product range rationalisation and reduction 
(Smith, 1991).
The case studies show a high degree of flexibility in the product - large and 
increasing product ranges, increasing degrees of customisation of the product, 
one-offs to medium batch sizes. The Carma example showed a complete 
rethinking of the product and change from a standardised product with a 
market life of five years, to diversified clothing lines redesigned semi-annually. 
Oil Control exhibited a very broad and constantly expanding product range. 
Even the case of automatic packaging machinery saw a marked increase in the 
number of basic models offered, as well as further customisation of each 
machine produced. In instance, broader product ranges and customisation 
involved greater degrees of integration with the final market, working directly 
with the client to respond to their needs or a particular problem, in the cases of 
automatic packaging machinery and oleodynamic components, or responding 
more quickly to market demand, in the knitwear example.
13 Flexible systems of production?
The post-Fordists maintain that as a result of these new kinds of market 
conditions and diversifying product ranges, a flexible production process is 
required, replacing the quest for standardisation, economies of scale and cost 
minimisation that were characteristic of Fordism. Product diversification and 
customisation have necessitated flexible systems of production that can adjust 
rapidly and accommodate changes in process required for smaller batches, 
quick turnaround, or when the nature of the product itself is constantly
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evolving. It is these characteristics which have been more generally described 
in the literature as "flexibility”. Flexibility is seen as the defining characteristic 
of the new regime of accumulation and is placed at the centre of production 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989). Flexibility can 
come in many guises, however, and can stem from technology, the labour 
process or organisational structures. The evidence from the case studies on the 
degree of flexibility and its sources is summarised below.
13.1 Flexibility from labour
The post-Fordists’ view of flexible labour processes includes claims that both 
job demarcations and the technical division of labour are reduced as workers 
perform multiple tasks (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989). The flexible 
specialisationists have claimed that the new forms of labour represent a re- 
emergence of craft production, skills, and a re-integration of conception and 
execution (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
The case studies show that quantitative labour flexibility does not reside 
primarily within the individual firm. Whether casa madre or sub-contractor, 
firms were very conservative in assuming new labour, even in times of 
expansion, given the difficulties in shedding labour in downturns, and preferred 
to rely on the agglomeration of firms found in the industrial district to deal with 
periods of high demand.
There were some exceptions, however, where workers within the casa madre 
or network firm were expected to accept some flexibility in hours of work, and 
especially to work overtime when needed. Another mechanism for dealing 
with this was the self-exploitation of the owner/operator, who would often take 
it upon himself to work extended hours in periods of high demand, while 
employees worked regular hours.
With few exceptions, there was little evidence in the case studies of a reduction
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or weakening in job demarcations, nor of qualitative flexibility in the form of 
interchangeability amongst workers in the same establishment. First, the 
extremely evolved (and constantly deepening) social division of labour 
continues to reduce and limit the range of activities within any given 
establishment. Within the individual establishment the overwhelming trend was 
the specialisation of workers in individual tasks, or on specific production 
machines. This sometimes occurred along gender lines. Women were used 
for counting output and packaging in the knit textile producing establishment 
(C&B) and for overseeing more automated machines at TARP. In knitwear 
network firms, and in the metal-mechanical sector, workers were always 
trained to specialise on a particular machine or group of machines. In the one 
case in the metal-mechanical sector where this was not the situation 
(Meccanica Sarti), a policy was being implemented to define tasks more 
precisely and specialise workers. As one owner put it, a "microscopic" 
technical division of labour prevailed, and the tendency was to the ongoing 
deepening of this process.
However, there were some exceptions to the rule: within Carma itself, where 
the production of prototypes and the seasonality of production required 
workers to be more generalised; owner/operators of the small network firms 
often knew how to operate all the machines, program them, as well as manage 
the company; and where they existed, work centres often resulted in the 
integration of previously separate tasks and the ability for one worker to 
operate several machines, though this generally also involved the de-skilling of 
the operator.
There was no evidence in the case studies to support the claim that a re­
integration of conception and execution was underway, as Piore and Sabel 
(1984) have suggested. In each case study, conception, product design and 
planning were undertaken in the casa madre, while virtually all production 
functions were performed externally. In most cases there were no feedback
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mechanisms in place between the production firms and the casa madre, and 
where they did exist they tended to be ad hoc or weak.
13.2 Flexibility from technology
The Piore and Sabel (1984) view suggested advanced, multi-purpose 
production machinery, and a return to craft-type production but in an advanced 
form. Indeed, new technology, especially computer-controlled production 
machinery, is frequently seen as a major source of flexibility, and in the 
extreme, as removing the relevance of economies of scale, replacing them with 
economies of scope (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989).
The case study evidence on this point is less dramatic, and varies according to 
sector, and even by production phase. In the case of the knitwear industry, 
while certain phases of the production process have been party to technological 
advancements (knitting, embroidery), other sectors have proved extremely 
resistant to automation and the application of computer technology. In the 
sewing/making up phase, for example, the machinery has remained virtually 
unchanged in the post-war period. The machinery in this industry remains 
extremely specialised, often dedicated not only to particular tasks, but also 
specialised according to the size of the piece, or the specific fabric. This was 
true of new equipment as well as the older equipment. There was frequent 
pressure exerted upon the artisan firms to purchase specialist machinery, as the 
changing fashion required certain kinds of fabrics, styles or finishing, for which 
dedicated machines were available. The purchase of such specialist machinery 
was resisted by the artisans because it was not economic; the amortisation of 
the machine would extend far beyond the actual need for the machine, given 
the short fashion "life expectancy" of a given style, and the small batch sizes 
would not warrant such a purchase.
The oleodynamics case study exhibited very advanced machinery, generally the 
latest available in NC, CNC and integrated computer-controlled work centres.
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This may be due, in part, to the relatively recent establishment of Oil Control 
compared to Carma or IMA; as a younger firm it was not burdened by an 
existing stock of older machines. As noted above, the work centres in 
particular were highly flexible, able to undertake several different processes 
sequentially with different tools and components. They also represented a 
partial re-synthesis of the labour process, re-combining previously separate 
tasks or stages of production. Alongside these machines, however, were 
dedicated machines producing in long series.
The product customisation and concomitant constant innovation occurs 
primarily in Oil Control and Edi-Systems, and stem from their direct relation 
with the market. Ongoing innovation implies the need for a flexible productive 
structure, one that can adapt to frequent changes in the product and production 
process. Flexibility is in this case primarily provided by the production 
equipment, which is CNC, the most advanced available, and can be operated by 
low-skilled workers.
In the automatic packaging machinery case, there was a high degree of 
variability, from network firms that had only traditional machinery, to other 
firms which maintained some NC and/or CNC machine tools.
In terms of technology, then, the case for an "advanced" craft sector a la Piore 
and Sabel is uneven at best. The adoption of new technologies is variable 
across firms and between sectors, and there is little evidence of a reintegration 
of conception and execution.
Economies of scale and scope
It is often suggested that “flexible” production technology or organisational 
structures eliminate the importance of economies of scale. Certainly, there was 
much evidence in the case studies of very small to medium production runs - 
including single pieces, and sometimes, small orders that were split amongst
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more than one artisan by the casa madre to reduce turnaround times.
While economies of scale have been reduced by new technology where it 
appears (e.g. vastly reduced set up times for machinery), particularly for repeat 
orders on NC or CNC machines where an existing program can be reused, 
there are still costs involved in frequent changes. New pieces require new 
control programs to be written, and the machines must be constantly re-set.
The smaller the number of pieces in an order, the more frequently this must be 
done.
The common view amongst network firm owners was that the advanced 
"flexible" machinery was generally not worth the high costs of investment, 
because the artisan firm's batch sizes were so small that the cost could not be 
justified. There were, of course, exceptions, particularly in Oil Control and 
TARP, where double shifts were run, and in Andalo, who adopted a different 
strategy of maximising overall use of the machine even though individual 
batches remained small in size.
What is innovative about the productive systems described in the case studies is 
not that they have eliminated the need to achieve economies of scale, but that 
they have adapted various ways of dealing with diseconomies of scale. In the 
IMA and Oil Control cases, we saw that the case madri were able to charge a 
premium in the marketplace, passing on costs of diseconomies of scale to final 
market buyers, and the network firms are also able to recoup these additional 
costs through charging a premium for small orders to the casa madre. Or, the 
case madri are able to force the sub-contractors to absorb the costs of 
diseconomies of scale, as we saw with Carma.
Technology may therefore be less important in contributing to production 
flexibility than other factors, such as vertical disintegration within the context 
of an industrial district. Where the new technology has contributed is to the
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diversification of the product range, by allowing certain types of designs, 
especially more complicated designs, to be realised that might not have been 
technically or economically feasible before. It has also contributed to the 
quality of the product, by improving precision and replicability of pieces.
13 3  Flexibility from organisational structures
What do the case studies suggest with respect to the role of organisational 
structures in achieving production flexibility? In the case of Carma, the 
quantity of labour needed fluctuates, both because of the bi-annual production 
seasons in the knitwear industry, but also even within a given season, in which 
the unpredictability of demand (which depends on the success in the market of 
given products) results in fluctuating demand for labour over the short term.
Within the context of an industrial district, vertically disintegrated production 
allows this problem to be overcome by providing quantitative labour flexibility. 
Labour requirements are mediated through a simple market transaction (i.e. 
commissioning piece-work from sub-contractors), not within the firm itself 
through a labour relationship that is governed by rules, unions, laws, etc.
Vertically disintegrated production within a district also allows the casa madre 
to split batches amongst many producers to save time, and/or gives the artisan 
firms the opportunity to subcontract to a second tier for the same reason. This 
can reduce the turnaround time of production.
The vertical disintegration of production, specifically in the context of a 
specialised, localised, industrial district, provides a significant degree of 
production flexibility - effectively providing qualitative and quantitative labour 
flexibility, as well as technological flexibility in the sense that the casa madre 
can choose from a wide variety of firms with differing production technologies.
IMA faced a similar problem to Carma, in the unpredictable timing of the
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demand for its “lumpy” product. Given the complexity and customisation of 
the product, it also requires a diverse range of expertise, technology and skills. 
The vertically disintegrated production structure and the extensive metal- 
mechanical district were instrumental in accommodating this variability, the 
concomitant wide fluctuations in labour requirements, and range of inputs 
required.
The Carma and IMA examples contrast with Oil Control, whose organisational 
structure is not generally a source of flexibility. Oil Control’s joint ownership 
structure, closed system, and lack of use of typical sub-contracting relations 
with other firms in the industrial district implies the surrendering of one of the 
most important elements of flexibility associated with the decentralised 
production model; that is, the avoidance of long-term commitments regarding 
labour and the ability to expand or contract productive capability simply by 
sub-contracting more or less piece work to artisans.
So while the vertically quasi-integrated production structure ensures product 
quality, it is less a source of flexibility per se. Additional flexibility is provided 
by the productive system's situation within the industrial district, however. 
When required, the district can offer qualitative and quantitative flexibility.
And more importantly, the district provides a safety net for Oil Control 
producers, by providing alternative sources of work from outside firms, in the 
event that Oil Control and Edi-Systems together cannot maintain an adequate 
volume.
Are the organisational structures of production a source of flexibility? In the 
cases of Carma and IMA, which had typical sub-contracting relationships with 
firms in the respective industrial districts, their network structures were the 
critical source of qualitative and quantitative flexibility, allowing them to 
expand and contract the capacity and range of the productive system directly in 
response to their needs at any given time.
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In the case of Oil Control, the vertically quasi-integrated productive structure 
per se did not offer a significant measure of flexibility. Flexibility in this case 
stems primarily from the production machinery (which to a certain extent is 
independent of productive organisation), and to a lesser degree from being part 
of a specialised industrial district which can be called upon for additional 
qualitative or quantitative flexibility, or as a “backup” source of demand.
13.4 The Sources of Flexibility
The evidence of the three case studies suggests that Sayer is only partly right 
when he says: "...as yet, the new kinds of production that we are seeing, 
whatever we wish to call them, have more to do with the organisation of work, 
both in terms of labour processes and industrial organisation, than the hardware 
of new technology" (Sayer, 1989: 673).
Flexible production technologies can provide some measure of flexibility, 
depending on how they are managed, and whether price premiums can be 
charged to recoup costs of diseconomies of scale36. In any event, labour 
processes contributed the least to flexibility, with the occasional exception of 
extending the hours of work in response to demand. Both the social and 
technical divisions of labour were extremely deep and constantly deepening, 
however. There was no evidence of a re-integration of conception and 
execution; if anything, these two aspects of the labour process were further 
isolated as the specialisation and complexity of the productive systems evolved.
In the case study districts, evidence suggests that flexibility is mainly a function 
of organisational structure, that is, vertical disintegration within the context of 
a district. A vertically disintegrated productive structure can provide 
qualitative and quantitative flexibility, deal with fluctuations in the amount of 
labour required over the short term, and provide a wide range of labour skills
This in turn  depends upon the relative power of the network firm vis-a-vis the casa madre, and the position of the 
casa madre'm the market.
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or technologies. But this is only true of vertical disintegration within the 
context of a localised, specialised productive agglomeration, namely, the 
industrial district. The industrial district provided both quantitative and 
qualitative flexibility, and competition between network firms in the district 
ensured a deepening specialisation and range of activities. Thus qualitative 
flexibility exists in two senses: the range of expertise and the high level of 
expertise in a given phase. Vertical disintegration alone is not enough to 
provide flexibility, as we saw in the case of Oil Control where under mutual 
ownership relations, the vertically quasi-disintegrated productive structure itself 
did not provide qualitative and quantitative flexibility. Flexibility is only 
achieved through vertical disintegration under certain types of inter-firm 
relations and within the context of a district where many lead producers share a 
body of sub-contractors and vice versa.
1.4 Conclusions
In broad outline, we can say that the case study evidence suggests productive 
systems that are consistent with the post-Fordist model, as described by 
Moulaert and Swyngedouw (1989), and others, with some qualifications drawn 
from the above discussion.
Certainly the evidence corresponds to key characteristics of post-Fordist 
production, including: market fragmentation, product differentiation and 
range, small batch production, no stocks, quasi-vertical integration or vertical 
disintegration. The relationship with technology was much more varied, and it 
was clear that there was evidence of both very advanced production technology 
as well as very antiquated technology. The weakest part of the picture relates 
to the characteristics of labour under a post-Fordist regime. There was little 
evidence of multiple tasks or elimination of job demarcations, for example, and 
instead clear evidence of a deepening of social and technical divisions of labour. 
Certainly, the case study evidence is nowhere near Piore and Sahel's (1984) 
visions of a "worker's utopia". Whether they measure up to an idealised vision
301
of post-Fordist production or not, the systems of production of described 
clearly have little in common with Fordism (economies of scale, mass 
production, homogeneous products, standardisation, vertical integration, etc.).
2. THE TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION
In the case studies, the territorial organisation of production of three different 
productive systems was described. The three cases are very different in several 
important aspects: product, industry, department, strength in the marketplace, 
etc. Despite these strong variations, they all share certain fundamental 
characteristics in their territorial organisation of production:
• vertically disaggregated productive systems, controlled by a lead firm or 
casa madre, which undertakes primarily product design, marketing and 
sales, and production administration;
• all production functions take place externally in a network of specialised 
small firms; and
• all systems are highly localised.
Given product, firm and industry differences, how can these strong similarities 
be explained? This section aims to explain the territorial organisation of 
production found in the three districts, addressing more systematically the 
rationale behind the vertically disintegrated, localised organisational structures, 
and spatial clustering. In broad outline, the line of reasoning suggests that 
there are certain necessary and characteristic elements associated with post- 
Fordist accumulation which interact with contingencies to produce the specific 
territorial organisation of production that we have seen in the case studies.
This is in contrast to other schools of thought which hold that, at least under 
certain conditions, vertical disintegration and spatial clustering are necessary.
Market conditions are characterised first and foremost by intense competition, 
resulting from globalization, expansion into new markets, competition from 
newly industrialising countries, free trade agreements, the free movement of
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financial capital, deregulation etc. Globalization has led to a widening and 
deepening of the division of labour at the global, national and regional level, 
and industrial “respecialization”- essentially an increasingly highly articulated 
and specialised division of labour (Storper and Walker, 1989). It is this 
respecialization that has created the potential for industrial districts of the kind 
described in the case studies, specialised not only by industry but by market 
segment.
Demand conditions have been affected by the saturation of key markets and 
fragmentation. In particular, three demand qualities emerge again and again in 
the context of post-Fordist production, not just in the Third Italy but 
throughout the advanced industrial nations: these are quality, timeliness, and 
customisation (Gertler, 1994). It might also be said, however, that these 
demand conditions may themselves have come about as a result of the 
development of productive forces; in particular, that flexible, computer- 
controlled production equipment is now seen to permit these characteristics, 
hence they come to be “demanded”.
These demand and market conditions have required significant transformations 
in the organisation of production and the labour process, elements of which 
are: organisational and ownership structures, labour, technology, management 
processes, and the social, technical and territorial divisions of labour. While 
these are all necessary generic elements in the accumulation process, the 
specific form they take (e.g. the specific technology, or labour process) is not 
solely determined by the regime. Different elements can come together in 
different ways to respond to market and demand conditions, depending in part 
on interaction with contingencies. For example, productive organisations can 
rely to greater or lesser degrees on technology, labour, or organisational 
structures to address the market context. In short, specific organisational 
forms and labour processes are not the result of necessary forces only, but of 
the interaction between necessary and contingent factors.
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Contingent forces come into play with respect to the market, for example, 
relating to the basis for the individual firm's insertion into the market and 
specific firm strategies. Carma had a weak market position in an industry 
characterised by low entry barriers and high levels of international competition. 
Carma used the network system in a way so as to devolve costs of 
diseconomies of scale to network firms, contain its own costs and thereby 
perpetuate its ability to insert itself successfully in the market. This was a 
strategic use of local space, and was a determinant in the territorial 
organisation of Carma’s network.
Contingent, industry-specific factors also come into play, for example the 
seasonality of the knitwear industry, or industries comprised of lumpy 
investment goods that resist automation and mass production, such as in the 
automatic packaging machinery sector. These kinds of industry-specific factors 
can add another layer of "exigencies" to those necessary ones stemming from 
post-Fordism.
Vertical disintegration has many advantages: it is a way of dealing with certain 
industry contingencies (seasonality, product lumpiness, unpredictability of 
demand over time); it allows firms to specialise, responding to the quality 
imperative; and it is a way of devolving risk (and potential associated costs). 
However, other organisational options are available, depending in part on the 
industry and technology available, or other factors, such as local culture.
These alternatives might include the substitution of labour with flexible 
production equipment, the use of part- time or contract employees, etc. In 
short, there is nothing necessary about vertical disintegration. However, it 
works very well, especially in certain industries, and in certain places. In other 
words, its effectiveness relates directly to industry, firm and place-specific 
factors.
On its own, however, vertical disintegration is insufficient to address the
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market requirements outlined above. This only occurs when vertical 
disintegration takes place within the context of an industrial district. That is, 
without an industrial district, vertical disintegration would not have responded 
to the range of market exigencies. The district itself is the primary source of 
qualitative and quantitative flexibility, and allows firms to respond to demands 
of quality, time-based competition, customisation, or irregular production 
needs.
Where production is vertically disintegrated, competition then plays a decisive 
role. It acts to promote constant product differentiation and propel the social 
division of labour, increasing specialisation, encouraging the adoption of new 
technologies, moderating prices of intermediate products, and so on. It is clear 
that the effects of competition are not just experienced in the realm of the 
global or national market for the final product, which tends to be at the national 
or international scale, but also at the local scale. Local competition occurs 
within a district both among case madri, and between sub-contractors in 
intermediate product markets created as a result of a vertical disintegration.
At the local level, there are a number of important contingencies which came 
into play. The most important of these was probably the fact that the industrial 
districts pre-dated the era of change that began in the 1970s. An extensive, 
specialised metal-mechanical industrial district existed in and around Bologna 
even in the 1920s, and the Carpi district can be dated back to the 1500s.
Another set of local contingencies relates to patterns of local uneven 
development. As noted in Chapter Three, significant local variations exist 
within Emilia-Romagna. It is essentially comprised of several distinct regions 
with different characteristics and degrees of economic development and 
accessibility (the mountains, the pedemontana, the plain, and the neighbouring 
regions of Veneto and Mantua). The uneven territorial distribution of work 
force characteristics (skills, unionisation, wage rates, unemployment levels,
305
malleability, female labour, etc.) is particularly important.
The pre-existing territorial distribution of productive capacity (i.e. labour force 
and firms) is also important. Carma was able to construct a spatially separated 
system because appropriate labour capability was scattered across the regional 
territory. If all sub-contractors and labour were aggregated in one urban 
centre this would not have been possible.
Uneven development thus also relates to the urban system. For example, a 
polycentric urban system such as that which exists in Emilia-Romagna acts to 
effectively separate the working class into many small communities, towns and 
cities. Disaggregated production systems, particularly those distributed over a 
polycentric urban system rather than aggregated in a single urban centre, can 
impede the consolidation of a working class and efforts toward unionisation.37 
The presence of many small to medium-sized cities, where the urban land 
market permitted central city clustering, was also found to be conducive to 
industrial districts.
And while obviously not the result of a deliberate strategy because it would 
imply coordination amongst all producers, the distribution of industrial 
activities over a polycentric urban structure avoids or at least delays the onset 
of agglomeration and urbanisation diseconomies. Indeed, many of the Italian 
academics' explanations for the success of the Emilian system of production 
have cited as a factor the absence of geographical concentration of production 
in one or even a few urban locales (Fua, 1985; Arcangeli et.al., 1980).
It is clear that particular characteristics of local territory have shaped the 
organisation of production and the adoption of a vertically disintegrated 
structure. A disaggregated productive structure is only effective in the context
37 Drucker (1994), for example, has described how the original organisation of blue collar workers came about 
because for the first time a  working class was spatially clustered within large workplaces, located w ithin single urban areas 
and residing in homogeneous neighbourhoods.
306
of an industrial district. If no such district existed locally, such an organisational 
structure could not be pursued. In other words, local territory is as integral a 
factor determining productive structures as labour, technology, ownership, etc. 
This suggests a different approach than that proposed by the transactions costs 
school, in which the evolution of a particular productive structure is seen more 
as a sequence: first a firm decides to externalize certain functions, then 
producer firms gravitate toward the lead firm in order to minimize transaction 
costs.
Given the integral nature of the production and territorial decision, it is not 
surprising that agglomeration occurs, as the clustered patterns of many of 
these districts were already established. Moreover, as the industrial district is 
the primary source of competitiveness, spatial clustering can be seen as a direct 
response to the need on the part of both lead firms and sub-contractors for 
access to the district. It is the primary source of quality, timeliness, 
customisation, qualitative and quantitative flexibility.
Also, in the in cases examined, the process of production includes not only 
firms, but extends to local institutions, associations, etc. These elements can be 
thought of as integral to the production process. Industrial production is not 
the undertaking of private enterprise, but could be seen in this case more as 
civic process - the city as factory. As has been noted many times, there is a 
particularly rich and industry-specific infrastructure in direct support of 
industry, including technical schools, industry and firm associations, unions, 
chambers of commerce, and a particularly strong local government (Capecchi, 
1990; Nanetti, 1988; Putnam, 1993).
Is spatial clustering a necessary outcome, as the transactions costs approach 
suggests or can it be solely attributed to local contingencies? As with vertical 
disintegration, we have seen that there are many good reasons why spatial 
clustering occurs: it reduces risk and inventory, promotes timeliness, provides
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access to other firms in the district and the civic capital that supports 
production. However, there is evidence that flexible, fast production can occur 
without such clustering38.
The key factor which causes spatial clustering is the constant product 
innovation that is underway within the districts, and the resulting inability to 
standardize or routinize production and hence transactions. This is why just-in- 
time suppliers to the auto industry - to take one example - need not cluster 
spatially even though their products also increasingly emphasize diversity, 
timeliness and quality. Though broader than in the past, the range of 
intermediate products in the car industry (say the varieties of car seat) is 
nonetheless restricted, finite, rigid, essentially unchanged over a period of 
years, and consistent specifications must be met. Everyone involved 
understands very clearly what the product inputs are, and there is no need for 
discussion - a simple faxed order form to a supplier will suffice. Just-in-time 
suppliers need not deliver quickly so much as reliably. So long as they can 
guarantee predictable, on-time delivery, production can take place in any 
location - close or distant. A major factor is overall high and predictable 
product volumes. The volumes of car seats produced are not likely to vary, as 
auto production on the assembly line is extremely regular.
Contrast this with the situation in the case studies described above. The 
products are constantly being changed or customised (APM and 
oleodynamics), redesigned (knitwear), or new products being developed to 
respond to particular problems (oleodynamics). The range of potential 
intermediate and final products is infinite and constantly changing, and batch 
sizes are small. As a result of constant change to the product, volumes of any 
single item are relatively low - about 100 automatic packaging machines might 
be produced by IMA in a year, compared to thousands of a given type of
At Ford's Oakville, Ontario minivan plant for example, all inputs are sourced just-in-time, from all over the world.
Their local seat supplier in tu rn  sources all of their own inputs just-in-time, from as far away as Mexico. A highly evolved 
production adm inistration system is able to respond to demands for timeliness, flexibility and quality w ithout geographical clustering.
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automobile. In such a situation it is impossible to standardize intermediate 
products and routinize transactions. Where there is ongoing product 
innovation and inability to standardize the product, spatial clustering allows 
these obstacles to be overcome.
In the absence of an ability to standardize products and routinize transactions, 
and in the face of competitive pressure and market demand for quality, 
timeliness and customisation, the role of a shared local culture, norms of 
behaviour, and mutual trust become critical elements in the ability of the district 
to function smoothly and competitively. In the three case studies, virtually all 
inter-firm transactions were extremely informal in nature, did not involve 
written contracts, and were able to be dealt with very efficiently and securely, 
allowing production to proceed quickly.
In general, inter-firm relations did not involve a lot of consultation and input 
from the network firms into product design or the production process. The 
transactions between firms tended to be primarily to contract specified (though 
unstandardized) piece work rather than to discuss its content. Quick, secure 
business transactions allow the effective re-integration of a vertically 
disintegrated productive structure, and they are greatly facilitated by shared 
culture, norms, and mutual trust. In effect, cultural standardization replaces the 
corporate and product standardization that takes place in other sectors, where 
networks may straddle different national or international cultures (e.g. the auto 
industry). This gives credence to Becattini’s (1990) notion of industrial 
districts as social organisms, in which geographical boundedness is an 
expression of the limits of shared culture and social norms. However, 
Becattini’s explanation on its own is insufficient; the role of local culture must 
be placed within the context of a broader dynamic of capital accumulation.
In brief, there is a fundamental difference between industries or segments which 
are characterised by ongoing and frequent product innovation, irregular and 
unpredictable demand, infinite product range, and short production runs, and
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those which are characterised by the ability to standardize, bounded flexibility, 
and high and predictable volumes. All of the case study districts shared the 
characteristic of ongoing product innovation, and the associated inability to 
routinize. This, and the shared culture, norms and trust which permit efficient, 
fast transactions, are key factors which account for spatial clustering.
Storper (1993, 1992) began to address this distinction with the concept of 
“technology district”, which was characterised by evolution, dynamism, 
unstandardized knowledge, and relatively open developmental paths.
According to Storper, what binds firms together in technology districts, even in 
the absence of direct inter-firm linkages, is technological learning and an 
infrastructure of rules and institutions - the untraded interdependencies. His 
concept, however, seems to apply more to cases of young, emerging 
industries, especially computer and other hi-tech industry districts. It does not 
accurately describe the Emilian examples, where there is constant innovation 
but in relatively mature industries, the technological content can be quite low, 
and development paths are not particularly open. Rather, innovation is simply 
the day-to-day business. As constant innovation is the singlemost important 
characteristic of the case study districts, they could be more accurately be 
described as “innovation districts”.
Additional Conclusions
Several further conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the specific 
territorial organisations of production are the result of the interaction of 
necessary forces relating to post-Fordism with contingent factors relating to 
industry characteristics, firm characteristics, and local territory. Despite the 
fact that the case study districts appeared in different sectors, with different 
market positions, etc., the similarities in their productive organisation can be 
attributed to the fact that they shared the characteristics of the “innovation 
district” - constant innovation and re-invention of the product, short production 
runs, infinite product types, etc., that render standardisation and routinization 
of transactions impossible.
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Second, local territorial conditions and space play an important role in 
determining the organisational structures of production. Local territory is as 
integral a determinant of productive structure and labour process as 
technology, skills, or other factors. In the case studies, local characteristics 
shaped the dominant, vertically disintegrated productive structure.
Third, the territorial organisation of production is not the result of a uni­
dimensional tendency to geographical clustering. Rather, it is the result of a 
more complex balancing of the need for proximity with a tendency toward 
dispersion. This latter tendency can result from the need for production 
systems to take advantage of conditions of local uneven development, or from 
the use of spatial separation as a mode of control of elements of the productive 
system.
In Carma's case, the successful insertion of the product in the market relied 
upon this spatial separation of sub-contractors, as an instrument of cost 
control. The spatially disaggregated production system, which is not confined 
to a single urban centre but extends over many towns and villages, impedes the 
organisation of the network firms. In Oil Control's case, the specific territorial 
organisation of production is a result not just of a tendency to clustering, but 
the result of a local spatial balancing between the need for clustering on one 
hand and the tendency toward dispersion on the other, especially the search for 
localised pools of labour with specific characteristics.
In short, the tendency toward spatial separation and dispersion has been 
overlooked, particularly in the context of industrial districts, where the 
emphasis has been on geographical clustering. Centrifugal tendencies are 
important in the functioning of the productive organisation and in its underlying 
rationale, though they are ultimately constrained to the local level by opposing 
forces of clustering.
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Fourth, the use of local territory in innovation districts relates especially to a 
particular firm’s market, market position, and strategy. Space was used by 
Carma as a regulating mechanism which ultimately helped control cost, and the 
polycentric nature of the urban system played a role in this regard. On the other 
hand IMA, which was able to charge a premium in the market because of its 
strong position, did not appear to use space either as a network control 
mechanism nor to exploit local uneven development.
Finally, in none of these cases was transactions costs a major determinant of 
the territorial organisation of production. In all cases except Carma, the firms 
did not identify competition in their sector to be based on price. Other factors, 
especially product quality, customisation, and timeliness were always more 
important. It is difficult to defend transactions costs as the major determinant 
of the territorial organisation of production, and geographical clustering in 
particular, when price is not a major competitive factor. Certainly transactions 
costs cannot be seen as a necessary factor leading from extemalisation of 
certain production functions to spatial agglomeration, as Scott seems to 
suggest it is, nor a sole factor explaining localisation.
3. INNOVATION DISTRICTS AND POST-FORDISM
In this section, certain themes that emerged from the literature relating to post- 
Fordism are rejoined, and re-evaluated in light of the case study evidence. It is 
argued that the districts described hereto are post-Fordist in nature, and that a 
transition to post-Fordism is clearly underway.
The Centrality of Flexibility
The case studies suggest that an emphasis on flexibility only as the defining 
feature of post-Fordism is too simplistic. There is a range of new market 
demands that are related to post-Fordism, only some of which can be addressed 
through flexibility. The new market realities suggested other exigencies, and
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approaches to competitiveness that relied on factors other than flexibility. 
Certainly high product quality and time-based competition are not necessarily 
linked to flexibility. Price was a decisive factor only in the case of Carma; the 
other firms were able to charge premiums in the marketplace because of their 
high quality product and customisation. These market demands must be 
addressed through means other than the attainment of flexibility, such as 
through higher skill levels, better technology, or increasing social and/or 
technical divisions of labour. To take Oil Control as an example, the firm’s 
particular organisational structure was established not because of a need for 
flexibility, but because of the overriding requirement for high product quality.
In short, it is misleading to reduce post-Fordism to flexibility. As has been 
detailed above, other factors come into play and are equally important 
determinants of territorial productive structures.
Pre-Fordist and Fordist industrial agglomerations
Certain critiques of post-Fordism have charged that some systems of 
production that have been dubbed "post-Fordist" cannot truly be said to be so, 
because they existed before or during Fordism; or they have always existed 
outside the Fordist mainstream and cannot now therefore be called post- 
Fordist. The Fordist/post-Fordist distinctions are not so clear cut, however. 
IMA, which existed throughout the Fordist period, produced a standardised 
product according to the logic of maximising economies of scale until the 
1980s, even though volumes were still relatively low compared to many mass 
production industries. Carma's production system was previously organised 
according to Fordist principles, and was subsequently re-organised. And while 
Oil Control developed its productive system only in the 1970s, and it was from 
the outset a decentralised one, long series, standardised oleodynamic products 
are produced within the same network firms alongside highly customised ones.
Does the fact that allegedly similar productive forms existed before and during
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Fordism mean that all industrial districts must be rejected as evidence of a 
potential new regime of accumulation? Such an approach is somewhat rash. 
First, the industrial districts that exist today are not the same as earlier 
incarnations, given computer-controlled production technologies, or market 
conditions, for example. Many significant transformations were observed in 
the case study districts, particularly since the 1970s. Second, the economic 
context in which modern-day industrial districts exist is completely unlike that 
which existed at the time of its predecessors. Current industrial districts are 
inserted into a qualitatively different logic of advanced capitalism, which is 
characterized by the respecialization of production upon which the new type of 
territorial organisation is premised.
In short, the fact that forms similar to industrial districts existed during or 
before Fordism should not blind us to the fact that there is a particular logic at 
work in the dynamic of advanced capitalism that underpins their current 
resurgence.
Species and Genus
The “innovation district” has been identified herein as a species of industrial 
agglomeration which exhibits certain characteristics, in particular, constant 
product innovation and a concomitant inability to routinize or standardize 
production. The three case studies examined each fell into this classification, 
and could all be considered examples of fundamentally the same entity. Other 
examples of the same species occur elsewhere, and might for example, include 
metropolitan garment districts such as those in New York or London.
The basis for defining the district type relates to unique, functional 
characteristics of the district, its particular territorial/organisational dynamic 
and its position within the broader global division of labour. This is also the 
approach taken by Storper (1993,1992), in his proposition for a “technology
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district” type, which operates according to a different dynamic. These 
approaches lead to a more meaningful typology than the industry-based 
typology proposed by Scott (1988b), which consisted of the three categories of 
advanced craft production; hi-tech, and office-based districts.
Necessary vs contingent origins
Critics of the new orthodoxy have argued that industrial districts are the result 
of contingent factors only, such as place-specific factors, and cannot therefore 
be cited as evidence of a new phase of post-Fordist accumulation (Amin and 
Robins, 1990a, 1990b). As argued above, the territorial organisation of 
production that exists in Emilia-Romagna, as depicted in the case studies, is the 
result of the interaction of necessary forces associated with globalisation of 
competition and markets, demand, the labour process, and accumulation with 
contingent factors associated with specific industries, firm strategies, or local 
conditions.
Nevertheless, the so-called rise of the industrial district must be situated in the 
broader (necessary) context of expanding markets, the deepening global 
division of labour, and the respecialization that have created the potential for 
the existence of highly specialized production complexes like (but not limited 
to) industrial districts. To the extent that globalizing forces and competition 
continue, and the pace of change continues to quicken, so too will the 
opportunities for increasingly specialised production complexes expand.
The particular, realised territorial organisation of that complex - be it localised 
or not - is the result of a more interactive process of necessary and contingent 
factors. It is overly rigid to say that a particular production complex can only 
be attributed to either necessary or contingent factors; they cannot be isolated 
one from the other. All production must take place in territory; production 
always involves place-specific factors whether it is Fordist or post-Fordist.
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Indeed, it was suggested above that global forces and local factors are not 
necessarily in opposition, and the conclusions from the case studies further 
suggest that in fact globalising forces may render local factors more important. 
When production is vertically disaggregated and externalised, there is greater 
scope for local factors to come into play and firms can be more closely tied 
with their local context. Many of the elements of competitive advantage that 
comprise Porter’s (1991) “diamond”, for example, are indeed local in nature. 
Certainly in the case of the rise of the Third Italy districts studied herein, the 
existence of local demand, local related industries, local competition, and 
other factor inputs such as labour and embedded skills contributed to the 
emergence of the industrial districts.
This suggests, however, that it is appropriate to be less deterministic about 
specific organisational forms associated with post-Fordism, however, given the 
role of industry, firm and local contingencies. These factors will interact with 
necessary factors to produce different production organisation outcomes in 
different places. In other words, the kind of approach espoused by Scott, 
which explains industrial districts on the basis of vertical disintegration and 
transactions costs necessitating spatial clustering, is less powerful than that put 
forward by the Regulation School, for example, which entertains much more 
open-ended outcomes in terms of the configurations of territorial production 
complexes.
There is, however, little doubt that the advanced industrial nations are entering 
a qualitatively different era that shares little with Fordism, and parallels the 
scale of transformation that took place with the introduction of technological 
innovations that brought about the evolution from rural manufacture to 
machinofacture in the late 18th century. Transformative changes are under 
way which have major implications for cities and regions, which is the subject 
of the following section.
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4. POST-FORDIST CITIES AND REGIONS
As we saw in Chapter Two, although placing spatial elements at the centre in 
proclaiming the resurgence of the region and industrial districts, the post- 
Fordist literature has paid scant attention to the actual spatial processes 
unfolding, the role of territory, or the implications of post-Fordism for cities 
and regions. On the rare occasions when the regional or urban implications of 
post-Fordism are addressed, they frequently result in contradictory allegations, 
for example: industrial districts could not exist in a metropolis (Becattini,
1990) - industrial districts are often found in metropolises (Scott, 1988a).
With very few exceptions (Lebomge and Lipietz, Scott, etc.), a post-Fordist 
regime of accumulation has not been related in any systematic way to spatial 
outcomes. What follows is an initial attempt to address this lacunae, by 
drawing on the case studies to point to the most important of the implications 
of post-Fordism for regions and cities. This requires some abstraction from 
complexity for a moment, in order to isolate the theoretical implications of 
post-Fordist production of the type described in the case studies. It is by no 
means to suggest that other forces will not also act upon the evolution of 
regions and cities, such as neo-Fordist manufacturing, office-based industries, 
etc.
Regions, cities and industrial districts
It has been claimed that post-Fordism implies a renewed emphasis on the 
regional scale and the re-emergence of regions (Sabel, 1988, 1989). This begs 
the issue, which is highly confused in the literature, of the relationship of 
industrial districts to regions. In the literature, industrial districts and regions 
are taken to mean the same thing, which seems to be the primary basis upon 
which claims of the re-emergence of regions are laid. Are regions indeed 
synonymous with industrial districts? Or is a region a place where a collection 
of industrial districts emerges?
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The equating of industrial districts with regions is inaccurate. While there are 
some instances where several industrial districts seem to emerge within a given 
region (e.g. the Third Italy, Baden-Wurttemburg. etc.), there are also many 
instances in which single industrial districts emerge in relative isolation (e.g. the 
Valenza Po jewelry district, the ski boot district in Montebelluna etc.). 
Generally, there is little in the way of direct linkages amongst industrial districts 
located within the same region. The Carpi knitwear district and the Sassuolo 
ceramics district, for example, are highly self-contained. There are some 
instances, however, in which districts share a common pool of sub-contracting 
firms that are related to a number of different industries. This was the case 
with the Bologna metal-mechanical district, which provided inputs into a range 
of related industries, including automatic packaging machinery, motorcycles, 
production equipment, transportation, agricultural equipment or 
instrumentation. In many cases though, simply because of the specialised 
nature of the given sector or industry, this ability for sub-producers to supply a 
range of client industries is not possible (eg knitwear), and there is little 
overlap.
Industrial districts are, however, almost without exception, clearly associated 
with an urban centre: the Carpi knitwear district, the Modena oleodynamics 
district, the Bologna automatic packaging district, the Sassuolo ceramics 
district, and so on. The urban centre of a district is demarcated by the close 
clustering of the case madri, as we saw in the case studies. Some larger 
districts can extend across urban centres, such as the Bologna automatic 
packaging district. But in every case, the territorial division of labour by 
industry sub-sector is extremely pronounced at the city or sub-regional scale.
In other words, the respecialization associated with increased global 
competition propels a division of labour that extends beyond the global, 
national or regional to the intra-regional and city level. In the Fordist and new 
international division of labour phases, the spatial division of labour tended to
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stop at the regional level. In the post-Fordist era, the division of labour 
proceeds beyond this level to the local scale. The basic territorial unit is not 
the Region in the sense that the Third Italy, the Italian industrial triangle, the 
Mezzogiomo, the Northeastern U.S., or Atlantic Canada are Regions, created 
by Fordist and pre-Fordist industrial capitalism, but smaller scale regions 
associated with a particular industry or more usually, market segment.
Relations between regions
Under the new international division of labour model, multi-national enterprises 
are disaggregated into various separate establishments according to function - 
headquarters, administration or R&D - can be established separately while 
various production functions can be broken apart by product line or sub­
component. Different functions are located in different areas of the globe, in 
order to take advantage of international variations in conditions, especially 
cheap labour or resources. Regions thus become defined on the basis of 
particular functions, and a core-periphery relationship develops. In the core are 
located the control functions, and those functions which require highly skilled 
labour. Headquarters functions tend to be located in the major world cities. 
R&D functions are also located in the advanced capitalist countries, but can 
often be found outside the major metropolises but in the core regions, in their 
own science parks and high-tech agglomerations. Routine production takes 
place in less developed, low wage and low cost economies wherever these may 
be found - either on the European or global periphery. The core region exerts 
control over and exploits the peripheral regions under this scenario, extending 
and deepening uneven development at a global scale.
The industrial district productive structure implies a global spatial division of 
labour that is entirely opposed to and distinct from that associated with the new 
international division of labour. Three unique characteristics of the post- 
Fordist industrial districts examined in detail in the case studies are critical:
• The industrial districts were defined on the basis of an industry or sub-
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industry.
• The industrial districts represent production systems that are virtually 
entirely integrated and self-contained. All functions necessary to the 
production of a particular good were performed within the district, 
including not just those directly associated with production, but also 
services and support. Despite participation in international product 
markets, ownership was maintained at the local level. Where there were 
interlocking corporate ownerships, these almost never extended beyond the 
district, and certainly not to foreign capitals. The only extra-district 
linkages were for raw material inputs and production machinery, and of 
course linkages with the final market.
• The industrial districts were clearly geographically delimited and contained 
at a local level.
This suggests an entirely different basis for the spatial division of labour. The 
division of labour between districts occurs along lines defined by industries and 
sectors (i.e. vertically) not by functional strata within a given industry or 
industries (or horizontally). Post-Fordist regions become defined on the basis 
of a social division of labour based on industry sectors, not on the basis of 
particular functions within industry as under the new international division of 
labour model. All functions related to production in that industry are 
performed and contained locally: R&D, administration, all production 
functions, marketing, services, etc. Linked to the international division of 
labour and respecialization, we are also witnessing a new local division of 
labour.
The pattern of uneven development between local areas becomes one of 
variations not between various horizontal strata in the occupational structure 
(as under the new international division of labour model), but a pattern of 
variation between the entire occupational structures and industry sectors. 
Uneven development at the regional scale is defined by the variation between
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the occupational and other characteristics of a particular industry or industries; 
e.g. the differences between a region dominated by the clothing industry versus 
a region dominated by the computer industry. This also suggests that local 
regions become more diverse occupationally, and socially, with a full range of 
social strata localized.
This post-Fordist spatial division of labour does not imply a global core- 
periphery relationship. Instead, each localised production complex has a direct 
relationship with the global market. This relationship is not mediated or 
controlled by external command centres in core regions or metropolises; it is 
mediated only by (ever-diminishing) national policies. A core/periphery 
control/dependence relationship between regions is replaced by an 
international, competitive relationship.
Post-Fordist core, periphery or in-between?
Some have noted that post-Fordist development occurs systematically outside 
the areas of Fordist accumulation (Moulaert and Swyngedouw, 1989; Scott, 
1988; Arcangeli, et. al., 1980). It is certainly true in the case of the Third Italy 
that flexible accumulation has occurred outside the major locus of Fordist 
accumulation (in Italy's case, the north-western industrial triangle).
We can only speculate on the reasons for this; it could be attributed to a 
number of factors, many of which have been referred to in the literature, in 
particular agglomeration and urban diseconomies (e.g. in the organisation of 
labour, high cost of labour, high land costs, etc.). However, the existence of 
production complexes in some very high land cost, metropolitan locations, 
such as the Midtown Manhattan garment district, challenges this view. Based 
on the evidence of the case studies, it can be proposed that a key factor relates 
to the importance of a high degree of integration of producers with the 
marketplace under post-Fordism. Boyer (quoted in Morgan, 1992), for 
example, notes that while the Fordist practice was to have more mediated, less
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direct links with consumers, post-Fordism is accompanied by close producer- 
user interaction in response to accelerating technological change, shorter 
product life cycles and less predictable, more segmented markets. This he 
claims, is characteristic of the Japanese, German and Swedish economies. It 
was certainly characteristic of each of the case studies.
In this respect it is easy to see that the Third Italy is ideally situated vis-a-vis its 
European market, while also avoiding the diseconomies associated with the 
major urban/industrial agglomerations of the northwest; it is as close as one 
can get (within Italy) to the centre of Europe. The importance of such a 
location is further reinforced by the centrality of time-based competition and 
the requirement of being able to deliver the final goods to market faster than 
competitors. In other words, post-Fordist production is likely to take place 
not only outside areas of Fordist accumulation, but also near to markets for 
manufactured goods and not in the distant periphery; a return of production to 
the core or regions highly accessible to core markets.
This focuses new attention on local uneven development in and near the core 
regions. Under the new international division of labour, conditions of local 
uneven development were overlooked in favour of much larger differences 
associated with uneven development at the global scale. But under post- 
Fordism, the need for close market integration implies a return of production 
activities to the "core" or at least areas highly accessible to the core, and a new 
emphasis then on conditions of local uneven development that can be exploited. 
Capital then turns its attention to the potential associated with exploiting 
uneven development in its own back yard. Exploiting conditions of local 
uneven development is an important factor in explaining local patterns of post- 
Fordist territorial organisation of production.
The Urban Hierarchy
A further implication of the post-Fordist division of labour relates to traditional
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concepts of urban hierarchy. Urban hierarchy often implies relationships of 
control, of larger, more central cities or places over smaller urban centres. This 
is certainly an implication of central place theory, and of the new international 
division of labour model, under which economic control becomes centralised in 
a few "world cities", with London, New York, and Tokyo being the most 
frequently cited. The metropolitan command centres exert control over the 
peripheral, backward regions through their headquarters and other knowledge- 
intensive functions.
As we have already seen, the post-Fordist division of labour contains the 
command and control functions at the same locus as production, and places 
regions in a competitive relationship with one another, rather than in a 
relationship of dominance and dependence. The core-periphery relationship is 
replaced with a competitive relationship between local production complexes, 
in which cities compete with one another in the global marketplace. Control 
functions are not necessarily contained in major international or national urban 
centres, but are dispersed throughout the productive regions. At the global or 
national scale, there is no longer a hierarchical relationship of control of larger, 
central cities over smaller or more peripheral ones. Urban centres of any size 
can find their international market position independently of other centres, as 
we saw in the cases of Bologna (population 455,000), Modena (population 
180,000) and Carpi (population 60,000).
The Urban System
Given that post-Fordist industrial districts and their urban centres are directly 
integrated into the international marketplace, irrespective of their size, the 
evidence of the case studies presented herein suggests an equalisation amongst 
urban places, allowing small places to compete on equal footing with large 
places in a global economy. Flexible production complexes are not associated 
directly with cities of a certain size, as was the case in pre-Fordist and Fordist 
industrial phases, where large production facilities were associated with the
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creation of the metropolis and the “great cities” (Weber, 1899).
Indeed, industrial districts can be found in towns of a few thousand inhabitants, 
or metropolises of ten million. As suggested earlier, in each case, they operate 
according to the logic of post-Fordism, as well as the contingencies of 
particular industries, firms and places. Scott (1988), for example, has 
suggested that the presence of industrial districts in metropolises such as New 
York City or London has much to do with the availability of a particular type 
of labour typically found in the large cities; cheap, immigrant, often female 
labour. Certainly, there is little evidence to support claims such as Becattini's 
(1990) that industrial districts could never function in a large metropolis 
because of a lack of shared values or beliefs; though these may exist within 
communities within the metropolis rather than across the metropolis.
However, there are more specific relationships between production scale and 
city size. In Chapter One, I described how in the latter 1800s, increasing 
market sizes for standardized products, achieved in part through the 
introduction of the railroad, allowed production scales to be increased and 
efficiencies to be achieved, causing industrial production to be primarily a 
large-city phenomenon (Pred, 1977). The scale of production exceeded the 
dimensions of small towns, auguring their “doom” (Weber, 1899).
In general, increasing urbanisation and large city growth were observed right 
up until about 1970 in the advanced industrial economies. There are two 
changes in particular associated with the post-Fordist era that suggest a 
potential reversal of this trend. First, as noted above, the globalization of 
trade, competition and the economy in general has brought about increasing 
global, national and regional divisions of labour, and the respecialization of 
production (Storper and Walker, 1989). This more highly articulated division 
of labour has opened up opportunities for specialised production, which occurs 
at a scale compatible with smaller and medium-sized urban centres. Indeed,
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this explains to a great degree the existence of the three industrial districts 
profiled in this thesis.
Second, changes in the forces of production have also brought about 
reductions in minimum efficient scales of production. This is primarily as a 
result of the flexibility achieved through the introduction of computers into the 
production process, which has dramatically reduced the cost associated with 
downtime, and increased the potential for product variations (Kaplinsky, 1984). 
Theoretically, the reduction of minimum efficient scale has the potential to 
reduce the size of operation, and permit smaller urban centres to take on a new 
role in production.
Indeed, this seems to be true both for innovation industries such as those of the 
Third Italy and routinized industries, though the underlying rationale for this 
outcome is extremely different in each case. In the Third Italy cases, product 
volumes, minimum scales, batch sizes, and routinization are all very low, while 
the product range is infinite. Products aimed at very specific market segments 
are compatible with small towns and cities, as the case studies clearly indicate, 
where the constant irregularity leads to geographical clustering of related firms. 
The urban land market in towns and smaller cities in particular also supported 
clustering in the central areas, whereas they would be forced to peripheral 
locations in larger cities.
This is in contrast with more routinized industries, such as the automobile 
sector, in which there is some product variation, but product options are 
standardised and limited. Minimum efficient scales remain very high, as do 
production volumes. Outsourcing is used extensively, which creates a larger 
number of smaller firms. But geographical clustering with related firms is not 
necessary because transactions are routinized, hence networks can extend over 
regions, nations, continents or the world. The more limited range of functions 
performed internally means that the final assembly plant is smaller, but volumes 
remain high.
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So even large volume, routinized production becomes possible in smaller urban 
centres, where a single assembly or component plant may be located in relative 
spatial isolation from its suppliers. There is evidence that this has been the 
pattern in new auto plant investment. Recent investments by Japanese 
automobile companies in Ontario, for example, have favoured smaller urban 
centres, like Alliston or Cambridge.
Of course, the internal dynamic in these two cases is extremely different. In 
innovation districts such as the Third Italy, there are strong local inter-firm 
linkages, connections with the surrounding infrastructure, and the potential for 
local development through small-scale business start-ups. In the case of the 
routinized operation, the individual production establishment sits in relative 
isolation from its local context.
Within the non-routinized industries described in the case studies, there appear 
to be further relationships between certain industry or product characteristics 
and city size, in particular in terms of product value and complexity. The 
lower cost, more simple products tend to be manufactured in the smaller urban 
centres, while more costly and complex products are made in larger cities. In 
the three case studies presented, there is a clear continuum: the most simple 
and least expensive product (knitwear) was manufactured in the smallest city; a 
more expensive, technologically sophisticated product (oleodynamic 
components) was manufactured in the medium-sized city; and the most 
expensive, complex product (automatic packaging machinery) was fabricated in 
the largest city. The more complex the product and production process, the 
greater the number of firms involved and extent of the network, and the larger 
the urban centre. It is difficult to imagine that Carpi could accommodate the 
automatic packaging machinery industry, for example.
One of the potential outcomes of this trend is the upsetting of the rank-size 
stability rule, as smaller urban centres compete on equal footing (in some
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industries) with larger urban centres. Indeed, this may be a factor behind the 
“clean break” and reversal of the pattern of ongoing urbanisation that is said to 
have occurred around 1970 (Hall and Hay, 1980). There is a certain amount of 
evidence that this reversal is underway, particularly the growth of medium and 
smaller urban centres, as outlined in Chapter One.
Re-agglomeration in urban centres
If the crisis of Fordism was associated with the de-industrialisation of the cores 
of major urban centres (Fothergill et.al., 1988), does post-Fordism suggest the 
re-capitalisation of these areas? The possibility of this outcome has been 
proposed, and the motion picture industry in the Los Angeles area cited as an 
example of urban re-agglomeration resulting from a number of changes in that 
industry (Christopherson and Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988a).
More specifically, it has been suggested that there is a rough direct correlation 
between plant characteristics such as size and routinization and distance from 
the core of the city. This implies that organisational or technological changes 
up or down the scale of plant size and routinization will be associated with 
decentralization and recentralization respectively, raising the possibility that the 
reorganisation of an industry or the introduction of new technologies could 
bring about reagglomeration in urban centres (Scott, 1988a). This would be a 
reversal of trends toward the dispersion of industry observed since the late 
1800s, starting with suburbanisation and leading to internationalisation of 
production.
It is not plant size per se that is correlated with location within the city, but 
routinization. Location is related to plant size only insofar as plant size is 
related to standardization (the more standardized is production, the greater 
plant size, as shown in Scott, 1988a). Certainly, the overwhelming tendency in 
production is toward routinization wherever possible, even in cases where there 
is greater apparent flexibility in the form of widening product range or product 
options.
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Again it is important to differentiate between industries which are characterised 
by ongoing innovation, irregular and unpredictable demand, infinite product 
ranges, short production runs, and those which are characterised by a degree of 
standardization, bounded flexibility, and predictable volumes. Re­
agglomeration in urban centres is more likely in the former case than in the 
latter. Urban re-agglomeration in the Los Angeles motion picture industry, for 
example, had to do with the introduction of legislation that broke up a 
monopolistic market. The motion picture would fall into the category of 
“innovation industry”, in the sense that every product (every film) is by 
definition different and requires reorganising a new production process from 
scratch.
Another important factor in the motion picture industry was the introduction of 
computer technology into production processes, such as sound and video 
editing, animation, etc. This substantially reduced the minimum efficient scale 
of operation required in these sectors, fragmenting the industry and creating a 
competitive situation amongst multiple firms in the same production phase, 
much the same as has been seen in the case studies of the Third Italy. The 
reduction in minimum production scale and fragmentation of the production 
process also contributed to the urban re-agglomeration. Small firms are more 
dependent upon geographical clustering, and the access to information, 
external support services, etc. that is associated with clustering in urban areas. 
They are also likely willing to pay higher central city unit land costs for this 
reason.
This relates to the point made earlier about the effect of declining production 
scale in the urban hierarchy, that is that it allows smaller urban centres to 
accommodate industry. There is a relationship between the urban hierarchy 
level and the intra-urban level, to the extent that at a certain point, volumes or 
routinization become so high that they quit the urban area altogether, and move 
to a distant, low cost location.
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Of course the potential for urban re-agglomeration relates to other contingent 
factors too, such as the availability of labour with appropriate characteristics in 
a particular urban areas, or the local urban land market and urban/suburban 
price differentials, and so on. Certainly, the point made earlier regarding the 
new emphasis on local uneven development would support the idea that there 
is a potential for such urban re-agglomeration especially, perhaps, given that it 
is often within larger urban areas and metropolises that the most extreme cases 
of uneven development exist, including devaluation of central city land and 
availability of cheap immigrant labour.
Intra-district patterns
The dynamics of intra-district spatial patterns are almost completely ignored in 
the literature. Scott (1988a) is one of the few to have examined the internal 
spatial structure of the industrial district or "complex”. Two specific aspects 
of intra-regional district organisation have been noted: 1) that there are 
systematic technological differences between core locations and fringe 
locations, and 2) that there are different patterns based on firm size.
Based on evidence from the New York City garment district, Scott (1988a) 
notes that high quality, highly skilled, flexible forms of manufacturing took 
place in the central core, while more routinized, low-skilled, lower-quality 
manufacturing functions occurred in the urban periphery. There is evidence of 
a similar tendency in the Third Italy case studies, where knitwear networks 
would extend into more distant, lower cost locations for more standardized, 
lower-cost functions. This would also support the general claim that 
clustering is related to lack of routinization. In other words, inability to 
routinize explains the need for clustering, while the degree of routinization can 
help to explain spatial patterns within clusters.
Within the Orange County high technology complex, spatial patterns related to 
firm size were also observed. Small plants had an especially strong tendency
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to cluster together compared to large plants. This was attributed to the higher 
unit transactions costs faced by small plants compared to large (i.e. small firms 
do not benefit from bulk transportation rates). Also, small firms were seen as 
more labour-intensive, so there was an inducement to gravitate toward the 
spatial centre of their main areas of labour supply. Large plants enjoyed 
economies of scale as a result of their higher levels of transactional activity, 
thus they were less locationally restrained than small plants. Also, large plants 
often required larger premises, which suggested lower-cost, peripheral 
locations. Scott suggests that "...any large industrial complex will almost 
certainly exhibit distinctive patterns of internal locational differentiation. These 
patterns will be likely at a minimum to consist of (a) a spatially dominant 
network of small plants in selected central areas of the complex, overlain by (b) 
a more dispersed distribution of large plants, the latter becoming dominant in 
peripheral zones" (1988a: 197).
Scott is attempting to draw generalised or necessary relations from the Orange 
County case, both in terms of the intra-district patterns observed, and in the 
explanation for them. He calls upon a transactions costs explanation, to ascribe 
necessary relations to intra-district spatial patterns. The evidence of the case 
studies presented herein challenges both of these aspects.
First, the intra-district patterns observed are opposite from those described by 
Scott for Orange County. The case madri (which tend to be the large firms) 
generally exhibited a pattern of centralisation in the major urban centre, while 
the smaller, network firms, although they were present within the core city, 
tended also to be scattered throughout the surrounding areas. Especially in the 
knitwear and oleodynamics districts did the case madri cluster very closely 
together. Aside from the fact that these lead firms share use of the network 
firms which are scattered around, the clustering of large firms may also be 
related to their competitive relationship. Proximity allows them to monitor 
each others products, innovations and advancements through informal
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mechanisms. The lead firms also have very close connections with service 
firms (graphics support, advertising, marketing, etc.), which are more likely to 
be found in the urban locations.
Extending the earlier analysis of this chapter, it can be suggested that this 
pattern is not the result of any necessary dynamic relating to transaction costs 
or access to labour markets. As we saw above, intra-district patterns are better 
explained in terms of factors such as:
• degrees of routiniaation in production;
• variations in value-added by production phase or product line;
• competition between firms within the district;
• the competitive strategies of lead firms within the district, their competitive
position and the particular basis of their insertion into the marketplace,
which affects their use of space and territory;39
• the exploitation of aspects of local uneven development toward the firm's 
competitive ends or to meet industry contingencies.
In the case of Emilia-Romagna, elements of local uneven development included 
spatial variations in labour force characteristics; a polycentric urban system; or 
the relatively even distribution of sub-contractor/artisan firms over regional 
space (which permits lead firms the ability to select firms that are localised but 
spatially disaggregated).
Based on this evidence, it could also be proposed that the major dimension of 
the core-periphery relationship no longer occurs at the international scale, 
between regions, but instead at the local level, between city and urban 
periphery or hinterland. There is a dominance/dependence relationship 
associated with the patterns of territorial industrial organisation described 
above, in which urban centres control their surrounding regions.
For example, Carma’s weak m arket position caused it to construct a network which segregated sub-contractors, allowing it to 
price so as to pass on costs of diseconomies of scale.
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A Territorial Reversal
In the advanced industrial nations, the so-called “clean break”, a dramatic 
reversal of territorial patterns, has been noted to have been underway since 
about 1970. As noted in Chapter One, the emerging pattern of urbanisation is 
observed to be moving downwards, from larger to smaller urban centres; 
outwards, from metropolitan cores to rings, and from metropolitan areas to 
non-metropolitan areas; and across, from older industrialised areas to new 
industrial spaces (Hall and Hay, 1980).
These patterns are most pronounced in the U.S., and Great Britain, while the 
rest of Europe is seen to be still tending toward overall toward metropolitan 
concentration, but less strongly than prior to 1970. The explanation offered for 
the clean break was the inevitable evolution as city-systems mature from a 
primate structure to a rank-size distribution. The lag experienced in parts of 
Europe was attributed to the fact that industrialisation and urbanisation 
proceed together in predictable, sequential phases, and that as parts of Europe 
were late industrialisers, they are also late urbanisers (Hall and Hay, 1980).
By and large, the evidence presented herein corroborates a clean break and 
patterns such as the downwards shift in the urban hierarchy, and the potential 
for movements outwards and across. Also noted above, however, is the 
potential for counter-movements, e.g. inwards, as a result of urban re- 
agglomeration, depending on the logic of post-Fordist accumulation in 
particular industries and places. However, the framework presented in this 
thesis suggests a different interpretation to the clean break; that it is associated 
with the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that the continuous path 
along which industrialisation and urbanisation are together proceeding may 
well be pre-empted, as transformations in the organisation of industrial 
capitalism bring about a dramatic restructuring of urban and regional territory.
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5. THE REORGANISATION TO POST-FORDIST TERRITORY
This thesis has attempted address the question of the relationship between post- 
Fordism and uneven development, in particular its impacts on cities and 
regions. This is an area that has been unexplored in the literature, despite the 
centrality of geography and agglomeration to arguments about post-Fordism.
In a nutshell, it has been argued that the pattern of cities and regions that has 
been evolving relatively smoothly since the beginning of the industrial era is 
currently undergoing a dramatic reorganisation, as a result of a new logic of 
post-Fordist capital accumulation. New patterns of uneven development are 
being forged.
Patterns of urban and regional development have been persuasively tied to 
industrial capitalism throughout the course of its evolution. It is generally 
acknowledged that industrialisation was the dominant force shaping the rise of 
the “great cities” and the metropolis, and the ongoing process of urbanisation 
(Mumford, 1961; Weber, 1899).
The dramatic economic upheavals that have been witnessed in the advanced 
industrial nations are associated with a transition from the Fordist regime of 
accumulation to a post-Fordist regime. The characteristics of this regime are 
still being debated and refined, but in general one can say that post-Fordism is 
the anti-thesis of Fordism - product range replaces product standardization, 
flexible production machinery replaces dedicated equipment, etc. - though in 
reality neither form is as pure as the textbook case. In the case of post-Fordism 
this is particularly true with respect to allegations of a worker’s utopia, and the 
centrality of flexibility. Industrial districts are further evidence of post- 
Fordism. Their recent “resurgence” can be explained by the interaction of 
necessary forces of post-Fordist accumulation (in particular that globalisation 
of trade, capital, and competition have brought about an increasingly 
articulated global division of labour which results in respecialisation) and
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contingent factors (especially those related to specific industry, firm or local 
conditions). Indeed, local geography is shown to play an integral role in 
determining the organisation of production.
The three case study districts (Carpi knitwear, Modena oleodynamics, and 
Bologna automatic packaging machinery) are all fundamentally of the same 
type. The key characteristic is the constant and frequent invention and 
reinvention of the product, resulting in a literally infinite product range, small 
batch sizes, and an inability to routinize production functions or transactions 
between firms. It is this characteristic that accounts for spatial clustering that 
is exhibited by the localised “innovation district”. Clustering is further 
reinforced by a shared local culture, norms, practices and trust, which serve to 
“standardise” otherwise irregular transactions, allow them to take place quickly 
and easily.
The innovation district may be distinguished from other species of district (e.g. 
the technology district) as well as from other “flexible” forms of post-Fordism 
such as flexible mass production. Routinization of products, components and 
transactions is still possible (and indeed necessary) in mass production 
industries, and as such, they tend to have different spatial patterns than those 
exhibited by the innovation district. Their spatial patterns are nonetheless also 
the result of interaction with industry, firm, and local contingencies.
From this analysis, certain specific implications can be drawn with respect to 
uneven development at a variety of scales including regions, the urban system, 
and intra-district space. Regions in the Fordist or new international division of 
labour sense are not the key economic units. The division of labour extends 
from the global to beyond the regional level to the sub-regional or city level. 
Core-periphery inter-regional relationships are replaced with relationships of 
direct competition in the global marketplace between different local regions and 
cities. Uneven development occurs at this lower geographic scale (i.e. between
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regions, not Regions) and on the basis of industry sectors, not functions. 
Integration with the market becomes a key locational factor for production.
At the same time, as a result of respecialization and declining minimum efficient 
scales of production, a whole new realm of productive possibilities is opened 
up for smaller cities and towns, and even a potential reagglomeration in central 
cities. At this point this is a seemingly unimaginable possibility, given the 
universal entrenchment of the vision of central city decline and 
deindustrialisation that we have been living in for the last two decades or so. 
Uneven development is further expressed in intra-district differentiation, which 
proceeds based on a number of factors, chief amongst them competitive 
strategies of lead firms, and degrees of routinization in production.
In short, extrapolating from the case studies leads one to suggest that post- 
Fordism is associated with a potential reversal of most key urbanization 
patterns seen in the last 150 years or so. This contributes to an explanation of 
the “clean break” in urbanization patterns observed since 1970 in the US and 
European countries.
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APPENDIX I
QUESTIONNAIRE OUTLINE
1. BACKGROUND
a. When was this establishment/firm founded? How did it come about? How 
did the founders develop expertise in this industry?
b. How many employees are there in this establishment/firm?
c. What is your main product(s) or main stages of production? Please 
describe.
d. Is this a single, independent, owner-operated establishment? If branch 
plants or other locations, where are they located and what functions do 
they perform?
e. What were your last annual revenues?
f. What are your main markets and/or clients? What share of sales is regional, 
national and exported?
g. How did this establishment come to be located in this particular location?
2. THE PRODUCT AND CLIENTS
a. Are products produced speculatively or by special order (or both)?
b. Who do your produce for (e.g. directly for the final market, other 
manufacturing companies, wholesalers)? What types of firms are they (e.g. 
what industry)? Where are they located (% local, % regional, % national, 
% international)?
c. How many clients do you produce for in a year? Last year?
d. What share of sales is accounted for by the top three clients?
e. Do you tend to work consistently for the same clients, or do they change 
frequently?
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3. FLEXIBILITY
a. How many different products do you produce on average, in a year, e.g. 
last year? Is this an increase or decrease over previous years?
b. What is the average lot size? The range of lot sizes?
c. How frequently does the production process change? Is there much 
variability in the type of work undertaken in this establishment?
d. Does the unit cost vary with lot size? How?
4 . PRODUCTION IN THE NETWORK
For case madri:
a. What are the main stages of production for your most typical product 
(including any R&D, design, marketing, etc.)?
b. Which stages are undertaken within this establishment and which 
externally?
c. How many establishments in total are involved in production? How many 
of these do you deal with directly in the coordination of production?
d. How many other establishments would be involved in the production of a 
single, typical product?
e. Are these firms specialised by phase? If not, how are the different stages of 
production distributed amongst the other firms, i.e. how many firms per 
stage, and how many stages per firm?
f. Where are these firms located? Local vs. regional (Third Italy) vs. national 
vs. abroad.
g. Within this firm, who coordinates production? How is it coordinated? Are 
computers used? In what ways?
h. What kinds of arrangements or agreements exist between this establishment 
and other firms involved in production (e.g. direct ownership, short or long 
term contracts, or is each piece of work negotiated separately)?
i. Do other establishments in the network have direct links with each other or 
only through a central coordinator (e.g. with respect to transfer of 
materials, information, intermediate goods, etc.)?
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j. How often does the production process change? Does each different 
product or order require organising a new network for production? Does 
the process inside the establishment change with each new order or 
product?
k. How do you decide which firms to use for any given piece of work?
1. Do any firms in the network work exclusively for you?
For network firms:
m. Do you work only for other firms, or do you also have your own products? 
If own products, are they produced entirely internally? If not, what other 
firms are used and for what functions?
n. How many firms do you work for in a year? What type of firms are they? 
What industries do they represent? Where are they located (% local, 
regional, national and international)? What share of annual revenues are 
attributable to the biggest client? To the second biggest client? To the third 
biggest client?
o. Do you tend to work consistently for the same firms, or do they change 
frequently?
p. What kinds of arrangements or agreements exist between this establishment 
and your clients?
q. Do you ever sub-contract work out to other firms? To homeworkers? If 
so, where are they located? What phases of production do these firms 
perform? What types of agreements do you have with them?
r. Who in this firm is responsible for co-ordinating production internally and 
externally?
s. Do you ever have direct links with other sub-contracting firms in the 
production of a given order?
t. Is there ever a flow of information from this establishment to the casa 
madre (e.g. regarding production processes, design suggestions, etc.)?
5. TECHNOLOGY
a. What kinds of production machinery do you have within this establishment 
(i.e. dedicated or multi-purpose equipment)? How many of each type of 
machine? Are any machines computer-controlled or programmable? When 
did you acquire the equipment?
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b. If there is computer-controlled equipment, has it changed the production 
process? How? (e.g. further division or recomposition of tasks, number or 
type of workers required, sequence of tasks, etc.)
c. Who is involved in making decisions about the types of machinery used in 
this establishment?
d. Are computers used in R&D? Production? Management? Administration? 
Are there direct computer linkages between these areas? Are there any 
direct computer linkages between firms in the production network?
6 . LABOUR PROCESS
a. What are the different types of workers in this establishment and what are 
their main tasks?
b. What skills does each type of worker require?
c. How many pay-scales are there in this establishment?
d. Is each worker assigned a specific, narrowly-defined task or is there fluidity 
or movement between tasks? Would, for example, a production worker 
also have input into design, development, or decisions about the production 
process?
e. What is the level of unionisation?
f. What is the supervisory structure?
7 . MANAGEMENT
a. What is the management structure of this firm (i.e. how many managers, 
division of responsibilities, reporting structure, etc.)?
b. Is this firm managed entirely internally or do management directives and 
decisions also come from outside the firm (e.g. from a parent company or 
casa madre)?
c. For network firms: Is there any consultation with clients on the 
production process, techniques, materials, etc.? If so, how does it take 
place and on what subjects?
d. Does this firm have any management control over other firms in the 
network? Over what things and how? Over what kinds of firms?
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e. Who in this establishment makes decisions about what specific products 
will be produced and how they will be produced, which orders to accept, 
(i.e. process of production, technology, labour requirements, internal vs. 
external production, etc.)?
f. Who takes part in decisions about investment?
g. Do the firms in the network have any input into these decisions about what 
is produced and how (i.e. what products, process, labour, technology)? If 
so, on what specific matters and through what mechanisms (e.g. informal 
talks, regularly scheduled meetings, etc.)?
h. Is the productive process supervised? What is the supervisory structure?
i. Is all administration undertaken internally? If not, which functions are 
undertaken elsewhere and by whom or what agencies? Where are they 
located?
j. Are outside sources used for advice, information, financial assistance, etc.? 
If so, for what purposes and what types of assistance?
8. GENERAL
a. Has the product or production process changed over the past 20 years? 
What were the major changes and why did they come about (e.g. with 
respect to division of labour, technology, internal vs. external production, 
number and types of workers, skills required, etc.)?
b. Are you able to keep the level of production relatively stable on a daily, 
seasonal, or annual basis? If not, how do you cope with fluctuations?
c. What are the major problems faced by this establishment today?
d. Why has the firm succeeded so far?
e. What would you like this establishment to be like in ten years’ time?
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APPEND IX 2
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
CARMA CASE STUDY
• Carma S.p.a.
Dott. Morelli - Director of Administration 
May 5 and May 30, 1988
• Corazzari e Bruschi 
Sig. Bruschi - owner 
May 30, 1988
• Confezione Fanny
- co-managers 
May 20, 1988
• Luciana Ricami
- owners 
May 23, 1988
• Tosatti eBacci
Sig.ri Tosatti e Bacci - owners 
May 23, 1988
• Union - Camera del Lavoro di Carpi - FILTEA 
Sig. Artioli
June 2, 1988
• Dott. Pagliani
Associazione Imprese Abbigliamento, Carpi 
April 20, 1988
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OIL CONTROL CASE STUDY
• Oil Control
Sig. Storci, owner and Ing. Ferrari, Director of Production 
July 1, 1988
• Edi-Systems
Sig.ra Acerbi - manager/partner 
July 11, 1988
• TARP
Sig.ri Venturelli - owners 
July 8, 1988
• RGP
Sig. Benedetti - owner/manager 
July 13, 1988
• Union Representatives- FLM
Sig. Girotti and Sig. A. Scarmani (Oil Control union delegate) 
Camera del Lavoro di Nonantola 
July 13, 1988
IMA CASE STUDY
• IMA S.p.a.
Sig. Leoncourti, VP, Director-General, July 13, 1988
Sig. Miselli, Director of Production and Technical Office, June 15, 1988
• Andalo
Sig. Andalo- owner 
June 27, 1988
• Ramazza
Sig. Ramazza - owner 
June 30, 1988
• Meccanica Sarti
Sig. Sarti - owner/manager 
June 27, 1988
• Vignoli-Roda
Sig. Vignoli - owner 
July 5, 1988
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